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iAbstract
Digital Watermarking Methods for
Data Security and Authentication
Mary Lynne Hallot
PhD Thesis,
Department of Computer Science,
University of the Western Cape.
Throughout history people have tried to develop methods to secure the exchange of infor-
mation. Due to the influence of the information technology revolution, protecting data of
different types has become as essential requirement. The technological innovations of the
military are responsible for a wide range of industrial and commercial advances and the
implementation of the protocols and procedures associated with military data processing
algorithms have influenced certain industry standards that are constantly being scrutinized
and improved upon. Different standards have been developed for particular market sectors.
For example, DES (Data Encryption Standard) was originally developed in the early 1970s
and, in 1976, was selected by the Federal Information Processing Standard for use in the
USA. Since that time, DES has had widespread use internationally and was upgraded to
triple DES or DES3 in the 1990s (essentially, but not literally, a triple encryption version of
DES in order to compensate for the relatively low key length associated with the original
DES).
Specialized areas of information security are in confidentiality, data integrity, access con-
trol, identification, authentication and authorization. The implementation associated with
these areas depend on the situation and requirement specifications. The design of new
approaches, methodology and analysis of the strengths and weaknesses associated with a
practical implementation are similar to the development of cryptographic algorithms. Pri-
vate messaging (encrypting email attachments, for example) information security measures,
financial transactions and a host of online services in information protection use specific
mathematical techniques and the design of computational methods exclusive to the study of
cryptography.
Cryptology is the study of systems that typically originate from a consideration of the
ideal circumstances under which secure information exchange is to take place. It involves the
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study of cryptographic and other processes that might be introduced for breaking the output
of such systems - cryptanalysis. This includes the introduction of formal mathematical
methods for the design of a cryptosystem and for estimating its theoretical level of security.
A point of note is that the mathematical strength of a cryptographic algorithm is a necessary
but not a sufficient requirement for a system to be acceptably secure. In the ideal case, the
cryptographic strength of an algorithm and/or implementation method can be checked by
means of proving its resistance to various kinds of known attacks. However, in practice,
this does not mean that the algorithm and/or its specific application is secure because other
unknown attacks may exist. For this reason, the security of a cryptosystem is often based on
knowledge of its working legacy and the confidence level that a community has acquired from
its continual use over many years often due to various up-grades, additions and modifications
as have been considered necessary. Thus, modern systems for securing information exchange
are often based to a large degree on past legacies associated with the performance of relatively
well established techniques.
Whatever the type, strength and historical legacy of a cryptosystem, all such system
suffer from the same fundamental problem. The fact that the data has been encrypted
and is thus, not readable in the usual sense of the word, alerts a potential attacker to the
fact that the information must be of value to have been encrypted in the first place. In
other words, the act of encrypting information ‘raises a flag’ to the fact that the information
has value. This fact can of course be used in the propagation of disinformation whereby
the attacker is encouraged to decrypt an encrypted message so that the decrypt is acted
upon by the attacker. However, while providing an approach that can provide a strategic
advantage, this does not provide a solution to the basic problem of a ciphertext ‘giving
the game away’. A principal solution to this problem is to ‘hide’ the plaintext and/or the
ciphertext in data that appears to be ‘innocent’ and unobtrusive and does not, by the very
nature of its non-compliance with a cipherext, trigger an attack. This can be accomplished
by embedding the ciphertext in images, for example. Another approach is to try a camouflage
the ciphertext in noise such as in transmission noise, especially when the transmission noise
is characteristic of the transmission environment through which a message is to sent. These
approaches to ‘hiding’ information are concerned with the art of Steganography such as
digital watermarking, for example.
In this thesis, although a background to encryption methods are presented, the focus
of the research has been on steganography and in particular, the use of steganographic
techniques for document security. The complexity in replicating digital media which has
quality has necessitated novel techniques to restrain the forbidden reproduction, forgery and
dissemination of digital data. We deem an embedding process to expose the process using
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Independent Component Analysis (ICA) and presents a method that demonstrates how ICA
can be used to detect forged documents. We show how robust digital watermarks used for
copyright protection can be explained as undetectable information concealed in a digital
media. This information is measurable as long as the quality of the content is considered
as being acceptable. Despite many algorithms, methods, techniques and fully functional
systems being used to hide information, the main dilemma is that the bulk of these methods
use a symmetric key. The key becomes the‘weakest link. In order to decipher or decode
the hidden data it is necessary to know the secret key. Once the secret key is known,
the watermark can not only be decoded, but also easily estimated and removed from the
content. In such a state of affairs, a decoder used for copy protection has to be either put
into operation as a tamper-proof device, or located in a trusted third party. These solutions
are expensive and not necessarily plausible. We used ICA to separate our 2D DataGlyph
from the watermark itself. Of interest is the fact that the 2D DataGlyph plays the role of
a watermark and is created to mislead the attacker who would try to crack the watermark
typically as a watermark is normally broken. This is done in the view that an attacker, not
realizing that a different element had been introduced, will be foiled.
We embedded a 2D Dataglyph as a watermark signature into a watermark. In case of
symmetric watermarks, the management of the keys is another challenge. This problem is
rectified by ensuring that a watermarker implements the key and only they alone know the
key. The 2D DataGlyph has its own key, whist the image maker has the original image. Each
are separate and not shared amongst the others. The chances of all three keys being found
are then minimal. Within these parameters we used ICA to see if it is possible to break
the watermark. The ICA technique extracts linearly independent distinctive parts from
a data-set. Unlike decorrelating data methods, ICA searches for directions in data-space
which are independent across all statistical orders. It is capable of finding the underlying
factors or sources when classic methods fail completely. The approach reported here has the
advantage of including a learning probabilistic model (as opposed to projections in data-
space), while remaining computationally efficient in high dimensions. A number of methods
are explored with regard to this focus including, diffusion of information with noise and the
use of DataGlyphs for the copy protection of documents. Moreover, we explore methods that
can be used for both audio and image data and, in the latter case, consider both electronic
image watermarking and similar techniques that can be applied to hardcopy images to secure
paper-based documents with regard to authentication and anti-counterfeiting measures.
June, 2008
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Notation and Glossary of Terms
Mathematical Notation
Alphabetic
a Step length
A Resultant step length
A(t) Amplitude modulation (amplitude envelope)
A(ω) Amplitude spectrum
chirp(t) Unit chirp function [with complex form exp(−iαt2)]
D Diffusivity
DF Fractal Dimension
DT Topological Dimension
E Entropy
f(t) Real or complex function - typically a system input
| f | modulus of real or complex function f
‖f(t)‖ Norm (e.g. a Euclidean norm) of a function f(t)
‖f(t)‖∞ Uniform norm - maximum value of f(t)
G(r | r0, t | t0) Time depedndent Green’s function
g(r | r0, ω) Time independent Green’s function
H Hurst exponent or dimension
H(t) Tophat function
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k Wavenumber (= 2pi/λ)
n(t) Noise function
N(k) Noise spectrum
ni Discrete noise function
Ni Discrete Noise spectrum
p(t) Impulse Response Function
pi Discrete Impulse Response Function
P (ω) Transfer Function (Fourier transform of p(t))
Pi Discrete Transfer Function (DFT of pi
P (x) Probability density function also denoted by Pr[x(t)]
P (ω) Power spectrum (=| F (ω) |2) where F (ω) is the
Fourier transform of f(t)
Pi Discrete power spectrum
Pr(x) Probability occurrence of x
q Fourier dimension
s(t) Real or complex signal
si Discrete real or complex signal
sgn(t) Sign function
sinc(t) Sinc function (= sin(t)/t)
t Time
u(r, t) Field solution to a partial differential equation
u0 u(r, t) at t = 0
∈ In (e.g. x ∈ [a, b) is equivalent to a ≤ x < b)
∀ Forall (e.g. f(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ (a, b])
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Greek
α Chirping parameter
Γ(q) Gamma function
δ(t) Dirac delta function
δn n-dimensional delta function
θ(t) Instantaneous phase
λ Wavelength or scale length
σ coeeficient of diffusion D−1
or standard deviation
ω Angular frequency
Ω Bandwidth of a spectrum
Operators
Dˆq Fractional differential operator
Fˆ1 One dimensional Fourier transform
Fˆ−11 One dimensional inverse Fourier transform
Fˆn n-dimensional Fourier transform
Fˆ−1n n-dimensional inverse Fourier transform
Hˆ Hilbert transform operator
Iˆq Fractional integral operator (e.g. Riemann-Liouville fractional integral)
Wˆ Wavelet transform
Wˆ−1 Inverse wavelet transform
⊗ Convolution operation (continuous or discrete and causal or otherwise,
depending on the context specified)
 Correlation operation (continuous or discrete and causal or otherwise,
depending on the context specified)
⊗⊗ two-dimensional convolution
⊗r convlution over r
⊗t convolution over t
⇐⇒ Transformation into Fourier space
←→ Transformation into some transform space (as defined)
Terms
Mathematical and Statistical
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DFT Discrete Fourier Transform
FFT Fast Fourier Transform
FIR Finite Impulse Response
FM Frequency Modulation or
Fractal Modulation
FIR Finite Impulse Response
GUI Graphical User Interface
IRF Impulse Response Function
IV Initialization Vector
PDE Partial Differential Equation
PDF Probability Distribution or Density Function
PSDF Power Spectral Distribution or Density Function
PSF Point Spread Function
RSRA ReScaled Range Analysis
Computer Science
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
BIN Binary
CCD Charge Couple Device
CHAR Character
DEC Decimal
ICT Information and Communications Technology
I/O Input/Output
MOD Modular
PCNG Pseudo Chaotic Number Generator
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
XOR Bit addition
USB Universal Serial Bus
Organizational and Standards
 
 
 
 
xAES Advanced Encryption Standard
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
DES Digital Encryption Standard
DES3 Triple DES
GCHQ Government Communications Head Quarters
JPEG Joint Photographic Expert Group
NDA Non Diclosure Agreement
OTP One-Time Pad
PIN Personal Identity Number
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RIP Regulation of Investigatory Powers
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
Terms Specific to Cryptology
Asymmetric Encryption
A cryptosystem in which encryption and decryption are performed using two different keys,
one of which is referred to as the public key and the other as a private key. Also known as
public key encryption.
Authentication
A process used to verify the integrity of transmitted data, especially a message.
Block Cipher
A symmetric encryption algorithm in which a large block of plaintext bits is transformed as
a whole into a ciphertext block of the same length.
Cipher
An algorithm or data used for encryption and decryption. A cipher is that data which is
used to replace a piece of information (an element in plaintext) with another object, with the
intent of concealling its meaning. Typically, the replacement rule is governed by a secret key.
Ciphertext
The output of an encryption algorithm; the encrypted form of message data.
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Code
A procedure for replacing a piece of information (e.g. letter, word, phrase) with another
object, not necessarily of the same sort. Generally, there is no intent to conceal meaning.
Examples include the 7-bit ASCII character code (each character is represented by 7 bits)
and frequency-shift keying (each binary value is represented by a particular frequency).
Confusion
A cryptographic technique that seeks to make the relationship between the plaintext and
the ciphertext as complex as possible. This is achieved by the use of a complex scrambling
algorithm that depends on a key and the input with the aim of maximising the Entropy of
the ciphertext.
Covertext
The output associated with the application of a steganographic technique.
Cryptanalysis
The branch of cryptology dealing with the breaking of a cipher to recover information, or
forging encrypted information that will be accepted as authentic.
Cryptography
The branch of cryptology dealing with the design of algorithms for encryption and decryp-
tion, intended to ensure the secrecy and authenticity of messages.
Cryptology
The study of secure communications which encompasses both cryptography and cryptanaly-
sis.
Cryptosystem
Any system that is concerned with the encryption and decryption of information.
Decryption
The translation of encrypted text or data (called ciphertext) into original text or data (called
plaintext). Also called deciphering.
Differential Cryptanalysis
A technique in which chosen plaintexts with particular operational difference patterns are
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encrypted. The difference patterns of the resulting ciphertext provide information that can
be used to determine the encryption key.
Diffusion
A cryptographic technique that seeks to obscure the statistical characteristics of the plaintext
by spreading out the influence of each individual plaintext elements over many ciphertext
elements.
Digital Signature
An authentication mechanism that enables the creator of a message to attach a code which
acts as a signature. The signature guarantees the source and integrity of the message.
Encryption
The conversion of plaintext or data into an unintelligible form by means of a public (or
private) algorithm from which the plaintext can be recovered by decryption. Also called
enciphering.
Hash Function
A function that maps a variable length data block or message into a fixed length value called
a hash code. The function is designed in such a way that, when protected, it provides an
authenticator for the data or message. Also referred to as a message digest.
Initialisation Vector (IV)
A random block of data that is used to begin the encryption of multiple blocks of plaintext,
when a block-chaining encryption technique is used. The IV serves to foil known-plaintext
attacks.
One-Way Function
A function that is easily computed, but where the calculation of its inverse is not feasible.
Plaintext
The input to an encryption function or the output to a decryption function.
Private Key
One of the two keys used in an asymmetric encryption system. For secure communication,
the private key should only be known to its user.
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Pseudo Chaotic Number Generator (PCNG)
A function that deterministically produces a sequence of numbers that are apparently chaotic.
Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
A function that deterministically produces a sequence of numbers that are apparently ran-
dom.
Public Key
One of the two keys used in an asymmetric encryption system. The public key is made
public and is used in conjunction with a corresponding private key.
Secret Key
The key is used in a symmetric encryption system. Both participants must share the same
key, this key must remain secret to protect the communication.
Steganography
The technique associated with the hiding encrypted data in host data.
Stegotext The host data used to hide plaintext and/or ciphertext.
Stream Cipher
A symmetric encryption algorithm in which ciphertext output is produced bit-by-bit or byte-
by-byte from a stream of plaintext input.
Symmetric Encryption
A cryptosystem in which encryption and decryption are performed using the same key. Also
known as conventional encryption.
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Chapter 1
Background to the Research Thesis
1.1 Introduction
In this thesis we concentrate on the functionality of watermarking and steganography and
present how these cases in history have used applications that can surrender new technologies
for secure information exchange invalid. Where we diverge in our line of attack is that cryp-
tography and watermarking techniques just keep repeating the same mistakes. This Chapter
discusses the various historical accounts encountered, the pitfalls, the patterns which emerge
and their weak points. We illustrate what should have been done to secure the information
henceforth. In Section 1.2, we discuss the history surrounding the area of investigation.
Section 1.3 is based on Knowledge Management whereby we give a detailed discussion of
how information is managed and protected and the pitfalls thereof. We discuss the issue
of Privacy and the use of Disinformation and how it is disseminated, illustrating some of
the managerial problems associated with Obfuscation for example. Section 1.4 explains the
basic concepts where we illustrate the fundamental premises through which some of the
theoretical ideas are based. In this chapter steganographic encryption is discussed together
with the processes and methods which are explained in context of the main consensus of our
thinking from Symmetric Encryption to Cryptanalysis. Finally in Section 1.8, we explain
the unique contributions of Steganography in terms of some of the historical achievements
and the improvements to be initiated.
1.2 Information and Communications Security
The quest for inventing innovative techniques which allow only authorized users to transfer
information that is impervious to attack by others has, and continues to be, an essential
2
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH THESIS 3
requirement in the communications industry. This requirement is based on the importance
of keeping certain information secure, obvious examples being military communications and
financial transactions, the former example being a common theme in the history and devel-
opment of cryptology [1].
The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) revolution associated with the
latter part of the Twentieth Century has brought about a number of significant changes in the
way we operate on a routine basis. One of the most significant of these changes is the impact
ICT has had upon basic human activities such as decision making, information processing and
knowledge management. Business communities and government organisations rely heavily
on exchanging, sharing and processing information to assist them in making a variety of
strategic decisions and a wide range of security infrastructures have been established to help
protect and preserve the integrity of information flowing across different channels.
At a government level, knowledge of public opinion allows politicians to react rapidly in
their policies or programmes (at least in those cases where the infrastructure of society is
based on democratic principles). In the commercial sector, ‘know how’ contributes consid-
erably to company market value because information is a primary competitive advantage.
Information is now a key factor in decision making for all organisations, whatever their size
and complexity, and is arguably the most important asset of an organisation. The data
transferred between different locations and recipients can therefore become vulnerable to
being intercepted and altered by a capable and interested eavesdropper, and information
exchange through the application of a secure infrastructure has, therefore, become an es-
sential component in all forms of knowledge management. In other words, ‘knowledge is
power’ and since all power must be contained, it is necessary to provide continuous improve-
ments to securing communications in order to maintain parity with the pace and growth of
ICT in general (e.g. [2] - [6]). This thesis focuses on the applications of watermarking and
steganography in cryptology and provides examples of how this application can yield new
technologies for secure information exchange.
1.3 Cryptology
Cryptography is the study of mathematical and computational techniques related to aspects
of information security (e.g. [7]-[9]). The word is derived from the Greek Kryptos, mean-
ing hidden, and is related to disciplines such Cryptanalysis and Cryptology. Cryptanalysis is
the art of breaking cryptosystems by developing techniques for the retrieval of information
from encrypted data [10]. Cryptology is the science that underpins cryptography and crypt-
analysis and can include a broad range of mathematical concepts, computational algorithms
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH THESIS 4
and technologies. In other words, Cryptology is a multi-disciplinary subject that covers a
wide spectrum of different disciplines and increasingly involves using a range of engineering
concepts and technologies through the innovation associated with term ‘technology trans-
fer’. Figure 1.1 shows some example subject areas associated with modern Cryptology [11].
These include areas such as Synergetics, which is an interdisciplinary science explaining the
formation and self-organization of patterns and structures in non-equilibrium open systems
and Semiotics, which is the study of signs and symbols, both individually and grouped in
sign systems including the study of how meaning is constructed and understood.
Cryptology is often concerned with the application of formal mathematical techniques to
design a cryptosystem and to estimate its theoretical security. This can include the use of
formal methods for the design of security software which should ideally be a ‘safety critical
system’ [12]. Although the mathematically defined and provable strength of a cryptographic
algorithm or cryptosystem is necessary, it is not a sufficient requirement for a system to be
acceptably secure. This is because it is difficult to estimate the security of a cryptosystem in
any formal sense when it is implemented in the field under conditions that can not always be
predicted and thus, simulated. The security associated with a cryptosystem can be checked
only by means of proving its resistance to various kinds of known attack that are likely to be
implemented. However, in practice, this does not mean that the system is secure since other
attacks may exist that are not included in simulated or test conditions. The reason for this
is that humans possess a broad range of abilities from unbelievable ineptitude to astonishing
brilliance which can not be formalised in a mathematical sense or on a case by case basis.
The practical realities associated with Cryptology are indicative of the fact that ‘Security
is a process, not a product’ [13]. Whatever the sophistication of the security product (e.g.
the encryption and/or key exchange algorithm(s), for example), unless the user adheres
strictly to the procedures and protocols designed for its use, the ‘product’ can be severely
compromised.
A good example of this is the use of the Enigma [14] cipher by Germany during the
second world war. It was not just the ‘intelligence’ of the ‘code breakers’ at Bletchley Park in
England that allowed the allies to break many of the Enigma codes but the ‘irresponsibility’
and, in many cases, the sheer stupidity of the way in which the system was used by the
German armed and intelligence services at the time. The basic mechanism for the Enigma
cipher, which had been developed as early as 1923 by Artur Schubius for securing financial
transactions, was well known to the allies (thanks to the efforts of the Polish Cipher Office
at Poznan in the 1930s) and the distribution of some 10000 similar machines (with relatively
minor modifications) to the German army, navy and air force was a disaster waiting to
happen. The solution would have been to design a brand new encryption engine or better
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Figure 1.1: Example subject areas that contribute to developments in modern Cryptology
[11].
still, a range of different encryption engines given the technology of the time, and use the
Enigma machine to propagate disinformation. Indeed, some of the new encryption engines
introduced by the Germans towards the end of the Second World War were not broken by the
allies. These historically intriguing insights are easy to contemplate in hindsight, but they
can also help to focus on the methodologies associated with developing new technologies for
knowledge management.
1.4 Knowledge Management
With regard to information security and knowledge management in general, there are some
basic concepts that are easy to grasp and sometimes tend to get lost in the detail. The first of
these is that the recipient of any encrypted message must have some form of a priori knowledge
on the method (the algorithm for example) and the operational conditions (e.g. the key)
used to encrypt a message. Otherwise, the recipient is in no better ‘state of preparation’
than the potential attacker. The conventional approach is to keep this a priori information to
a minimum but in such a way that it is critical to the decryption process. Another important
reality is that in an attack, if the information transmitted is not deciphered in good time,
then it may become redundant. Coupled with the fact that an attack usually has to focus on
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH THESIS 6
a particular criterion (a specific algorithm for example), one way to enhance the security of
a communications channel is to continually change the encryption algorithm and/or process
offered by the technology currently available.
Another approach to knowledge management is to disguise or camouflage the encrypted
message in what would appear to be ‘innocent’ or ‘insignificant’ data such as a digital
photograph of a holiday snap-shot, a music file or both, for example1. This is known as
Steganography [19]-[21]. Further, the information security products themselves should be in-
troduced and ‘organised’ in such a way as to reflect their apparent insignificance in terms of
both public awareness and financial reward. This is of course contrary to the dissemination
of many encryption systems, a process that is commonly perceived as being necessary for
business development through the establishment of a commercial organisation, international
patents, distribution of marketing material, elaborate and sophisticated Web sites, author-
itative statements on the strength of a system to impress customers, publications and so
on. Thus, a relatively simple but often effective way of maintaining security with regard
to the use of an encryption system is to not tell anyone about it. The effect of this can
be enhanced by publishing other systems and products that are designed to mislead the
potential attacker. In this sense, ICT security products should be treated in the same way
as many organisations treat a breach of security, i.e. not to publish the breach in order to
avoid embarrassment and loss of faith by the client base.
1.4.1 Keeping it Quiet
A classic mistake (of historical importance) of not ‘keeping it quiet’, in particular, not
maintaining ‘silent warfare’ [22], was made by Winston Churchill when he published his
analysis of World War I. In his book The World Crisis 1911-1918 published in 1923, he stated
that the British had deciphered the German Naval codes for much of the war as a result of
the Russians salvaging a code book from the small cruiser Magdeburg that had ran aground
off Estonia on August 27, 1914. The code book was passed on to Churchill who was, at the
time, the First Sea Lord. This helped the British maintain their defences with regard to
the German navy before and after the Battle of Jutland in May, 1916. The German navy
became impotent and forced the Germans to turn their attention to unrestricted submarine
warfare. In turn, this led to an event (the sinking on May 7, 1915 of the Lusitania, torpedoed
by a German submarine, the U-20) that galvanized American opinion against Germany and
played a key role in the United States’ later entry into World War I on April 17, 1917 and
the defeat of Germany [23], [24].
1By encoding the encrypted message in the least significant bit or bit-pair of the host data, for example.
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Figure 1.2: A military grade Enigma cipher (left), the three cipher rotors (centre) and
a photograph of Marian Rejewski who invented the Bomba kryptologiczna, the basis for the
deciphering machines constructed at Bletchley Park.
Churchill’s publication did not go un-noticed by the German military between the First
and Second World wars. Consequently significant efforts were made to develop new encryp-
tion devices for military communications. This resulted in the famous Enigma machine,
named after Sir Edward Elgar’s masterpiece, the Enigma Variations [25]. This was an electro-
mechanical machine about the size of a portable typewriter (see Figure 1.2), with a standard
keyboard, three (Figure 1.2) and later, four interchangeable rotors, and a number of plug
connectors. The rotors and plugs offered 200 quintillion permutations. The machine could
be used without difficulty by semi-skilled operators under the most extreme battle condi-
tions. The rotor settings could be changed daily or several times a day according to the
number of messages transmitted, after which the rotors returned to their original setting.
The interest in cryptology by Germany that was undoubtedly stimulated by Churchill’s in-
discretions included establishing a specialist cipher school in Berlin. Ironically, it was at
this School that some of the Polish mathematicians were trained who later worked for the
Polish Cipher Office, opened in utmost secrecy at Poznan in 1930 [26], [27]. In January
1929, the Dean of the Department of Mathematics, Professor Zdzislaw Krygowski from the
University of Poznan, provided a list of his best graduates to start working at this office.
One of these graduates was the brilliant young logician, Marian Rejewski (see Figure 1.2)
who pioneered the design of the Bomba kryptologiczna, an electro-mechanical device used for
eliminating combinations that had not been used to encrypt a message with the Enigma
cipher [28]. However, the design of the Bomba kryptologiczna was only made possible through
the Poles gaining access to the Enigma machine and obtaining knowledge of its mechanism
without alerting the Germans to their activities. In modern terms, this is equivalent to
obtaining information on the type of encryption algorithm used in a cryptosystem.
The Bomba kryptologiczna helped the Poles to decipher some 100,000 Enigma messages
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from as early January 1933 to September 1939 including details associated with the remili-
tarization of the Rhine Province, Anschluss of Austria and seizure of the Sudetenland. It was
Rejewski’s original work that formed the basis for designing the advanced electro-mechanical
and later, the electronic decipher machines (including ‘Colossus’ - the world’s first program-
mable computer) constructed and utilized at Bletchley Park between 1943 and 1945 [29],
[30].
After the Second World War, Winston Churchill made sure that he did not repeat his
mistake, and what he referred to as his ‘Ultra-secret’ - the code breaking activities undertaken
at Station X in Bletchley Park, England - was ordered by him to be closed down and the
technology destroyed soon after the end of the war. Further, Churchill never referred to
his Ultra-secret in any of his publications after the war. Those personnel who worked at
Bletchley Park were required to maintain their silence for some fifty years afterwards and
some of the activities at Bletchley Park remain classified to this day. Bletchley park is now
a museum which includes a reconstruction of ‘Colossus’ (see Figure 1.3) undertaken in the
mid-1990s. However, the type of work undertaken there in the early 1940s continues in many
organisations throughout the world such as the Government Communications Head Quarters
(GCHQ) based at Cheltenham in England [31] where a range of ‘code making’ and ‘code
breaking’ activities continue to be developed.
The historical example given above clearly illustrates the importance of maintaining a
level of secrecy when undertaking cryptographic activities. It also demonstrates the im-
portance of not publishing new algorithms, a principle that is at odds with the academic
community; namely, that the security of a cryptosystem should not depend upon algorithm
secrecy. However, this has to be balanced with regard to the dissemination of information
in order to advance a concept through peer review, national and international collaboration.
Taken to an extreme, the secrecy factor can produce a psychological imbalance that is detri-
mental to progress. Some individuals like to use confidential information to enhance their
status. In business, this often leads to issues over the signing of Non-Disclosure Agreements
or NDAs, for example, leading to delays that are of little value, especially when it turns out
that there is nothing worth disclosing. Thus, the whole issue of ‘keeping it quiet’ has to be
implemented in a way that is balanced, such that confidentiality does not lead to stagnation
in the technical development of a cryptosystem. However, used correctly and through the
appropriate personality, issues over confidentiality coupled with the ‘feel important’ factor
can be used to good effect in the dissemination of disinformation.
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Figure 1.3: The Colossus Mark II computer (left) design by T Flowers at the Post Office
Research Station was first installed at Bletchley Park in June 1944. The machine - which
was, in effect, the worlds first electronic digital computer - was reconstructed at Bletchley
Park in the mid-1990 (right).
1.4.2 Disinformation
Disinformation is used to tempt the enemy into believing certain kinds of information. The
information may not be true or contain aspects that are designed to cause the enemy to
react in an identifiable way that provides a strategic advantage [32], [33]. Camouflage, for
example, is a simple example of disinformation [34]. This includes techniques for transform-
ing encrypted data into forms that resemble the environments through which an encrypted
message is to be sent. At a more sophisticated level, disinformation can include encrypted
messages that are created with the sole purpose of being broken in order to reveal information
that the enemy will react to by design.
Disinformation includes arranging events and processes that are designed to protect
against an enemy acquiring knowledge of a successful encryption technology and/or a suc-
cessful attack strategy. A historically significant example of this involved the Battle of Crete
which began on the morning of 20 May 1941 when Nazi Germany launched an airborne
invasion of Crete under the code-name Unternehmen Merkur (operation mercury) [35]. Dur-
ing the next day, through miscommunication and the failure of Allied commanders to grasp
the situation, the Maleme airfield in western Crete fell to the Germans which enabled them
to fly in heavy reinforcements and overwhelm the Allied forces. This battle was unique in
two respects: it was the first airborne invasion in history 2; it was the first time the Allies
made significant use of their ability to read Enigma codes. The British had known for some
weeks prior to the invasion of Crete that an invasion was likely because of the work being
2Illustrating the potential of paratroopers and so initiating the Allied development of their own airborne
divisions.
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undertaken at Bletchley Park. They faced a problem because of this. If Crete was reinforced
in order to repel the invasion then Germany would suspect that their encrypted communica-
tions were being compromised. But this would also be the case if the British and other Allied
troops stationed on Crete were evacuated. The decision was, therefore, taken by Churchill to
let the German invasion proceed with success but not without giving the invaders a ‘bloody
nose’. Indeed, in light of the heavy casualties suffered by the parachutists, Hitler forbade fur-
ther airborne operations and Crete was dubbed ‘the graveyard of the German parachutists’.
The graveyard for German, British, Greek and Allied soldiers alike was not a product of a
fight over desirable and strategically important territory (at least for the British). It was a
product of the need to secure Churchill’s ‘Ultra-secret’. In other words, the Allied efforts to
repulse the German invasion of Crete was, in reality, a form of disinformation, designed to
secure a secret that was, in the bigger picture, more important than the estimated 16,800
dead and wounded that the battle cost.
1.4.3 Plausible Deniability
Deniable encryption allows an encrypted message to be decrypted in such a way that different
and plausible plaintexts can be obtained using different keys [36]. The idea is to make it
impossible for an attacker to prove the existence of the real message, a message that requires a
specific key. This approach provides the user with a solution to the ‘gun to the head problem’
as it allows the sender to have plausible deniability if compelled to give up the encryption
key. There are a range of different methods that can be designed to implement such a
scheme. For example, a single ciphertext can be generated that is composed of randomised
segments or blocks of data which correlate to blocks of different plaintexts encrypted using
different keys. A further key is then required to assemble the appropriate blocks in order
to generate the desired decrypt. This approach, however, leads to ciphertext files that are
significantly larger than the plaintexts they contain. On the other hand, a ciphertext file
should not necessarily be the same size as the plaintext file and padding out the plaintext
before encryption can be used to increase the Entropy of the ciphertext.
Other methods used for deniable encryption involve establishing a number of abstract
‘layers’ that are decrypted to yield different plainexts for different keys. Some of these
layers are designed to include so-called ‘chaff layers’. These are layers that are composed
of random data which provide the owner of the data to have plausible deniability of the
existence of layers containing the real ciphertext data. The user can store ‘decoy files’ on
one or more layers while denying the existence of others, identifying the existence of chaff
layers as required. The layers are based on file systems that are typically stored in a single
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directory consisting of files with filenames that are either randomized (in the case where
they belong to chaff layers), or are based on strings that identify cryptographic data, the
timestamps of all files being randomized throughout.
1.4.4 Obfuscation
In a standard computing (windows) environment, a simple form of camouflage can be imple-
mented by renaming files to be of a different type; for example, storing an encrypted data
file as a .exe or .dll file. Some cryptosystems output files with identifiable extensions such
as .enc which can then be simply filtered by a firewall. Another example includes renaming
files in order to access data and/or execute an encryption engine. For example, by storing
an executable file as a .dll (dynamic link library) file (which has a similar structure to a .exe
file) in a directory full of real .dll files associated with some complex applications package,
the encryption engine can be obfuscated, especially if it has a name that is similar to the
environment of files in which it is placed. By renaming the file back to its ‘former self’,
execution of cryptosystem can be undertaken in the usual way.
1.4.5 Steganographic Encryption
It is arguable that disinformation should, where possible, be used in conjunction with the
exchange of encrypted information which has been camouflaged using steganographic tech-
niques for hiding the ciphertext. For example, suppose that it had been assumed by Germany
that the Enigma ciphers were being compromised by the British during the Second World
War. Clearly, it would have been strategically advantageous for Germany to propagate dis-
information using Enigma. If, in addition, ‘real information’ had been encrypted differently
and the ciphertexts camouflaged using broadcasts through the German home radio service,
for example, then the outcome of the war could have been very different. The use of new
encryption methods coupled with camouflage and disinformation, all of which are dynamic
processes, provides a model that, while not always of practical value, is strategically com-
prehensive and has only rarely been fully realised. Nevertheless, some of the techniques that
have been developed and are reported in this work are the result of an attempt to realise
this model.
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1.5 Basic Concepts
Irrespective of the wealth of computational techniques that can be invented to encrypt data,
there are some basic concepts that are a common theme in modern cryptography. The
application of these concepts typically involves the use of random number generators and/or
the use of algorithms that originally evolved for the generation of random number streams,
algorithms that are dominated by two fundamental and interrelated themes [4], [5], [6]:
• the use of modular arithmetic;
• the application of prime numbers.
The application of prime numbers is absolutely fundamental to a large range of encryption
processes and international standards such as PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) details of
which are discussed in Chapter 2.
Using a traditional paradigm, we consider the problem of how Alice (A) and Bob (B)
can pass a message to and from each other without it being compromised or ‘attacked’ by
an intercept. As illustrated in Figure 1.4, we consider a simple box and combination lock
scenario. Alice and Bob can write a message, place it in the box, lock the box and then
send it through an open ‘channel’ - the postal services, for example. In cryptography, the
Figure 1.4: Alice and Bob can place a message in a box which can be secured using a
combination lock and sent via a public network - the postal service, for example.
strength of the box is analogous to the strength of the cipher. If the box is ‘weak’ enough
to be opened by brute force, then the strength of the lock is relatively insignificant. This
is analogous to a cipher whose statistical properties are poor, i.e. whose PDF is narrow
and whose information Entropy is relatively low, with a similar value to the plaintext. The
strength of the lock is analogous to the strength of the key in a real cryptographic system.
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This includes the size of the combination number which is equivalent to the length of the
key that is used. Clearly a four rotor combination lock as illustrated in Figure 1.4 represents
a very weak key since the number of ordered combinations required to attempt a brute force
attack to open the lock are relatively low, i.e. for a 4-digit combination lock where each rotor
has ten digits 0-9, the number of possible combinations is 10000 (including 0000). However,
the box-and-lock paradigm being used here is for illustrative purposes only.
1.5.1 Symmetric Encryption
Symmetric encryption is the simplest and most obvious approach to Alice and Bob sending
their messages. Alice and Bob agree on a combination number a priori. Alice writes a message,
puts it in the box, locks it and sends it off. Upon receipt, Bob unlocks the box using the
combination number that has been agreed and recovers the message. Similarly, Bob can
send a message to Alice using exactly the same approach or ‘protocol’. Since this protocol
is exactly the same for Alice and Bob it has a symmetry and thus, encryption methods that
adopt this protocol are referred to as symmetric encryption methods. Given that the box
and the lock have been designed to be strong, the principal weakness associated with this
method is its vulnerability to attack if a third party obtains the combination number at
the point when Alice and Bob invent it and agree upon it. Thus, the principal problem in
symmetric encryption is how Alice and Bob exchange the key. Irrespective of how strong the
cipher and key are, unless the key exchange problem can be solved in an appropriate and a
practicable way, symmetric encryption always suffers from the same fundamental problem -
key exchange!
If E denotes the encryption algorithm that is used which depends upon a key K to
encrypt plaintext P , then we can consider the ciphertext C to be given by
C = EK(P )
Decryption can then be denoted by the equation
P = EK(C)
Note that it is possible to encrypt a number of times using different keys K1, K2, ... with the
same encryption algorithm to give a double encrypted cipher text
C = EK2(EK1(P ))
or a triple encrypted ciphertext
C = EK3(EK2(EK1(P )))
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Decryption, is then undertaken using the same keys in the reverse order to which they have
been applied, i.e.
P = EK1(EK2(EK3(C)))
Symmetric encryption systems, which are also referred to as shared secret systems or
private key systems, are usually significantly easier to use than systems that employ dif-
ferent protocols (such as asymmetric encryption). However, the requirements and methods
associated with key exchange sometimes make symmetric system difficult to use. Examples
of symmetric encryption systems include the Digital Encryption Standard DES and DES3
(essentially, but not literally, the Digital Encryption Standard with triple encryption) and
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Symmetric systems are commonly used in many
banking and other financial institutes and in some military applications. A well known his-
torical example of a symmetric encryption engine, originally designed for securing financial
transactions and later used for military communications was the Enigma used by the German
military during World War II.
1.5.2 Asymmetric Encryption
Instead of Alice and Bob agreeing on a combination number a priori, suppose that Alice sets
her lock to be open with a combination number known only to her. If Bob then wishes to
send Alice a message, he can make a request for her to send him an open lock. Bob can
then write his message, place it in the box which is then locked and sent on to Alice. Alice
can then unlock the box and recover the message using the combination number known only
to her. The point here is that Bob does not need to know the combination number, he
only needs to receive an open lock from Alice. Of course Bob can undertake exactly the
same procedure in order to receive a message from Alice. Clearly, the processes that are
undertaken by Alice and Bob in order to send and receive a single message are not the same.
The protocol is asymmetric and we refer to encryption systems that use this protocol as being
asymmetric. Note that Alice could use this protocol to receive messages from any number
of senders provided they can get access to one of her open locks. This can be achieved by
Alice distributing many such locks as required.
One of the principal weaknesses of this approach relates to the lock being obtained by
a third party whose interest is in sending bogus or disinformation to Alice. The problem
for Alice is to find a way of validating that a message sent from Bob (or anyone else who is
entitled to send messages to her) is genuine, i.e. that the message is authentic. Thus, data
authentication becomes of particular importance when implementing asymmetric encryption
systems.
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Asymmetric encryption relies on both parties having two keys. The first key (the public
key) is shared publicly. The second key is private, and is kept secret. When working with
asymmetric cryptography, the message is encrypted using the recipients’ public key. The
recipient then decrypts the message using the private key. Because asymmetric ciphers tend
to be computationally intensive (compared to symmetric encryption), they are usually used
in combination with symmetric systems to implement public key cryptography. Asymmetric
encryption is often used to transfer a session key rather than information proper - plaintext.
This session key is then used to encrypt information using a symmetric encryption system.
This gives the key exchange benefits of asymmetric encryption with the speed of symmetric
encryption. A well known example of asymmetric encryption - also known as public key
cryptography - is the RSA algorithm which is discussed in Chapter 2. This algorithm uses
specific prime numbers (from which the private and public keys are composed) in order to
realize the protocol. To provide users which such prime numbers, an infrastructure needs to
be established by a third party whose ‘business’ is to distribute the public/private key pairs.
This infrastructure is known as the Public Key Infrastructure or PKI. The use of a public
key is convenient for those who wish to communicate with more than one individual and
is thus, a many-to-one protocol that avoids multiple key-exchange. On the other hand, a
public key provides a basis for cryptanalysis. Given that C = EK(P ) where K is the public
key, the analyst can guess P and check the answer by comparing C with the intercepted
ciphertext, a guess that is made easier if it is based on a known Crib - i.e. information
that can be assumed to be a likely component of the plaintext. Public key algorithms are
therefore often designed to resist chosen-plaintext attack. Nevertheless, analysis of public
key and asymmetric systems in general, reveals that the level of security is not as significant
as that which can be achieved using a well-designed symmetric system. One obvious and
fundamental issue relates to the third party responsible for the PKI and how much trust
should be assumed, especially with regard to legislation concerning issues associated with
the use of encrypted material.
1.5.3 Three-Way Pass Protocol
The three-way pass protocol, at first sight, provides a solution to the weaknesses associated
with symmetric and asymmetric encryption. Suppose that Alice writes a message, puts it in
the box, locks the box with a lock whose combination number is known only to her and sends
it onto Bob. Upon receipt Bob cannot open the box, so Bob locks the box with another
lock whose combination number is known only to himself and sends it back to Alice. Upon
receipt, Alice can remove her lock and send the box back to Bob (secured with his lock
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only) who is then able to remove his lock and recover the message. Note that by using this
protocol, Alice and Bob do not need to agree upon a combination number; this avoids the
weakness of symmetric encryption. Further, Alice and Bob do not need to send each other
open locks which is a weakness of asymmetric encryption.
The problem with this protocol relates to the fact that it requires the message (secured
in the locked box) to be exchanged three times. To explain this, suppose we have plaintext
in the form of an ASCII-value array p[i] say. Alice generates a cipher n1[i] using some
appropriate strength random number generator and an initial condition based on some long
integer - the key. Let the ciphertext c[i] be generated by adding the cipher to the plaintext
(process of confusion), i.e.
c1[i] = p[i] + n1[i]
which is transmitted to Bob. This is a substitution-based encryption process and is equivalent
to Alice securing the message in the box with her lock - the first pass. Bob generates a new
cipher n2[i] using the same (or possibly a different) random number generator with a different
key and generates the ciphertext
c2[i] = c1[i] + n2[i] = p[i] + n1[i] + n2[i]
which is transmitted back to Alice - the second pass. Alice now uses her cipher to generate
c3[i] = c2[i]− n1[i] = p[i] + n2[i]
which is equivalent to her taking off her lock from the box and sending the result back to
Bob - the third pass. Bob then uses his cipher to recover the message, i.e.
c3[i]− n2[i] = p[i].
However, suppose that the cipher texts c1, c2 and c3 are intercepted, then the plaintext array
can be recovered since
p[i] = c3[i] + c1[i]− c2[i].
This is the case for any encryption process that is commutative and associative. For example,
if the arrays are considered to be bit streams and the encryption process undertaken using
the XOR process (denoted by ⊕), then
c1 = n1 ⊕ p
c2 = n2 ⊕ c1 = n2 ⊕ n1 ⊕ p
c3 = n1 ⊕ c2 = n2 ⊕ p
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and
c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c3 = p
This is because for any bit stream a, b and c
a⊕ a⊕ b = b
and because the XOR operation is both commutative and associative i.e.
a⊕ b = b⊕ a
and
a⊕ (b⊕ c) = (a⊕ b)⊕ c
These properties are equivalent to the fact that when Alice receives the box at the second
pass with both locks on it, she can, in principle, remove the locks in any order. If, however,
she had to remove Bob’s lock before her own, then the protocol would become redundant.
1.5.4 Public-Private Key Encryption
Public-Private Key Encryption [40], [41] is fundamentally asymmetric and in terms of the box
and combination-lock paradigm is based on considering a lock which has two combinations,
one to open the lock and another to lock it. The second constraint is the essential feature
because one of the basic assumptions in the use of combination locks is that they can be
locked irrespective of the rotor positions. Thus, after writing a message, Alice uses one of
Bobs specially designed locks to lock the box using a combination number that is unique
to Bob but is openly accessible to Alice and others who want to send Bob a message. This
combination number is equivalent to the public key. Upon reception, Bob can open the
lock using a combination number that is known only to himself - equivalent to a private
key. However, to design such a lock, there must be some mechanical ‘property’ linking the
combination numbers required to first lock it and then unlock it. It is this property that is
the principal vulnerability associated with public/private key encryption, a property that is
concerned with certain precise and exact relationships that are unique to the use of prime
numbers and their applications with regard to generating pseudo random number streams
and stochastic functions in general [42].
1.6 Cryptanalysis
Any cryptographic system must be able to withstand cryptanalysis [43]. Cryptanalysis
methods depend critically on the encryption techniques which have been developed and are,
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therefore, subject to delays in publication. Cryptanalysts work on ‘attacks’ to try and break
a cryptosystem. In many cases, the cryptanalysts are aware of the algorithm used and will
attempt to break the algorithm in order to compromise the keys or gain access to the actual
plaintext. It is worth noting that even though a number of algorithms are freely published,
this does not in any way mean that they are the most secure. Most government institutions
and the military do not reveal the type of algorithm used in the design of a cryptosystem. The
rationale for this is that, if we find it difficult to break a code with knowledge of the algorithm
then how difficult is it to break a code if the algorithm is unknown? On the other hand,
within the academic community, security in terms of algorithm secrecy is not considered to
be of high merit and publication of the algorithm(s) is always recommended. It remains to
be understood whether this is a misconception within the academic world (due in part to
the innocence associated with academic culture) or a covertly induced government policy
(by those who are less innocent!). For example, in 2003, it was reported that the Americans
had broken ciphers used by the Iranian intelligence services. What was not mentioned, was
the fact that the Iranian ciphers were based on systems purchased indirectly from the USA
and thus, based on USA designed algorithms [44].
The ‘known algorithm’ approach originally comes from the work of Auguste Kerchhoff.
Kerchhoff’s Principle states that: A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system,
except the key, is public knowledge. This principle was reformulated by Claude Shannon as the
enemy knows the system and is widely embraced by cryptographers world wide. In accordance
with the Kerchhoff-Shannon principle, the majority of civilian cryptosystems make use of
publicly known algorithms. The principle is that of ‘security through transparency’ in which
open-source software is considered to be inherently more secure than closed source software.
On this basis there are several methods by which a system can be attacked where, in each
case, it is assumed that the cryptanalyst has full knowledge of the algorithm(s) used.
1.6.1 Basic Attacks
We provide a brief overview of the basic attack strategies associated with cryptanalysis.
Ciphertext-only Attack is where the cryptanalyst has a ciphertext of several messages at
their disposal. All messages are assumed to have been encrypted using the same algorithm.
The challenge for the cryptanalyst is to try and recover the plaintext from these messages.
Clearly a cryptanalyst will be in a valuable position if they can recover the actual keys used
for encryption.
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Known-plaintext Attack makes the task of the cryptanalysis simpler because, in this
case, access is available to both the plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext. It is then
necessary to deduce the key used for encrypting the messages, or design an algorithm to
decrypt any new messages encrypted with the same key.
Chosen-plaintext Attack involves the cryptanalyst possessing both the plaintext and
the ciphertext. In addition, the analyst has the ability to encrypt plaintext and see the
ciphertext produced. This provides a powerful tool from which the keys can be deduced.
Adaptive-chosen-plaintext Attack is an improved version of the chosen-plaintext at-
tack. In this version, the cryptanalyst has the ability to modify the results based on the
previous encryption. This version allows the cryptanalyst to choose a smaller block for en-
cryption.
Chosen-ciphertext Attack can be applied when the cryptanalyst has access to several
decrypted texts. In addition, the cryptanalyst is able to use the text and pass it though a
‘black box’ for an attempted decrypt. The cryptanalyst has to guess the keys in order to
use this method which is performed on an iterative basis (for different keys), until a decrypt
is obtained.
Chosen-key attack is based on some knowledge on the relationship between different keys
and is not of practical significance except in special circumstances.
Rubber-hose Cryptanalysis is based on the use of human factors such as blackmail and
physical threat for example. It is often a very powerful attack and sometimes very effective.
Differential Cryptanalysis is a more general form of cryptanalysis. It is the study of
how differences in an input can affect differences in the output. This method of attack is
usually based on a chosen plaintext, meaning that the attacker must be able to obtain en-
crypted ciphertexts for some set of plaintexts of their own choosing. This typically involves
acquiring a Crib of some type as discussed in the following section.
Linear Cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack which uses linear relations between
inputs and outputs of an encryption algorithm which holds with a certain probability. This
approximation can be used to assign probabilities to the possible keys and locate the one
that is most probable.
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1.6.2 Cribs
The problem with any form of plaintext attack is, of course, how to obtain part or all of the
plaintext in the first place. One method that can be used is to obtain a Crib. A Crib, a
term that originated at Bletchley Park during the Second World War, is a plaintext which
is known or suspected of being part of a ciphertext. If it is possible to compare part of
the ciphertext that is known to correspond with the plaintext then, with the encryption
algorithm known, one can attempt to identify which key has been used to generate the
cipherext as a whole and thus decrypt an entire message. But how is it possible to obtain
any plaintext on the assumption that all plaintexts are encrypted in their entirety? One way
is to analyse whether or not there is any bad practice being undertaken by the user, e.g.
sending stereotyped (encrypted) messages. Analysing any repetitive features that can be
expected is another way of obtaining a Crib. For example, suppose that a user was writing
letters using Microsoft word, for example, having established an electronic letter template
with his/her name, address, company reference number etc. Suppose we assume that each
time a new letter is written, the entire document is encrypted using a known algorithm. If
it is possible to obtain the letter template then a Crib has been found. Assuming that the
user is not prepared to share the electronic template (which would be a strange thing to ask
for), a simple way of obtaining the Crib could be to write to the user in hardcopy and ask
that the response from the same user is of the same type, pleading ignorance of all forms of
ICT or some other excuse. This is typical of methods that are designed to seed a response
that includes a useful Crib. Further, there are a number of passive cribs with regard to letter
writing that can be assumed, the use of Dear and Yours sincerely, for example.
During the Second World War, when passive cribs such as daily weather reports became
rare through improvements in the protocols associated with the use of Enigma and/or oper-
ators who took their work seriously, Bletchley Park would ask the Royal Air Force to create
some ‘trouble’ that was of little military value. This included seeding a particular area in
the North Sea with mines, dropping some bombs on the French coast or, for a more rapid
response, asking fighter pilots to go over to France and ‘shoot up’ targets of opportunity3,
processes that came to be known as ‘gardening’. The Enigma encrypted ciphertexts that
were used to report the ‘trouble’ could then be assumed to contain information such as the
name of the area where the mines had been dropped and/or the harbour(s) threatened by the
mines. It is worth noting that the ability to obtain cribs by gardening was made relatively
easy because of the war in which ‘trouble’ was to be expected and to be reported. Coupled
3Using targets of opportunity became very popular towards the end of the war. Fighter pilots were
encouraged to ‘get them in the air, get them on the ground, just get them’.
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with the efficiency of the German war machine with regard to its emphasis on accurate and
timely reports, the British were in a privileged position in which they could create cribs at
will and have some fun doing it.
When a captured and interrogated German stated that Enigma operators had been in-
structed to encode numbers by spelling them out, Alan Turing reviewed decrypted messages,
and determined that the number ‘eins’ appeared in 90% of the messages. He automated the
crib process, creating an ‘Eins Catalogue’, which assumed that ‘eins’ was encoded at all po-
sitions in the plaintext. The catalogue included every possible position of the various rotors
and plug board settings of the Enigma. This provided a very simple and effective way of
recovering the key and is a good example of how the statistics (of a word or phrase) can be
used in cryptanalysis.
The use of Enigma by the German naval forces (in particular, the U-boat fleet) was,
compared to the German army and air force, made secure by using a password from one
day to the next. This was based on a code book provided to the operator prior to departure
from base. No transmission of the daily passwords was required, passive cribs were rare
and seeding activities were difficult to arrange. Thus, if not for a lucky break, in which
one of these code books (which were printed in ink that disappeared if they were dropped
in seawater) was recovered in tact by a British destroyer (HMS Bulldog) from a damaged
U-boat (U-110) on May 9, 1941, breaking the Enigma naval transmissions under their time-
variant code-book protocol would have been very difficult. A British Naval message dated
May 10, 1941 reads: ‘1. Capture of U Boat 110 is to be referred to as operation Primrose;
2. Operation Primrose is to be treated with greatest secrecy and as few people allowed to
know as possible...’ Clearly, and for obvious reasons, the British were anxious to make sure
that the Germans did not find out that U-110 and its codebooks had been captured and
all the sailors who took part in the operation were sworn to secrecy. On HMS Bulldog’s
arrival back in Britain a representative from Bletchley Park, photographed every page of
every book. The ‘interesting piece of equipment’ turned out to be an Enigma machine, and
the books contained the Enigma codes being used by the German navy.
The U-boat losses that increased significantly through the decryption of U-boat Enigma
ciphers led Admiral Carl Doenitz to suspect that his communications protocol had been
compromised. He had no firm evidence, just a ‘gut feeling’ that something was wrong.
His mistake was not to do anything about it4, an attitude that was typical of the German
High Command who were certifiable with regard to their confidence in the Enigma system.
However, they were not uniquely certifiable. For example, on April 18, 1943, Admiral
Yamamoto (the victor of Pearl Harbour) was killed when his plane was shot down while
4An instinct can be worth a thousand ciphers, ten-thousand if you like.
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he was attempting to visit his forces in the Solomon Islands. Notification of his visit from
Rabaul to the Solomon’s was broadcast as Morse coded ciphertext over the radio, information
that was being routinely decrypted by the Americans. At this point in the Pacific War, the
Japanese were using a code book protocol similar to that used by the German Navy, in
which the keys were changed on a daily basis, keys that the Americans had ‘generated’
copies of. Some weeks before his visit, Yamamoto had been given the option of ordering
a new set of code books to be issued. He had refused to give the order on the grounds
that the logistics associated with transferring new code books over Japanese held territory
was incompatible with the time scale of his visit and the possible breach of security that
could arise through a new code book being delivered into the hands of the enemy. This
decision cost him his life. However, it is a decision that reflects the problems associated with
the distribution of keys for symmetric cryptosystems especially when a multi-user protocol
needs to be established for execution over a wide communications area. In light of this
problem, Yamamoto’s decision was entirely rational but, nevertheless, a decision based on
the assumption that the cryptosystem had not already been compromised. Perhaps it was
his ‘faith in the system’ and thereby his refusal to think the ‘unthinkable’ that cost him his
life!
The principles associated with cryptanalysis that have been briefly introduced here illus-
trate the importance of using a dynamic approach to cryptology. Any feature of a security
infrastructure that has any degree of consistency is vulnerable to attack. This can include
plaintexts that have routine phrases such as those used in letters, the key(s) used to encrypt
the plaintext and the algorithm(s) used for encryption.
1.7 Steganography
One of the principal weaknesses of all encryption systems is that the form of the output
data (the ciphertext), if intercepted, alerts the intruder to the fact that the information
being transmitted may have some importance and that it is therefore worth attacking and
attempting to decrypt it. In Figure 1.4, for example, if a postal worker observed a locked
box passing through the post office, it would be natural for them to wonder what might be
inside. It would also be natural to assume that the contents of the box would have a value in
proportion with the strength of the box/lock. These aspects of ciphertext transmission can
be used to propagate disinformation, achieved by encrypting information that is specifically
designed to be intercepted and decrypted. In this case, we assume that the intercept will be
attacked, decrypted and the information retrieved. The key to this approach is to make sure
that the ciphertext is relatively strong (but not too strong!) and that the information ex-
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tracted is good quality in terms of providing the attacker with ‘intelligence’ that is perceived
to be valuable and compatible with their expectations, i.e. information that reflects the
concerns/interests of the individual(s) and/or organisation(s) that encrypted the data. This
approach provides the interceptor with a ‘honey pot’ designed to maximize their confidence
especially when they have had to put a significant amount of work in to ‘extracting it’. The
trick is to make sure that this process is not too hard or too easy. ‘Too hard’ will defeat the
object of the exercise as the attacker might give up; ‘too easy’, and the attacker will suspect
a set-up!
In addition to providing an attacker with a honey-pot for the dissemination of disinfor-
mation it is of significant value if a method can be found that allows the real information to
be transmitted by embedding it in non-sensitive information after (or otherwise) it has been
encrypted, e.g. camouflaging the ciphertext. This is known as Steganography which is con-
cerned with developing methods of writing hidden messages in such a way that no one apart
from the intended recipient knows of the existence of the message in contrast to cryptogra-
phy in which the existence of the message itself is not disguised but the content is obscured
[19], [20]. This provides a significant advantage over cryptography alone is that messages
do not attract attention to themselves, to messengers, or to recipients. No matter how well
plaintext is encrypted (i.e. how unbreakable it is), by default, a ciphertext will arouse sus-
picion and may in itself be incriminating, as in some countries encryption is illegal. With
reference to Figure 1.4, Steganography is equivalent to transforming the ‘strong box’ into some
other object that will pass through without being noticed - an ‘egg-box’, for example.
The word ‘Steganography’ is of Greek origin and means ‘covered’, or ’hidden writing’. In
general, a steganographic message appears as something else known as a covertext. By way
of a simple illustrative example, suppose we want to transmit the phrase
The Queen likes horses
which is encrypted to produce the cipher stream
syoahfsuyTebhsiaulemNG
This is clearly a scrambled version of a message with no apparent meaning to the order
of the letters from which it is composed. Thus, it is typical of an intercept that might be
attacked because of the very nature of its incomprehensibility. However, suppose that the
cipher stream above could be re-cast to produce the phrase
Beware of Greeks bearing gifts
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If this phrase is intercepted it may not be immediately obvious that there is alternative
information associated with such an apparently innocuous message, i.e. if intercepted, it is
not clear whether or not it is worth initiating an attack.
The conversion of a ciphertext to another plaintext form is called Stegotext conversion and
is based on the use of Covertext. Some covertext must first be invented and the ciphertext
mapped on to it in some way to produce the stegotext. This can involve the use of any
attribute that is readily available such as letter size, spacing, typeface, or other characteristics
of a covertext, manipulated in such a way as to carry a hidden message. The basic principle
is given below:
Data → Covertext
↓
Plaintext → Ciphertext → Stegotext → Transmission
Note that this approach does not necessarily require the use of plaintext to ciphertext con-
version as illustrated above and that plaintext can be converted into stegotext directly. A
simple approach to is to use a mask to delete all characters in a message except those that
are to be read by the recipient of the message. For example, consider the following message:
At what time should I confirm our activities? kindly acknowledge.
This seemingly innocent plaintext could be used to hide the message
Attack now
through application of the following mask:
11000010000000000000000000000000001100000000001000001000111000000
where 0 denotes that a character or space is to be ignored and 1 denotes that a character
or space is used. Apart from establishing a method of exchanging the mask which is equiv-
alent to the key in cryptography, the principal problem with this approach is that different
messages have to be continuously ‘invented’ in order to accommodate hidden messages and
that these ‘inventions’ must appear to be legitimate. However, the wealth of data that is
generated and transmitted in todays environment and the wide variety of formats that are
used means that there is much greater potential for exploiting steganographic methods than
were available before the IT revolution. In other words, the IT revolution has generated
a camouflage rich environment in which to operate and one can attempt to hide plaintext
or ciphertext (or both) in a host of data types, including audio and video files and digital
images. Moreover, by understanding the characteristics of a transmission environment, it is
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possible to conceive techniques in which information can be embedded in the transmission
noise, i.e. where natural transmission noise is the covertext. There a some counter measures
- steganalysis - that can be implemented in order to detect stegotext. However the technique
usually requires access to the covertext which is then compared with the stegotext to see
if any modifications have been introduced. The problem is to find ways of obtaining the
original stegotext.
1.7.1 Hiding Data in Images
The relatively large amount of data contained in digital images makes them a good medium
for undertaking steganography. Consequently digital images can be used to hide messages
in other images. A colour image typically has 8 bits to represent the red, green and blue
components. Each colour component is composed of 256 colour values and the modification
of some of these values in order to hide other data is undetectable by the human eye.
This modification is often undertaken by changing the least significant bit in the binary
representation of a colour or grey level value (for grey level digital images). For example,
the grey level value 128 has the binary representation 10000000. If we change the least
significant bit to give 10000001 (which corresponds to a grey level value of 129) then the
difference in the output image will not be discernable. Hence, the least significant bit can
be used to encode information other than pixel intensity. Further, if this is done for each
colour component then a letter of ASCII text can be represented for every three pixels.
The larger the host image compared with the hidden message, the more difficult it is to
detect the message. Further, it is possible to hide an image in another image for which there
are a number of approaches available (including the application of bit modification). For
example, Figure 1.5 shows the effect of hiding one image in another through the process of
re-quantization and addition. The image to be embedded is re-quantised to just 3-bits or 8
grey levels so that it consists of an array of values between 0 to 7. The result is then added
to the host image (an array of values between 0 and 255) on an pixel by pixel basis such
that if the output exceeds 255 then it is truncated (i.e. set to 255). The resulting output is
slightly brighter with minor distortions in some regions of the image that are homogeneous.
Clearly, knowledge of the original host image allows the hidden image to be recovered (by
subtraction) giving a result that is effectively completely black. However, by increasing its
brightness, the hidden image can be recovered as shown in Figure 1.5 which, in this example,
has been achieved by re-quantising the data from 0-7 back to 0-255 grey levels. The fidelity
of this reconstruction is poor compared to the original image but it still conveys the basic
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Figure 1.5: Illustration of ‘hiding’ one image (top left) in another image (top right) through
simple re-quantisation and addition (bottom left). By subtracting the bottom left image
from the top right image and re-quantising the output, the bottom right reconstruction is
obtained.
information, information that could be covertly transmitted through the host image as an
email attachment, for example. Note that the host image represents, quite literally, the key
to recovering the hidden image. The additive process that has been applied is equivalent
to the process of confusion that is the basis for a substitution cipher. Rather than the key
being used to generate a random number stream using a pre-defined algorithm from which
the stream can be re-generated (for the same key), the digital image is, in effect, being
used as the cipher. Note that the distortion generated by re-quantization means that the
same method can not be used if the hidden image is encrypted. The degradation in the
ciphertext will not allow a decrypt to be accomplished. However, by diffusing the image
with a noise field, it is possible to hide the output in a host image without having to resort
to quantization.
Steganography is often used for digital watermarking. This is where the plaintext, which
acts as a simple identifier containing information such as ownership, copyright and so on, is
hidden in an image so that its source can be tracked or verified. This is equivalent to hiding
a 2-bit image in a host image as illustrated in Figure 1.6 which uses the same method as
discussed above. In this example, a columnar transposition cipher has been used to encrypt
this sentence using the keyword: Steganography. This grid is given by
11 12 03 04 01 07 08 05 10 02 09 06 13
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I n t h i s e x a m p
l e , a c o l u m n a
r t r a n s p o s i t i
o n c i p h e r h a s
b e e n u s e d t o
e n c r y p t t h i s
s e n t a n c e u s i n
g t h e k e y w o r d
: S t e g a n o g r a p
h y
and the ciphertext is
haai yaeexus huwg ,t ecnts
t rcnrtht opee eenmntaosira
i npupn gscshstckaamihtisor
elordt yoIlrobesg:hne nene
ypais ndp
As in the previous example, the host image is required to recover the ciphertext information
and is thus the key to the process.
The methods discussed above refer to electronic-to-electronic type communications in
which there is no loss of information. Steganography and watermarking techniques can be
developed for hardcopy data which has a range of applications. These techniques have to be
robust to the significant distortions generated by the printing and/or scanning process. A
simple approach is to add information to a printed page that is difficult to see. For example,
some modern colour laser printers, including those manufactured by HP and Xerox, print tiny
yellow dots which are added to each page. The dots are barely visible and contain encoded
printer serial numbers, date and time stamps. This facility provides a useful forensics tool for
tracking the origins of a printed document which has only relatively recently been disclosed.
1.7.2 Hiding Data in Noise
The art of steganography is to use what ever covertext is readily available to make the
detection of plaintext or, ideally, the ciphertext as difficult as possible. This means that
the embedding method used to introduce the plaintext/cipherext into the covertext should
produce a stegotext that is indistinguishable from the covertext in terms of its statistical
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Figure 1.6: Binary image of encrypted information (right), obtained by subtraction of the
covertext image from the stegotext image (left).
characteristics and/or the information it conveys. From an information theoretic point of
view, this means that the covertext should have significantly more capacity than the ci-
pheretext, i.e. there must be a high level of redundancy. Utilising noisy environments often
provides an effective solution to this problem. There are three approaches that can be
considered:
• embedding the ciphertext in real noise;
• transforming the ciphertext into noise that is then added to data;
• replacing real noise with ciphertext that has been transformed in to synthetic noise
with exactly the same properties as the real noise.
In the first case we can make use of noise sources such as thermal noise, flicker noise, and
shot noise associated with electronics that digitize an analogue signal. In digital imaging this
may be noise from the imaging charge couplde device (CCD) element; for digital audio, it may
be noise associated with the recording techniques used or amplification equipment. Natural
noise generated in electronic equipment usually provides enough variation in the captured
digital information that it can be exploited as a noise source to ‘cover’ hidden data. Because
such noise is usually a linear combination of different noise types generated by different
physical mechanisms, it is usually characterised by a normal or Gaussian distribution as a
result of the Central Limit Theorem (see Chapter 3).
In the second case, the ciphertext is transformed into noise whose properties are consistent
with the noise that is to be expected in certain data fields. For example, lossy compression
schemes (such as JPEG - Joint Photographic Expert Group) always introduce some error
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(numerical error) into the decompressed data and this can be exploited for steganographic
purposes. By taking a clean image and adding ciphertext noise to it, information can be
transmitted covertly providing all users of the image assume that it is the output of a JPEG
or some other lossy compressor. Of course, if such an image is JPEG compressed, then the
covert information may be badly corrupted.
In the third case, we are required to analyse real noise and derive an algorithm for
its synthesis. Here, the noise has to be carefully synthesized because it may be readily
observable as it represents the data stream in its entirety rather than data that is ‘cloaked’
in natural noise. This technique also requires that the reconstruction/decryption method is
robust in the presence of real noise that we should assume will be added to the synthesized
noise during a transmission phase. In this case, random fractal models are of value because
the spectral properties of many noise types found in nature signify fractal properties to a
good approximation. This includes transmission noise over a range of radio and microwave
spectra, for example, and Internet traffic noise.
With regard to Internet traffic noise the time series data representing packet size and
inter-arrival times shows well defined random fractal properties. There are a range of time-
series models that can be used to charactersize Internet traffic noise based on the number of
packets (or bytes) as a function of time. Fractal time-series models are applicable when the
underlying processes have a similar appearance regardless of the time scale over which they
are observed.
An example of the random fractal nature of Internet traffic is given in Figure 1.7 which
shows the number of packets per unit time over four different time scales [45]. Compared with
a time-series model based on Poisson statistics (i.e. a Poisson random number generator) as
shown in Figure 1.7, it is clear that Internet traffic noise has fractal characteristics (i.e. has
self-affine behaviour). Like real traffic, Internet traffic changes over a daily cycle according
to the number of users. However, much of the traffic ‘riding’ the Internet can be modelled
using fractals and as the Internet has become larger and larger, the fractal nature of the
traffic has become more and more pronounced. The basis for the fractal nature of Internet
traffic noise can be analysed in terms of information flow through a complex network of sites.
The use of fractal geometry for coding information and/or embedding it in random fractal
noise has been considered in a number of publications (e.g. [46]-[50]). In this case, the
stegotext is generated directly using a random fractal noise generator which modulates the
value of the fractal dimension according to the bit type in an input bit stream. The output
is a contiguous stream of fractal noise whose properties are ‘tuned’ to be consistent with the
noisy environment in which a wireless communications system is operating. The technique
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Figure 1.7: Simulated Poisson based time-series model (left), real Internet traffic time-series
(centre) and simulated fractal time-series model taken over four different time scales (from
top to bottom respectively). The shaded areas highlight the data displayed in each plots
above respectively.
is analogous to using Frequency Modulation (FM) and is referred to as Fractal Modulation
(also FM) which provides for the reconstruction of a bit stream with acceptable bit-error
rates in the presence of expected signal-to-noise ratios. In addition to using random fractal
noise to generate covertext and/or stegotext fields, the fractal fields themselves can be used
as low resolution printable features (texture maps) that encode information in a way that is
consistent with the principles of Fourier optics - convolution based encoding. This provides a
method of information recovery that is robust to low resolution image acquisition technology
and data degradation [51], [52], thus providing a COTS approach to securing the authenticity
of printed materials.
1.8 About This Thesis
This thesis has been prepared in such a way that its focus on watermarking and steganogra-
phy is presented in the context of modern cryptology. The purpose of this Chapter has been
to introduce the reader to the basic themes associated with cryptology from both a historical
context and a modern idiom. Irrespective of the details of an encryption algorithm and its
implementation, the governing principles associated with cryptography are compounded in
an understanding of the processes of diffusion and confusion. The basis of these processes are
the focus for material given in Chapter 2 which provides an overview of digital watermarking
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Chapter 3 considers the role of wavelets (e.g. the Morlet wavelet) for embedding plaintext
or ciphertext in covertext. The background to image based watermarking schemes is the
basis for Chapter 4 which provides a survey of the methods currently available. Image based
information is the theme for the material considered in Chapter 5 which explores the use
of steganography and digital watermarking for e-to-e communications and the application
of (fractal) texture coding schemes for low resolution print security based on DataGlyphs.
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a conclusion to the work and considers an example of further
developments that can be undertaken.
1.9 Research Methodology
The research methodology applied in this thesis follows the principle of Experimental Soft-
ware Engineering 5 which is a sub-field of software engineering. In this thesis, ESE is used to
determine the suitability of algorithms for the development of watermarking methods that
are based on the principles of cryptography, in particular, the diffusion and confusion of
data.
ESE aims at applying empirical theories and methods for understanding and improving
the software development process in organizations. It is a multi-disciplinary field, building
upon subsidiary fields such as statistics, sociology, psychology, and computer science. The
main objective of ESE is to evaluate tools, techniques, and technologies used in software
engineering empirically, and thereby enhancing the state of the art and practice in software
engineering. The method employed to achieve the goal is to run empirical investigations
with the software development process as the object of study.
There is a five step research method for undertaking software engineering experiments:
1. Experiment definition. In this step the hypothesis is defined, along with the objectives
and goals of the experiment. The hypothesis, at this stage, need not be formally stated, but
should be stated clearly. The objective and goals are found by asking the following questions:
what is studied? (object of study), what is the purpose of the experiment? which effect is
studied? (quality focus) whose view is assumed? (perspective of the study) and where is the
study conducted? (context).
2. Experiment planning. At this stage, the hypothesis is formalized including a null hy-
pothesis. Input/independent variables and output/dependent variables are determined. A
5Wohlin et al., Experimentation in software engineering: An introduction, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
London, 2000.
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suitable experiment design is chosen, and the potential validity problems with the results
are discussed.
3. Experiment operation. Subjects and the materials needed (for data collection forms) for
the experiment is prepared, before executing the experiment. The primary objective of this
stage is to gather data for the next step.
4. Analysis and interpretation. Descriptive statistics are used to understand the data gath-
ered during step three. A possible reduction of the data set must be considered. After the
data has been reduced, a hypothesis test is performed using statistical techniques.
5. Presentation and package. This stage is concerned with presenting and packaging the
findings. It is important that the experiment design is clear, to allow for replication as this
is an important mechanism for validating the findings.
Experimental software engineering is based on a hypothetic-deductive research model. The
primary problem facing any empirical researcher is the wealth and complexity of the real
world. The hypothetic-deductive research model ‘solves this by reducing the scope of the
empirical enquiry. The controlled experiment is a good example of such a reduction, where
the empirical world is reduced to a set of independent and dependent variables, subjects,
and the treatments applied to the subjects. The ontology of this research philosophy is that
the real world can be divided into small bits that can later be reassembled into a complete
picture.
1.10 Principal Hypothesis and Original Contributions
The principal hypothesis upon which this thesis is based concerns the use of data diffusion
for generating watermarks that are robust to data degradation, and, as such, can be applied
to authenticating data that may undergo severe degradation of some form. This includes
the use of data diffusion for authenticating audio and image data and for printed materials
in which degradation occurs in the print-scan process. In the context of this hypothesis, the
principal contributions that are new and innovative as reported in this thesis are compounded
in the following:
• Development of a new data authentication technique that is based on the use of data
diffusion.
• Application of data diffusion using ‘chirp coding’ for audio data verification and au-
thentication.
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• Application of data diffusion using ‘texture coding’ for document verification and au-
thentication.
• Design and implementation of a prototype system based on textured DataGlyphs.
• Application of Independent Component Analysis for the evaluation of DataGlyphs.
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2
Digital Watermarking
2.1 Introduction
The primary aim of digital watermarking is to design methods which provide for the au-
thentication of data (encrypted or otherwise) but in a more universal significance, digital
watermarking may be employed to hide information in data. Watermarking is an area of
cryptology that is related to the ‘art’ of hiding secret information in data, or Steganography.
In this Chapter, we provide an overview of digital watermarking and consider diversifications
to watermarking from the vantage point of a watermarker. We consider our approach over
cryptography in that if information can be embedded in a data field that is fully covert, then
it is not immediately clear to a potential attacker that there may be information in the data
that is worth attacking. We use the method of a watermarker and applied cryptography
to confuse the attacker, who will approach our code by breaking it like a watermarker not
realizing we have used cryptography to encode information. If we consider the case where
this ‘secret information’ is an encrypted field, then watermarking can provide a method
of covert encryption. In this chapter, we divide the area of interest and investigation into
three segments. In order to understand the pitfalls of digital watermarking, we explain the
principal components and applications, thereby introducing the process of applying of a
digital watermark and the flaws that can be taken advantage of. Once the properties are
investigated, one is able to understand the approach taken and the problems encountered
regarding visibility which is the idea we exploit in terms of the new system developed and
its robustness. The process of attacking and breaking a watermark is discussed in Secton 2.3
with regard to resistance to distortions, for example. Finally in Section 2.4, watermarking
and cryptography is explained in order to introduce the principal differences associated with
each field.
34
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2.2 Digital Watermarking
Digital watermarking is an area of growing importance in information technology security
as discussed in Chapter 1. One of the principal aims is to design methods which provide
for the authentication of data (encrypted or otherwise) but in a more general sense, digital
watermarking may be use to hide information in data.
The principal model that underpins this technology is based on the equation
s = Pˆ f + n
where f is the information that is to embedded in the data (the watermark), Pˆ is some
linear operator and s is the output data (the watermarked image). The function n, which is
usually taken to be noise, can indeed be a noise field, but in the context of watermarking it
can be any other host data. The operation Pˆ f can be non-stationary, in most watermarking
methods, a stationary model is used. In such cases, the basic watermaking model is of the
type
s = p⊗ f + n
where p is any useful function that is of value to the watermarking process.
Watermarking is an area of cryptology that is related to the ‘art’ of hiding secret informa-
tion in data, or Steganography. It has an advantage over cryptography in that, if information
can be embedded in a data field that is fully covert, then it is not immediately clear to a
potential attacker that there may be information in the data that is worth attacking. If we
consider the case where this ‘secrete information’ is an encrypted field, then watermarking
can provide a method of covert encryption.
The operation Pˆ f describes the processes of ‘diffusion’ the process of adding noise (i.e.
Pˆ f +n) is the process of ‘confusion’. For example, one of the processes Pˆ f that can be used
is based on the convolution of f with the kernel
p(x) =
√
1
4piDt
exp
[
−
(
x2
4Dt
)]
which is the Green function for the 1D diffusion equation with diffusivity D at time t, the
operation p⊗ f being a solution to the 1D diffusion equation for a source f(x that starts to
diffuse at t = 0.
This chapter considers approahes to digital watermarking and stegonography with a focus
on the application of wavelets (in particular, a frequency modulated chirp). We also consider
the use of fractal modulation for camouflaging data in an environment that is assumed to
be characterised by random fractal noise.
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2.3 Survey of Digital Watermarking Methods
In this section1, we provide an overview of digital watermarking.
With rapid growth in computer networks and information technology, a large number
of copyright works now reside in digital form. Further, electronic publishing is becoming
increasingly popular. These developments in computer technology increase the problems
associated with copyright protection and enforcement and thus, future developments in net-
worked multimedia systems are conditioned by the development of efficient methods to pro-
tect ownership rights against unauthorized copying and redistribution. Digital watermarking
has recently emerged as a candidate to solve this difficult problem. The mid-1990s saw the
convergence of a number of different information protection technologies, whose theme was
the hiding (as opposed to encryption) of information. Hiding can refer to either making the
information imperceptible or keeping the existence of the information secret [53]. Important
sub-disciplines of information hiding are Steganography and Watermarking. Steganography
and watermarking are concerned with techniques that are used to imperceptibly convey in-
formation. However, they are two different and distinct disciplines: Watermarking, is the
practice of hiding a message (copyright notices or individual serial numbers for example)
about an image, audio clip, video clip, or other work of media within that work itself [53]
without degrading its quality in such a way that it is expected to be permanently embedded
into the data and can be detected later. Steganography, on the other hand, is the study of
the techniques used to hide one message inside another, without disclosing the existence of
the hidden message or making it apparent to an observer that this message contains a hidden
message [134]. From the previous definitions we distinguished them as follows [53],[55]:
• The information hidden by a watermarking system is always associated with the object
to be protected or its owner while steganographic systems just hide information.
• As the purpose of steganography is to have a covert communication between two par-
ties whose existence is unknown to a possible attacker, a successful attack consists of
detecting the existence of this communication. Watermarking, as opposed to steganog-
raphy, has the additional requirement of robustness against possible attacks; even if
the existence of the hidden information is known it should be hard for an attacker to
destroy the embedded watermark. In other words, steganography is mainly concerned
with detection of the hidden message while watermarking concerns potential removal
by a pirate.
1Based on an edited version of K. W. Mahmoud, ‘Low Resolution Watermarking for Print Security’, PhD
Thesis, Loughborough University, 2005, (Chpater 1).
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Figure 2.1: The general framework of a watermarking system [58]
• Steganographic communications are usually point-to-point (between sender and re-
ceiver) while watermarking techniques are usually one-to-many.
2.3.1 Principal Components
All watermarking schemes share the same generic building blocks (see Figure 2.1). These
blocks and their functions are described below [56],[57].
Watermark Embedding System (Signature Casting): The embedded data is the
watermark that one wishes to embed. It is usually hidden in a message referred to as a cover
(work), producing the watermarked cover. The inputs to the embedding system are the
watermark, the cover and an optional key. A key is used to control the embedding process
so as to restrict detection and/or recovery of the embedded data to parties who know of
it. The watermarked cover may face some intentional and/or unintentional distortion that
may affect the existence of the watermark. The resultant outputs are called the ‘Possibly
Distorted Watermarked Cover’.
Watermark Detection System (Extraction): The inputs to the detection system
are the possibly distorted watermarked cover, the key and depending on the method, the
original cover or the original watermark. Its output is either the recovered watermark or
some kind of confidence measure indicating how likely it is for a given watermark at the
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input to be present in the work under inspection (e.g. Correlation). Current watermarking
schemes may be viewed as spread-spectrum communications systems [53], whose aim is to
send the watermark between two parties with two sources of noise; noise due to the original
cover and noise due to processing.
2.3.2 Applications
In this section we discuss some of the scenarios where watermarking is already being used
as well as other potential applications. The list given here [53],[55],[56],[59] is by no means
complete and is intended to give a perspective of the broad range of possibilities that digital
watermarking opens.
Owner identification. Embedding the identity of a work’s copyright holder as a watermark
in order to prevent other parties from claiming the copyright of the data.
Labeling. The hidden message can contain labels that, for example, allow for annotation
of images or audio data. Of course, the annotation may also be included in a separate
file, but with watermarking it becomes more difficult to destroy or lose this label, since
it becomes closely tied to the object that it annotates. This is especially useful in
medical applications since it prevents potentially dangerous errors.
Fingerprinting (Transaction Tracking). This is similar to the previous application and
allows acquisition devices (such as video cameras, audio recorders, etc.) to insert in-
formation about the specific device (e.g., an ID number and date of creation). This is
especially useful for identifying people who obtain content legally but illegally redistrib-
ute it. This can involve the embedding of a different watermark into each distributed
copy.
Authentication. Embedding signature information in a work that can be later checked to
verify if it has not been tampered with.
Copy and Playback Control. The message carried by the watermark may contain infor-
mation regarding copy and display permissions. A secure module can be added in
copy or playback equipment to automatically extract this permission information and
block further processing if required. In order to be effective, this protection approach
requires agreements between work providers and consumer electronics manufacturers
to introduce compliant watermark detectors in their video players and recorders. This
approach is being taken in Digital Videodiscs (DVD) for example.
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Broadcast monitoring. Identifying when and where works are broadcast by recognizing
watermarks embedded in the data.
Additional information. The embedded watermark could be an n-bit index to a database
of URLs stored on a known location on the Internet. This index is used to fetch a
corresponding URL from the database. The URL is then used to display the related
web pages.
2.3.3 Classifications
Watermarking systems can be classified according to several aspects which are described
below.
Private/Public Systems
Private Marking Systems (Informed Detector) require at least the original cover. This
means that only the copyright holder can detect the watermark. In a private system,
we can identify where the distortions were, and invert them before applying the wa-
termark detector (using the original cover to reverse the embedding process or using
the original work as a ‘hint’ to find where the watermark could be in the distorted
watermarked cover). These types of systems may also require a copy of the embedded
watermark for detection and just yield a ’YES’ or ’NO’ response to the question: does
the distorted marked object contain this watermark? Private systems usually feature
increased robustness (greater strength to the embedded bits) not only toward noise-like
distortions, but also distortions in the data geometry since it allows the detection and
inversion of geometrical distortion [59]. Unfortunately, for these techniques to be ap-
plied, the possibility to access the original image must be granted. This mean that the
set-up of a watermarking system becomes more complicated, and on the other hand,
the owners of the original images are compelled to insecurely share their works with
anyone who wants to check the existence of the watermark.
Semi-private Marking Systems. These systems use the original watermark only and
check whether it exists in the cover or not.
Public Marking Systems (Blind Marking). These systems remain the most challeng-
ing since they require neither the secret original nor the embedded watermark . Blind
watermarking techniques are less robust and are therefore more suitable for appli-
cations requiring lower security than copyright application, such as authorized copy
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distribution in electronic commerce.
Transformation
Another classification criterion distinguishes schemes into spatial domain techniques and
transform-domain techniques depending on whether the watermark is encoded by directly
modifying pixels (such as simply flipping low-order bits of selected pixels) or by altering some
frequency coefficients obtained by transforming the image into the frequency domain. Spatial
domain techniques are simple to implement and often require a lower computational cost,
although they can be less robust against tampering than methods which place the watermark
in the transform domain. Watermarking schemes that operate in a transform space are
increasingly common, as this can aid robustness against several attacks and distortions
(Transform domain method hide messages in significant area of the cover image which makes
them more robust to attacks). However, while they are more robust to various kind of signal
processing, they remain imperceptible to the human sensory system. Most schemes operate
directly on the components of some transform of the cover like discrete cosine transform,
discrete wavelet transforms and discrete Fourier transforms.
2.3.4 Visibility
Copyright marks do not always need to be hidden, as some systems use visible digital wa-
termarks [56], but most of the literature has focused on invisible (or transparent) digital
watermarks which have wider applications. Modern visible watermarks may be visual pat-
terns (e.g. a company logo or copyright sign) overlaid on digital images.
2.3.5 Robustness
Fragile Watermarks. Watermarks that have very limited robustness and are destroyed as
soon as the object is modified too much. They are applied to detect modifications of
the watermarked data, rather than conveying unreadable information [53]. Crypto-
graphic techniques have already made their mark on authentication. However, there
are two significant benefits that arise from using watermarking: First, the signature
becomes embedded in the message. Second, it is possible to create ’soft authentication’
algorithms that offer a multi-valued measure that accounts for different unintentional
transformations that the data may have suffered instead of the classical yes/no answer
given by cryptography-based authentication.
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Robust Watermarks. have the property that it is not feasible to remove them or make
them useless without destroying the object at the same time. This usually means that
the mark should be embedded in the most robust significant components of the object
[59].
Naturalness
Watermarks that range from pseudo-random sequences to small image logo that can be easily
recovered and authenticated.
2.3.6 Properties
Watermark system can be characterized by a number of defining properties [53],[59],[56]. The
relative importance of each property is dependent on the requirements of the application and
the role that the watermark will play. Some important properties are listed below:
Fidelity (watermark imperceptibility) Perceptual similarity between the original and
the watermarked versions must be very high (i.e. the difference between the original
image and the embedded watermarked work should be invisible). It has been argued
that the watermark should not be noticeable to the viewer instead of being impercep-
tible [59]. Furthermore, if a signal is truly imperceptible, then perceptually base lossy
compression algorithms should, in principle, remove such a signal. Current compres-
sion algorithms can still leave room for an imperceptible signal to be inserted. This
may not be true of the next generation of compression algorithms. Thus, to survive
the next generation of lossy compression algorithms, it is necessary for a watermark to
be noticeable to a trained observer.
Statistical invisibility The watermark must be statistically invisible to thwart unautho-
rized removal (i.e. a statistical analysis should not produce any advantage from the
attacking point of view). The noise-like watermark is statistically invisible and has
good auto-correlation properties.
Readily extracted If the decoder needs to run in real-time, then it is necessary for the
decoding process to be significantly simpler than the encoding process [59]. In some
applications, this requirement is reversed depending on the purpose of watermarking
system.
Data payload This refer to the amount of information that can be carried in a watermarked
cover and raises capacity issues in digital watermarking. The length of the watermark
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serves as a measure of the capacity. A longer watermark signal means that more
coefficients need to be modified; hence, the watermarked images look ’noisier’. The
more information one wants to embed, the lower the watermark robustness.
Embedding Effectiveness The probability that the embedder will successfully embed a
watermark in a randomly selected work. This property is related to real-time embed-
ding system (which must be high).
False Positive Rate The frequency with which we should expect a watermark to be de-
tected in a non-watermarked object (which must be low).
Robustness (Security) The watermark should be resilient to standard manipulations
which are both intentional and unintentional in nature. Some authors [53] distin-
guish between resistance to intentional and unintentional attacks. They use ’security’
when dealing with the ability of the watermark to resist hostile attacks while using the
’robustness’ when dealing with the ability of the watermark to survive normal process-
ing of the content such as spatial filtering, lossy compression, printing and scanning,
geometric distortions (such as rotation, translation and scaling). Note, that robustness
actually comprises two separate issues: (i) whether or not the watermark is still present
in the data after distortion; (ii) whether the watermark detector can detect it. For ex-
ample, watermarks inserted by many algorithms remain in the data after geometric
distortions but the corresponding detection algorithm can only detect the watermark
if the distortion is first removed, otherwise the detector can not detect the watermark
[59]. In general, any increase in robustness comes at the expense of increased water-
mark visibility. Also the presence of the original cover increases the robustness. For
example, the use of the original image permits some pre-processing to be carried out
before the watermark checking such as: rotation angles, translation and scaling factors
which can usually be estimated together with missing parts of the image which can
be replaced by corresponding parts of the original one. It is possible to undertake and
exhaustive search on different rotation angles and scaling factors until a watermark is
found, but this is prohibitively computationally intensive.
2.4 Distortions and Attack
In practice, a watermarked cover may be altered either intentionally or unintentionally, so
the watermarking system should still be able to detect and extract the watermark. The
distortions are limited to those that do not produce excessive degradations, since otherwise
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2. DIGITAL WATERMARKING 43
the transformed object would be unusable. Several authors have classified attacks based on
a range of aspects. One famous classification has been carried out by Craver et al. [60],[61].
2.4.1 Attack Classifications
There are four general classes of attacks [60], organized by the way in which an attack
attempts to defeat the watermarking technology. These classes are illustrated below together
with some examples for each class. Some of them may be intentional or unintentional,
depending on the application.
Robustness (Unauthorized removal)
This type of attacks aim to diminish or remove the presence of a digital watermark from its
associated content, while preserving the content so that it is not useless after the attack is
over. Some examples of robustness attacks are discussed below.
Additive Noise. This may happen (unintentionally) in certain applications such as D/A
(printing) and A/D (scanning) converters or from transmission errors. It could hap-
pen intentionally by an attacker who is trying to destroy the watermark (or make it
undetectable) by adding noise to the watermarked cover.
Filtering. Linear filtering such as low-pass filtering or non-linear filtering such as median
filtering.
Collusion attack. In some watermarking schemes, if an image has been watermarked many
times under different secret keys, it is possible to collect many such copies and ’average’
them into a composite image that closely resembles the original image and does not
contain any useful watermarking data [62].
Inversion attack (elimination attack). An attacker may try to estimate the watermark
and then remove the watermark by subtracting the estimate or reverse the insertion
process to perfectly remove the watermark. This means that an attacked object can not
be considered to contain a watermark at all (even using a more sophisticated detector).
Note, that with different watermarked objects, it is possible to improve the estimate
of the watermark by simple averaging.
Lossy Compression. This is generally an unintentional attack, which appears very often
in multimedia applications. Practically, nearly all audio, video and digital images
that are currently distributed via the Internet are in compressed form. Lossy image
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compression algorithms are designed to disregard redundant perceptually-insignificant
information in the coding process. Watermarking tries to add invisible information
to the image. An optimal image coder would therefore simply remove any embedded
watermark information. However, even state-of-the-art image coding such as JPEG
2000 does not achieve optimal coding performance and therefore there is a ’distortion
gap’ that can be exploited for watermarking. Actually, one can observe that the use of
a particular transform provides good results against compression algorithms based on
the same transform. For instance, DCT-domain image watermarking is more robust
to JPEG compression than spatial-domain watermarking.
Presentation (Masking Attacks)
This attack does not attempt to remove the watermark, but instead, alters the content
so that the watermark can no longer be detected or extracted easily. This means that
the attacked work can still be considered to contain the watermark, but the watermark
is undetectable by an existing detector (such as a detector sensitive to image rotation).
Examples of presentation attacka include:
Chopping attack (mosaic attack). Here, an image is ’chopped’ into distinct sub-images,
which are embedded one after another in a web page. Common web browsers render
sub-images together as a single image, so the result is identical to the original image.
However, the chopping process distributes the original image’s watermark into many
pieces and the watermark cannot be recovered unless the original image is reconstructed
first.
Rotation and Spatial Scaling. Detection and extraction fail when rotation or scaling is
performed on the watermarked image because the embedded watermark and the lo-
cally generated version do not share the same spatial pattern anymore. This kind of
attack can be unintentional, occurring during the scanning-printing process (copies
from printing and/or scanning maybe rotated, scaled, cropped or translated in com-
parison with the original image).
Cropping. This is a very common attack since in many cases the attacker is interested in
a small portion of the watermarked object, such as parts of a certain picture or frames
of a video sequence. With this in mind, in order to survive this kind of attack, the
watermark needs to be spread over the whole document.
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2.4.2 Interpretation
This kind of attack seeks to forge invalid or multiple interpretations from watermark evidence
[60] whereby an attacker can devise a situation, which prevents assertion of ownership. Some
example are:
• Multiple watermarking: An attacker may watermark an already watermarked object
(creating uncertainty about which watermark was inserted first) and later make claims
of ownership. The easiest solution is to time-stamp the hidden information by a certi-
fication authority.
• Unauthorized embedding (Forgery). Embedding an illegitimate watermark into works
that should not contain them or using watermark inversion to remove the original
watermark before inserting a new watermark.
Legality
In a legal attack, the attacker uses a legal precedent, the identity or reputation of the object
owner, or some other non-technical information to establish doubt in court as to whether a
watermark actually constitutes the proof that its owner claims.
Cox Classification for Attacks
Cox et al. [53] classify the attacks into two main categories: active and passive. Active
attacks (e.g. changing the cover) include:
• Unauthorized removal (robustness attack).
• Unauthorized embedding (forgery).
Passive attacks (e.g. not changing the cover) include unauthorized detection which can be
in three levels according to severity:
• the adversary detects and deciphers an embedded message;
• the adversary detects the watermark and distinguishes one mark from another, but
can not decipher what the marks mean;
• the adversary detects the watermark but without distinguishing the decipher.
There are situations in which the watermark has no hostile enemies and need not to be
secure, e.g. when the watermark is used to provide enhanced functionality.
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2.5 Watermarking and Cryptogarphy
Watermarking is distinguished from other techniques such as placing the mark in the media
header, encoding it in a visible bar, or speaking it out loud as an introduction to an audio
clip in three ways:
• a watermark is imperceptible;
• a watermark is inseparable from the work (once the digital images is printed on paper,
all data in the header is left behind and further, this data may not survive a change
in the image format);
• a watermark undergoes same transformations on the work, which can help in authen-
tication and detection based on the kind of alteration that the image has undergone.
Cryptography
Cryptography can be defined as the study of secret writing, i.e. concealing the contents of a
secret message by transforming the original message into a form that cannot be easily inter-
preted by an observer. Thus, the mere discovery of encrypted data suggests that something
is illicit, or at least secret, is occurring. Cryptographic techniques can hide a message from
plain view during communication, and can also provide auxiliary information that effectively
proves the messages. However, traditional cryptosystems suffer from one important draw-
back, which renders them useless for the purpose of enforcing copyright law [61]: they do
not permanently associate cryptographic information with work. Thus, cryptography alone
cannot make any guarantees about the redistribution or alteration of content after it has
initially passed through the cryptosystem (i.e. cryptography can not help the seller monitor
how a legitimate customer handles the content after decryption). Watermarking can fulfil
this need; it places information within the content where it is never removed during normal
usage. Further, steganography has a distinct advantage over cryptography; it allows for
the communication of secret information without alerting an attacker to the presence of the
secrets.
Fidelity
It is currently widely accepted that robust/high fidelity watermarking techniques should
largely exploit the characteristics of the HVS and human auditory system (HAS) for more
effectively hiding watermarks. Perceptual masking techniques exploit the perceptual mask-
ing properties of the human auditory system and of the human vision system [75]. A good
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watermarking schema has to adapt to the particular image being watermarked in order to
exploit specific HVS characteristics and hence amplifying the watermark where the alter-
ations are least likely to be noticed. Local image characteristics that can help determine the
visibility of a watermark are listed below:
Texture. It is usually true to say, that the human eyes are not sensitive to the small changes
in texture but are very sensitive to small changes in the smooth areas of an image.
Hence, it should be possible to incorporate more information into those parts of the
image that contain more textures than smooth area. Related methods accomplish
this by calculating a value of local contrast and mapping increasing contrast values to
increasing watermark magnitudes [64].
Edges. Edge information of an image is the most important factor for perception of the
image. This can present a problem though, as directional edges separating two distinct
objects in an image may be identified as high contrast areas. This results in the
application of a higher strength watermark signal around the connected edges which
causes objectionable watermark ringing on connected edges. Methods have also been
proposed which identify areas of true high contrast texture while protecting connected
directional edges [64],[132] (regions that contain a sudden transition in luminance).
Brightness/Contrast. When the mean value of the square of the noise is the same as the
background, the noise tends to be most visible against mid-gray backgrounds. The
mid-gray regions have lower noise-capacity compared to other regions[132].
Robustness
The key to making the watermark robust and to preventing the watermark from being easily
attacked is to embed the watermark in the perceptually significant regions of the image.
These regions do not change much after several signal processing or compression operations.
Moreover, if these regions lose their fidelity significantly, the reconstructed image could
be perceptually different from the original one (i.e. visual fidelity is only preserved if the
perceptually significant regions remain intact). Also, lossy image compression algorithms are
designed to disregard redundant information. Information bits placed within textured areas
of the image are therefore more vulnerable to attack. The question, therefore, is how much
extra watermark information can we add to the perceptually significant regions without any
impact on the visual fidelity? There is a compromise to be reached between hiding a large
number of information bits where they can least be seen, but where they can be attacked
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by image compression algorithms, or placing fewer bits on less textured but safer portions
of the image.
Capacity
Every pixel value of an image can be altered only to a certain limit without making a
perceptible difference to the image quality. This limit can be called as the ’just noticeable
distortion’ or JND level [66],[64],[132]. For instance, smooth areas are assigned relatively
low JND compared to strongly textured regions (i.e. strongly textured regions have a very
high capacity for noise).
Shaping
There is an advantage to shaping the watermark spectrum based on the cover to match
currently known human visual systems. Inserting a watermark that is a function of the
cover leads to a non-linear embedding procedure. Such a procedure has the advantage that
when the image energy in a particular area is small, the watermark energy is also reduced,
thereby avoiding artifacts, and when the image energy is large, the watermark energy is
increased, thereby improving the robustness of the procedure. Conversely, if simple linear
addition to the watermark and image occurs, then the energy of the watermark must be very
low in order to avoid worst case scenarios in which the image energy in a particular place is
very low and artifacts are created because the watermark energy was too strong relative to
the image[59].
Spread Spectrum
Spread-spectrum techniques spread a narrow band signal (watermark) over a much wider
band (cover) such that the signal-to-noise ratio in any single band is very low. However, with
precise knowledge of the spreading function, the receiver is able to extract the transmitted
signal, summing up the signals in each of the bands such that the detector signal-to-noise
ratio is strong. Spread spectrum techniques are useful because they have a low probability
of interception by an attacker [75]. Embedding a watermark in the high frequency spec-
trum yield low robustness whereas embedding the watermark in the low frequency spectrum
yields visible impacts. Spread spectrum techniques can reconcile these conflicting points by
allowing a low-energy signal to be embedded in each of the frequency bands (both high and
low).
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2.6 Open Problems
Even though watermarking is a fast growing field there are a number of outstanding problems
such as the following [67]:
• Optimization between robustness and visibility limiting the capacity.
• Detection speed which is crucial especially in a real time applications.
• Reading the watermark after geometric distortion.
• Adaptability to different printing process, paper and ink which may degrade the wa-
termark. Moreover, printed images do not maintain their quality over time. They are
subject to aging, soiling, crumbling, tearing, and deterioration. Designing a watermark
scheme to compensate for these kinds of unintentional attacks is another challenge.
• Different input devices (scanner, cameras) introduce different types of distortions. Ac-
counting for these differences in detection is also a major challenge.
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3
Application of Wavelets to
Watermarking
3.1 Introduction
We discuss a new method for ‘watermarking’ digital signals using wavelets. In particular,
we introduce a technique that utilizes Morlet wavelets (with zero characteristic frequency)
known as ‘chirp coding’. The reason for considering this method is related to the unique
properties that chirps provide in terms of the quality of extracting information from signals
with very low signal-to-noise ratios and the simplicity of the process that is required to do this
(i.e. correlation). The use of frequency modulation is the basis for the method presented
here and, in the following sections, the theoretical background to the Matched Filter is
considered and the result of using chirp functions with matched filtering re-visited. We
apply this method in a novel manner by allowing the authentication scheme to be developed
in which the watermark is generated from the field in which it is to be hidden. This function
is unique in terms of its properties for reconstructing information (via application of the
Matched Filter). The approach considered here allows a code to be generated directly from
the input signal, the same code being used to watermark the signal. The code used to
watermark the signal is therefore self-generating. Although other applications are possible,
chirp coding provides a new and novel technique for fragile audio watermarking. In this
case, the watermarked signal does not change the perceptual quality of the signal since the
chirp generated is of very low frequency and amplitude. The watermark is ‘broken’ as soon
as any tampering is undertaken on the (watermarked) signal.
It is often desirable to have a watermark extraction process that is ‘blind’, implying
that the original signal is not required to extract the watermark to increase security. We
50
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solve this problem by using a signal dependent watermark sequence. However, to facilitate a
blind extraction process, watermark extraction should be transparent to the watermarking
scheme (implying that the sequence extracted from the original and watermarked signals are
the same). Thus, in this chapter we consider a new multi-level robust audio watermarking
scheme based on embedding ‘chirps’ (i.e. a stream of frequency modulated signals). The
method exploits a unique property of a chirp which is that it can be recovered in very noisy
environments. The watermarking sequence is derived from the signal spectrum by dividing
it into sub-bands using wavelet decomposition.
3.2 Theoretical Concepts
In cryptography and stenography (the process of hiding secret information in data [72])
the principal ‘art’ is to develop methods in which the processes of diffusion and confusion
are maximized; one important criterion being that the output s should be dominated by
the noise n which in turn should be characterized by maximum Entropy (i.e. a uniform
statistical distribution) [73].
Given the equation
s = Pˆ f + n
then being able to recover f from s given n (and the operator Pˆ ) provides a way of authenti-
cating the signal. If, in addition, it is possible to determine that a copy and/or modification
of s has been made leading to some form of data degradation and/or corruption that can
be conveyed through an appropriate analysis of f , then a scheme can be developed that
provides a check on: (i) the authenticity of the data s; (ii) its fidelity [134], [75].
Formally, the recovery of f from s is based on the inverse process
f = Pˆ−1(s− n)
where Pˆ−1 is the inverse operator. Clearly, this requires the field n to be known a priori. If
this field has been generated by a pseudo random or a pseudo chaotic number generator,
then the initial condition(s) used to generate this field must be known a priori in order to
recover the data f . In this case, the seed represents the private key required to recover f .
However, in principle, n can be any field that is considered appropriate for confusing the
information Pˆ f including a pre-selected signal or image. Further, if the process of confusion
is undertaken in which the signal-to-noise ratio is set to be very low (i.e. ‖n‖ >> ‖Pˆ f‖), then
the watermark f can be hidden covertly in the data n provided the inverse process Pˆ−1 is
well defined and computationally stable. In this case, it is clear that the host signal or image
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n must be known in order to recover the watermark f leading to a private watermarking
scheme in which the field n in its entirity is a key. This field can of course be (lossless)
compressed and encrypted as required. In addition, the operator Pˆ (and its inverse Pˆ−1)
can be key dependent. The value of this operator key dependency relies on the nature and
properties of the operator that is used and whether it is compounded in an algorithm that
is required to be in the public domain for example.
Another approach is to consider the case in which the field n is unknown and to consider
the problem of extracting the watermark f in the absence of knowledge of this field. In this
case, the reconstruction is based on the result
f = Pˆ−1s+m
where
m = −Pˆ−1n
Now, if a process Pˆ is available in which ‖Pˆ−1s‖ >> ‖m‖, then an approximate (noisy)
reconstruction of f can be obtained in which the noisem is determined by the original signal-
to-noise ratio of the data s and hence, the level of covertness of the diffused watermark Pˆ f .
In this case, it may be possible to post-process the reconstruction (de-noising for example)
and recover a relatively high-fidelity version of the watermark, i.e.
f ∼ Pˆ−1s
This approach (if available) does not rely on a private key (assuming Pˆ is not key dependent).
The ability to recover the watermark in this case, only requires knowledge of the operator
Pˆ (and its inverse) and post-processing options as required. The problem here is to find
an operator that is able to recover the watermark effectively in the presence of the field n.
Ideally, we require an operator Pˆ with properties such that Pˆ−1n→ 0.
In this chapter, we consider the case where the operator Pˆ = δ(t)⊗ so that s(t) =
f(t) + n(t) and where f is contructed from a sequence of Morlet wavelet or chirp function,
specifically, a linear Frequency Modulated (FM) chirp of the (complex) types exp(±iαt2)
where α is the chirp parameter and t is the independent variable. The inverse process
is undertaken by correlating with the (complex) conjugate of the chirp exp(−iαt2). This
provides a reconstruction for f in the presence of the field n that is accurate and robust
with very low signal-to-noise ratios. Further, we consider a watermark based on a coding
scheme in which the field n is the input. The watermark f is therefore n-dependent. This
allows an authentication scheme to be developed in which the watermark is generated from
the field in which it is to be hidden. Authentication of the watermarked data is then based
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on comparing the code generated from s ∼ n and that reconstructed from s = f + n when
‖f‖ << ‖n‖. This is an example of a self-generated coding scheme which avoids the use,
distribution and application of reference codes. There are numerous applications of this
technique in areas where authentication is mandatory. For example, the method can readily
be applied to audio data with no detectable differences in the audio quality of the data,
providing a tamper proof facility that can be used to validate the autheticity of the data.
3.3 Wavelets
We now discusses an approach to ‘watermarking’ digital signals using wavelets. In particular,
we introduce a technique that utilises Morlet wavelets (with zero characteristic frequency).
These wavelets modulate the frequency linearly with time and are consequenctly known
as linear frequency modulated wavelets or ‘chirps’. The method introduced is therefore
known as ‘chirp coding’. The principles underlying this approach are based on the use of
a matched filter to provide a reconstruction of a chirped code that is uniquely robust, i.e.
in the case of very high signal-to-chirp ratios. The theoretical and computational aspects
of the matched filter and the properties of a chirp are revisited to provide the essential
background to the method. Signal code generating schemes are then addressed and details
of the coding and decoding techniques considered. The method considered is of value for
embedding information in digital signals and for authenticating the data. The approach is
generic in the sense that it can can be used for a range of data types and applications (the
authentication of speech and audio signals for example).
Fresnel diffusion which is based on the principles associated with Fresnel optics in which
the object function f is mapped to an image function u at a distance z via the equation
u(x, y) = p(x, y)⊗⊗f(x, y)
where the Point Spread Function (PSF) p is given by (ignoring scaling)
p(x, y) = exp
[−iα(x2 + y2)]
and
α =
pi
zλ
Here, λ is the wavelength. By correlating u with p∗ we obtain an estimate fˆ for f given by
fˆ(x, y) ' XY sinc(αXx) sinc(αY y)⊗⊗f(x, y).
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which in Fourier space becomes
Fˆ (kx, ky) =
pi
2
α2
F (kx, ky), | kx |≤ piXzλ , | ky |≤ piYzλ ;
0, otherwise.
Observe that for a fixed values of X, Y and z, as λ decreases, the bandwidth of fˆ(x, y)
increases. In other words the resolution on the structure of f , as determined by fˆ , increases
as the wavelength decreases. This is of course consistent with the basic expression for
resolution R in which
R ∼ D
λ
where D is the size of the aperture. The point here, is that in optics, the wavelength
governs tha resolution available and in Fresnel optics this is a consequence of the fact that
the convolution kernel is given by exp(ipiR2/zλ), R =
√
x2 + y2. Note that for the one-
dimensional case, we can write this result in the form
u(x) =
∫
w
(
x− y
L
)
f(y)dy
where
w(x) = exp(ipix2)
and
L = zλ.
In principal, by changing the wavelength of a Fresnel imaging system, we can change the
resolution of the system and thus explore the structure of the two-dimensional object function
f(x, y) on a multi-resolutional basis. In a practical Fresnel imaging system, for example, it
is not usually possible to adjust the wavelength in an arbitrary way. However, for signal
processing, we can choose to analyse a function f(t) by convolving it with the function w(t)
over a range of scales L.
The function w(t) is an example of a wavelet known as the Morlet wavelet which, as a
function of time t, is given by (without the correction term and for unit amplitude)
w(t) = exp[i(ω0t− t2/2)]
where ω0 is the characteristic frequency of the wavelet. However, w is only one of a number
of arbitrary functions that may be considered. Thus, from a generic point of view, we are at
liberty to generalise and define the wavelet transformation of a signal f(t) as
f(t)↔ FL(t)
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in terms of projections of f(t) onto a family of functions that are all normalized dilations
and translations of a prototype ‘wavelet’ function w, i.e.
Wˆ [f(t)] = FL(τ) =
∫
f(t)wL(t, τ)dt
where
wL(t, τ) =
1√| L |w
(
τ − t
L
)
, L 6= 0.
The parameters L and τ are continuous dilation and translation parameters respectively.
Note that the wavelet transformation is essentially a convolution transform in which w(t)
is the convolution kernel but with a factor L introduced. The introduction of this factor
provides dilation and translation properties into the convolution integral that gives it the
ability to analyse signals in a multi-resolution role where the convolution integral is now a
function of L. In general, a multi-resolution signal analysis is a framework for analysing
signals based on isolating variations in the signal that occur on different temporal or spatial
scales. The basic analysis involves approximating the signal at successively coarser scales
through repeated application of a smoothing (convolution) operator.
The multi-resolution properties of the wavelet transform have been crucial to their de-
velopment and success in the analysis and processing of signal and images. Wavelet trans-
formations play a central role in the study of self-similar or fractal signals and images. The
transform constitutes as natural a tool for the manipulation of self-similar or scale invariant
signals as the Fourier transform does for translation invariant such as stationary and periodic
signals. All wavelet signal analysis is based on convolution type operations which include
a scaling property in terms of the amplitude and temporal extent of the convolution kernel
either in one- or many-dimensions (e.g. [68], [69] and [70]).
A necessary and sufficient condition for this transformation to be invertible is that w(t)
satisfy the admissibility condition∫
| W (ω) |2| ω |−1 dω = Cw <∞
where W is the wavelets Fourier transform, i.e.
W (ω) =
∫
w(t) exp(−iωt)dt
Provided w has reasonable decay at infinity and smoothness, as is usually the case in practice,
the admissibility condition above is equivalent to the condition∫
w(t)dt = 0
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For any admissible w(t), the wavelet transform has an inverse given by
f(t) = Wˆ−1[FL(τ)] =
1
Cw
∫ ∫
FL(τ)wL(t, τ)L
−2dLdτ
There are a wide variety of wavelets available [i.e. functional forms for wL(τ)] which are
useful for processing signals in ‘wavelet space’ when applied in discrete form. The properties
of the wavelets vary from one application to another but in each case, the digital signal fi is
decomposed into a matrix (a set of vectors) Fij where j is the ‘level’ of the decomposition.
Note that a random fractal signal in which
u(t) =
1
t1−q/2
⊗ n(t)
is, in effect, a wavelet transform for L = 1 where
wq =
1
t1−q/2
Fractal modulation involves the generation of fractal noise for different values of q that can
be used to encode information.
3.4 Matched Filtering using Chirps
The Matched Filter (e.g. [76], [77] and [78]]) is one of the most common filters used for
pattern recognition. It is based on correlating the data with a matching template of the
feature that is assumed to be present in the date [77]]. If the feature does indeed exist, then
the output of the filter produces a local maximum or spike where the feature occurs. This
process can be applied generally, but when the template and feature are based on linear FM
wavelets the result has some special and important properties which provide an output that
is uniquely robust in the presence of high noise levels, i.e. high degrees of confusion. It is
this property that forms the basis for a variety of active information systems such as those
used in Real and Synthetic Aperture Radar (e.g. [79], [80] and [81]), active sonar and some
forms of seismic prospecting, for example. A chirped signal is used in pulse compression
Real and Synthetic Aperture Radar applications because of its ability to give low side-lobes
when correlated with itself. This gives an advantage of being detected in the presence of high
background noise. In a watermarking application, this background noise becomes the signal
to be watermarked. Interestingly, some mammals (dolphins, whales and bats, for example)
use frequency modulation for communication and detection. The reason for this is the unique
properties that chirps provide in terms of the quality of extracting information from signals
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with very low signal-to-noise ratios and the simplicity of the process that is required to
do this (i.e. correlation). The invention and use of chirps for man made communications
and information systems dates back to the early 1960s (the application of FM to radar for
example); mother nature appears to have ‘discovered’ the idea some time ago. The use of
frequency modulation is the basis the method presented here and, in the following section,
the theoretical background to the Matched Filter is considered and the result of using chirp
functions with matched filtering re-visited.
3.4.1 The Matched Filter
We start by considering the basic linear stationary (convolution) model for a signal s as a
function of time t, namely
s(t) = p(t)⊗ f(t) + n(t)
where f is the Impulse Response Function (IRF), p is the Instrument Function, n is the noise
(which is typically taken to have stationary statistics) and ⊗ is the convolution operation,
i.e.
(p⊗ f)(t) =
∫
p(t− τ)f(τ)dτ.
A fundamental inverse (deconvolution) problem is to find an estimate fˆ of f given s. The
Matched Filter is based on assuming a linear convolution model for this estimate of the form
fˆ(t) = q(t)⊗ s(t)
Clearly, the problem is to find the filter q. The Matched Filter is based on finding q subject
to the condition that
r =
| ∫ Q(ω)P (ω)dω |2∫ | N(ω) |2| Q(ω) |2 dω (7.2)
is a maximum where Q, P and N are the Fourier transforms of q, p and n respectively and
where we defined the Fourier transform pair as
F (ω) =
∫
f(t) exp(−iωt)dt,
f(t) =
1
2pi
∫
F (ω) exp(iωt)dω.
in which the limits of the integrals are taken to be in (−∞,∞). Note, that the ratio defining
r is a ‘measure’ of the signal-to-noise ratio. In this sense, the matched filter maximizes the
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the output.
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Assuming that the noise n has a ‘white’ uniform power spectrum, the filter Q which
maximizes the SNR defined by r can be shown to be given by the simple result
Q(ω) = P ∗(ω).
The required solution is therefore given by
fˆ(t) =
1
2pi
∫
P ∗(ω)S(ω) exp(iωt)dω
Using the ‘correlation theorem’ we can write
fˆ(t) = p(t) s(t) ≡
∫
p(τ + t)s(τ)dτ.
Hence, the matched filter is based on correlating the signal s with the IRF p.
3.4.2 Derivation of the Matched Filter
With the problem specified as given in the previous section, the matched filter is essentially
a ‘by-product’ of the ‘Schwarz inequality’, i.e. the result∣∣∣∣∫ Q(ω)P (ω)dω∣∣∣∣2 ≤ ∫ | Q(ω) |2 dω ∫ | P (ω) |2 dω.
If we write
Q(ω)P (ω) =| N(ω) | Q(ω)× P (ω)| N(ω) |
then the above inequality becomes∣∣∣∣∫ Q(ω)P (ω)dω∣∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣∣∫ | N(ω) | Q(ω) P (ω)| N(ω) |dω
∣∣∣∣2
≤
∫
| N(ω) |2| Q(ω) |2 dω
∫ | P (ω) |2
| N(ω) |2dω.
From this result, using the definition of r given in equation (7.2), we see that
r ≤
∫ | P (ω) |2
| N(ω) |2dω.
Now, if r is to be a maximum, then we require that
r =
∫ | P (ω) |2
| N(ω) |2dω
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or ∣∣∣∣∫ | N(ω) | Q(ω) P (ω)| N(ω) |dω
∣∣∣∣2 = ∫ | N(ω) |2| Q(ω) |2 dω ∫ | P (ω) |2| N(ω) |2dω.
But this is only true if
| N(ω) | Q(ω) = P
∗(ω)
| N(ω) |
Hence, r is a maximum when
Q(ω) =
P ∗(ω)
| N(ω) |2 .
3.4.3 ‘White Noise’ Condition
The noise term n(t) can, in principle, have arbitrary characteristics although they are usually
assumed to be stationary. The noise is characterised by two fundamental characteristics: (i)
the Probability Distribution Function (PDF) or the Characteristic Function (i.e. the Fourier
transform of the PDF); (ii) the Power Spectral Distribution Function (PSDF). To apply the
Matched Filter, the function | N(ω) |2 in addition to P (ω) is required to be known a priori.
In some practical systems this is possible if the Impulse Response Function is set to zero so
that the output of the system is ‘noise driven’. In general however, it is often necessary to
apply a suitable model for the PSDF. Such models may include random fractal noise, for
example. However, if we consider the case when the PSDF is uniform or ‘white’ and of unit
amplitude then we can write
| N(ω) |2= 1∀ω
so that the Matched Filter reduces to the simple result
Q(ω) = P ∗(ω).
3.4.4 Deconvolution of Linear FM Chirps
The matched filter is frequently used in systems that utilize linear Frequency Modulated
(FM) signals. Signals of this type are known as ‘chirped signal’. A linear FM signal which
is taken to be of compact support (t ∈ [−T/2, T/2]) is given (in complex form) by
p(t) = exp(iαt2), | t |≤ T
where α is a constant and T is the length of the signal. The phase of this signal is given by
αt2 (i.e. it has a quadratic phase factor) and its instantaneous frequency is therefore given
by
d
dt
(αt2) = 2αt
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which varies linearly with time t. Hence, the frequency modulations are linear which is why
the signal is referred to as a ‘linear’ FM pulse.
Let us first consider the case when the additive noise term is neglected and consider a
signal given by
s(t) = exp(iαt2)⊗ f(x), | t |≤ T.
If we now apply a (white noise) matched filter, then we have
fˆ(t) = exp(−iαt2) exp(iαt2)⊗ f(t), | t |≤ T.
The correlation integral can now be evaluated thus
exp(−iαt2) exp(iαt2) =
T/2∫
−T/2
exp[−iα(τ + t)2] exp(iατ 2)dτ
= exp(−iαt2)
T/2∫
−T/2
exp(−2iαtτ)dτ.
Evaluating the integral over τ , we have
exp(−iαt2) exp(iαt2) = T exp(−iαt2)sinc(αTt)
and hence
fˆ(t) = T exp(−iαt2)sinc(αTt)⊗ f(t).
3.4.5 Approximation for Long Chirps
A further useful simplification can now be made to the result for fˆ which allows the expo-
nential term to be ignored. In particular, if we consider T >> 1 then
cos(αt2)sinc(αTt) ' sinc(αTt)
and
sin(αt2)sinc(αTt) ' 0
so that
fˆ(t) ' T sinc(αTt)⊗ f(t).
This simplification, under a condition that is often practically applicable, allows the result
for fˆ to be easily analysed in Fourier space. Using the convolution theorem we can write
(ignoring scaling by pi/α)
Fˆ (ω) =
F (ω), | ω |≤ αT ;0, | ω |> T. (2.2)
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which describes fˆ as being a band-limited version of f (assuming the f is not band-limited)
where the bandwidth is determined by αT .
In the presence of additive noise, the result is
fˆ(t) ' T sinc(αTt)⊗ f(t) + exp(−iαt2) n(t)
The correlation function produced by the correlation of exp(−iαt) with n(t) will, in general,
be relatively low in amplitude since n(t) will not normally have features that match or
correlate with those of a (complex) chirp. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
‖T sinc(αTt)⊗ f(t)‖ >> ‖ exp(−iαt2) n(t)‖
and that in practice, fˆ is a band-limited reconstruction of f with high SNR. Thus, the use
of chirps for diffusing an input f allows for a high degree confusion using additive noise with
relative low SNRs
An example of a matched filter reconstruction is given in Figure 3.1. Here, two unit
spikes have been convolved with a linear FM chirp of the form p(t) = sin(αt2) whose width
or pulse length T is significantly greater than that of the input signal. The output signal
has been generated using an SNR of 1 where the SNR is defined by
SNR =
‖p(t)⊗ f(t)‖∞
‖n(t)‖∞
and where ‖ • ‖∞ denotes the uniform norm. Clearly, this example illustrates the fidelity of
the reconstruction for f(t) using a relatively simple operation for processing data that has
been badly distorted by additive noise.
3.5 Chirp Code Watermarking
Consider the field n(t) to be some pre-defined signal to which a watermark is to be ‘added’
to generate s(t). In principle, any watermark described by a function f(t) can be used. On
the other hand, for the purpose of authentication we require two criterion: (i) f(t) should
represent a code which can be reconstructed accurately and robustly; (ii) the watermark
should be sensitive (and ideally ultra-sensitive) to any degradation in the field s(t). To
satisfy condition (i), it is reasonable to consider f(t) to represent a bit stream, i.e. to
consider the discretized version of f(t) - the vector fi - to be composed of a set of elements
with value 0 or 1. This binary code can of course be based on a key or set of keys which, when
reconstructed, is compared to a key for the purpose of authenticating the data. However, this
requires the distribution of such keys (public and/or private). Instead, we consider the case
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Figure 3.1: Example of a reconstruction using the matched filter (bottom right) from a noisy
signal (bottom left) generated by the convolution of an input consisting of two spikes (top
left) with a linear FM chirp (top right).
where a binary sequence is generated from the field n(t). There are a number of approaches
that can be considered based on the spectral characteristics of n(t), for example, or through
application of wavelet decomposition which is discussed later.
3.5.1 Chirp Coding
Given that a binary sequence has been generated from n(t) through some process, we now
consider the method of chirp coding. The purpose of chirp coding is to ‘diffuse’ each bit over
a range of compact support. However, it is necessary to differentiate between 0 and 1 in the
sequences. The simplest way to achieve this is to change the polarity of the chirp. Thus, for
1 we apply the chirp sin(αt2), t ∈ T and for 0 we apply the chirp -sin(αt2), t ∈ T where
T is the chirp period. The chirps are then concatenated to produce a contiguous stream of
data, i.e. a signal composed of ±chirps or a ‘chirp stream’. Thus, the binary sequence 010
for example is transformed to the signal
s(t) =

−chirp(t), t ∈ [0, T );
+chirp(t), t ∈ [T, 2T );
−chirp(t), t ∈ [2T, 3T ).
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The period over which the chirp is applied depends on the length of the signal to which the
watermark is to be applied and the length of the binary sequence. In the example given
above the length of the signal is taken to be 3T . In practice, care must be taken over the
chirping parameter α that is applied given a period T in order to avoid aliasing and in some
cases it is of value to apply a logarithmic sweep instead of a linear sweep.
3.5.2 Decoding
Decoding or reconstruction of the binary sequence requires the application of a correlator
using the function chirp(t), t ∈ [0, T ). This produces a correlation function that is either
-1 or +1 depending upon whether −chirp(t) or +chirp(t) has been applied respectively. For
example, after correlating the chirp coded sequence 010 given above, the correlation function
c(t)becomes
c(t) =

−1, t ∈ [0, T );
+1, t ∈ [T, 2T );
−1, t ∈ [2T, 3T ).
from which the original sequence 010 is easily inferred - the change in sign of the correlation
function identifying a change of bit (from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0). Note, that in practice
the correlation function may not be exactly 1 or -1 when reconstruction is undertaken in
the presence of additive noise; the binary sequence is effectively recovered by searching the
correlation function for changes in sign.
3.5.3 Watermarking
The watermarking process is based on adding the chirp stream to the signal n(t). Let the
chirp stream be given by the function h(t), then the watermarking process is described by
the equation
s(t) = a
[
bh(t)
‖h(t)‖∞ +
n(t)
‖n(t)‖∞
]
where the coefficients a > 0 and 0 < b < 1 determine the amplitude of the signal s and the
chirp stream-to-signal ratio where
a = ‖n(t)‖∞.
The coefficient a is required to provide a watermarked signal whose amplitude is the same
as the original signal n. The value of b is adjusted to provide an output that is acceptable
in the application to be considered but to also provide a robust reconstruction of the binary
sequence by correlating s(t) with chirp(t), t ∈ [0, T ).
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3.6 Code Generation
In the previous section, the method of chirp coding a binary sequence and watermarking the
signal n(t) has been discussed where it is assumed that the sequence is generated from n(t).
In this section, the details of this method are presented. There are a wide variety of coding
methods that can be applied [82]. The problem is to convert the salient characteristics of
the signal n(t) into a sequence of bits that is relatively short and conveys information on
the signal in a unique and complete way. There are a number of ways of undertaking this.
For example, in practice the digital signal ni - which is composed of an array of floating
point numbers - could be expressed in binary form and each element concatenated to form a
contiguous bit stream. However, the length of the code (i.e. the total number of bits in the
stream) will tend to be large leading to high computational costs in terms of the application
of chirp coding/decoding. What is required, is a process that yields a relatively short binary
sequence (when compared with the original signal) that reflects the important properties of
the signal in its entirety. Two approaches are considered here: (i) Power Spectral Density
decomposition and (ii) Wavelet decomposition [83].
3.6.1 Power Spectrum Decomposition
Let N(ω) be the Fourier transform n(t) and define the Power Spectrum P (ω) as
P (ω) =| N(ω) |2
Here, we consider a binary sequence that is taken to ‘encode’ the spectral characteristics
of the signal. Thus, if for example, the binary sequence is based on just the low frequency
components of the signal, then any distortion of the high frequencies of the watermarked
signal will not affect the recovered watermark. Hence, we consider the case where the power
spectrum is decomposed into N components as follows:
P1(ω) = P (ω), ω ∈ [0,Ω1)
P2(ω) = P (ω), ω ∈ [Ω1,Ω2)
...
PN(ω) = P (ω), ω ∈ [ΩN−1,ΩN)
Note that it is assumed that the signal n(t) is band-limited with a bandwidth of ΩN .
The set of the functions P1, P2, ..., PN now represent the complete spectral characteristics
of the signal n(t). Since each of these functions represents a unique part of the spectrum,
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we can consider a single measure as an identifier or tag. A natural measure to consider is
the energy which is given by the integral of the functions over their frequency range. In
particular, we can consider the energy values in terms of their contribution to the spectrum
as a percentage, i.e.
E1 =
100
E
Ω1∫
0
P1(ω)dω
E2 =
100
E
Ω2∫
Ω1
P2(ω)dω
...
EN =
100
E
ΩN∫
ΩN−1
PN(ω)dω
where
E =
ΩN∫
0
P (ω)dω.
Code generation is then based on the following steps:
(i) Rounding to the nearest integer the (floating point) values of Ei to decimal integer form:
ei = round(Ei), ∀i
(ii) Decimal integer to binary string conversion:
bi = binary(ei)
(iii) Concatenation of the binary string array bi to a binary sequence:
fj = cat(bi)
The watermark fj is then generated by chirp coding.
3.6.2 Wavelet Decomposition
The wavelet transform was discussed earlier in this chapter and is defined by
Wˆ [f(t)] = FL(t) =
∫
f(τ)wL(t, τ)dτ
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where
wL(t, τ) =
1√| L |w
(
t− τ
L
)
.
The wavelet transformation is essentially a convolution transform in which w(t) is the con-
volution kernel but with a factor L introduced. The introduction of this factor provides
dilation and translation properties into the convolution integral (which is now a function of
L) that gives it the ability to analyse signals in a multi-resolution role. It is this property
that is the basis for considering the following approach.
We consider a code generating method that is based on computing the energies of the
wavelet transformation over N levels. Thus, the signal n(t) is decomposed into wavelet space
to yield the following set of functions:
FL1(τ), FL2(τ), ... FLN (τ).
The (percentage) energies of these functions are then computed, i.e.
E1 =
100
E
∫
| FL1(τ) |2 dτ,
E2 =
100
E
∫
| FL1(τ) |2 dτ,
...
EN =
100
E
∫
| FLN (τ) |2 dτ,
where
E =
N∑
i=1
Ei.
The method of computing the binary sequence for chirp coding from these energy values fol-
lows that described in the method of power spectrum decomposition. Whether applying the
power spectrum decomposition method or wavelet decomposition technique, the computa-
tions are undertaken in digital form using a DFT and a DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform)
respectively.
3.7 Coding and Decoding Processes
The coding process reads in a named file, applies the watermark to the data using wavelet
decomposition and writes out a new file using the same file format. The Decoding process reads
a named file (assumed to contain the watermark or otherwise), recovers the code from the
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watermarked data and then recovers the (same or otherwise) code from the watermark. The
coding program displays the decimal integer and binary codes for analysis. The decoding
program displays the decimal integer streams generated by the wavelet analysis of the input
signal and the stream obtained by processing the signal to extract the watermark code or
otherwise. This process also provides an error measure based on the result
e =
∑
i
| xi − yi |∑
i
| xi + yi |
where xi and yi are the decimal integer arrays obtained from the input signal and the
watermark (or otherwise). In the application considered here, the watermarking method
has been applied to audio (.wav) files in order to test the method on data which requires
that the watermark does not affect the fidelity of the output (i.e. audio quality). Only a
specified segment of the data is extracted for watermarking which is equivalent to applying
and off-set to the data. The segment can be user defined and if required, form the basis
for a (private) key system. Further any wavelet can be used for this process and the actual
wavelet used yields another feature that can form part of the private key required to extract
the watermark.
Coding Process
The coding process is compounded in the following basic steps:
Step 1: Read a .wav file.
Step 2: Extract a section of a single vector of the data (note that a .wav contains stereo
data, i.e. two vectors).
Step 3: Apply wavelet decomposition using Daubechies wavelets with 7 levels. Note that
in addition to wavelet decomposition, the approximation coefficients for the input signal are
computed to provide a measure on the global effect of introducing the watermark into the
signal. Thus, 8 decomposition vectors in total are generated.
Step 4: Compute the (percentage) ‘energy values’.
Step 5: Round to the nearest integer and convert to binary form.
Step 6: Concatenate both the decimal and binary integer arrays.
Step 7: Chirp code the binary sequence.
Step 8: Scale the output and add to the original input signal.
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Step 9: Re-scale the watermarked signal.
Step 10: Write to a file.
Decoding process
The decoding process is as follows:
Step 1: Steps 1-6 in the coding processes are repeated.
Step 2: Correlate the data with a chirp identical to that used for chirp coding.
Step 3: Extract the binary sequence.
Step 4: Convert from binary to decimal.
Step 5: Display the original and reconstructed decimal sequence.
Step 6: Display the error.
The method of digital watermarking compounded in coding/decoding algorithms given
makes specific use of the chirp function. This function is unique in terms of its proper-
ties for reconstructing information (via application of the Matched Filter). The approach
considered here allows a code to be generated directly from the input signal and that same
code is used to watermark the signal. The code used to watermark the signal is therefore
self-generating. Reconstruction of the code only requires a correlation process with the wa-
termarked signal to be undertaken. This means that the signal can be authenticated without
access to an external reference code. In other words, the method can be seen as a way of
authenticating data by extracting a code (the watermark) within a code (the signal) and is
consistent with approaches that attempt to reconstruct information without the host data
[84].
Audio data watermarking schemes rely on the imperfections of the human audio sys-
tem. They exploit the fact that the human auditory system is insensitive to small amplitude
changes, either in the time or frequency domains, as well as insertion of low amplitude time
domain echo’s. Spread spectrum techniques augment a low amplitude spreading sequence,
which can be detected via correlation techniques. Usually, embedding is performed in high
amplitude portions of the signal, either in the time or frequency domains. A common pitfall
for both types of watermarking systems is their intolerance to detector de-synchronization
and deficiency of adequate methods to address this problem during the decoding process.
Although other applications are possible, chirp coding provides a new and novel technique
for fragile audio watermarking. In this case, the watermarked signal does not change the
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perceptual quality of the signal. In order to make the watermark inaudible, the chirp gen-
erated is of very low frequency and amplitude. Using audio files with sampling frequencies
of over 1000Hz, a logarithmic chirp can be generated in the frequency band of 1-100Hz.
Since the human ear has low sensitivity in this band, the embedded watermark will not be
perceptible. Depending upon the band and amplitude of the chirp, the signal-to-watermark
(chirp stream) ratio can be in excess of 40dB. Figure 3.2 is an example of an original and
a watermarked audio signal which shows no perceptual difference during a listening test.
Various forms of attack can be applied which change the distribution of the percentage sub-
band energies originally present in the signal including filtering (both low pass and high
pass), cropping and lossy compression (MP3 compression) with both constant and variable
bit rates. In each case, the signal and/or the watermark is distorted enough to register the
fact that the data has been tampered with. Figure 3.3 shows the power spectral density of
the original, watermarked and an attacked audio signal. The band pass filtering attack is
such that there is negligible change in the power spectral density; however, the tampering
is easily detected by the proposed technique. Further, chirp based watermarks are difficult
to remove from the signal since the initial and the final frequency is at the discretion of the
user and its position in the data stream can be varied through application of an offset, all
such parameters being combined to form a private key.
Figure 3.2: Original signal (above) and chirp based watermarked signal for tamper proofing
(below)
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Figure 3.3: Difference in the power spectral density of the original, watermarked and tam-
pered signal. The tampering attack is done by using a band pass filter with normalised lower
cut-off frequency of 0.01 and higher cut-off frequency 0.99
3.8 Application to Audio Data Authentication
With the increase in computing power and high bandwidth internet connectivity, copying,
editing and illegal distribution for audio has become very easy. To overcome this problem,
digital audio watermarking has been proposed for applications such as copyright, annotation,
authentication, broadcast monitoring, and tamper-proofing [85], [86], [87]. An important
goal to be achieved by a watermark is its imperceptibility such that the end user is unaware
of its presence. This is especially important when the audio data is music where degradation
in quality cannot be tolerated. Most of the developed algorithms take advantage of the
Human Auditory System (HAS) limitations to embed a perceptually transparent watermark
into a host signal. A wide range of time domain embedding techniques such as alteration of
the Least Significant Bit (LSB) [89], echo addition [90], [91], Quantization Index Modula-
tion (QIM) and spread spectrum methods and transform domain techniques such as Fourier,
Cepstral [96], Wavelet [97], [98] , [99] etc. have been tried. Most of these methods and the
algorithms developed fall in the category of robust watermarking due their high tolerance
towards different attacks. However, there are some applications where there is a need for
checking the authenticity/originality of audio. Such applications in digital audio authenti-
cation can be found in areas such as broadcasting, sound recording of criminal events etc.
Thus, watermarking for such applications must be fragile i.e. the watermark should ‘break’
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as soon as any tampering is undertaken on the (watermarked) signal. It is also desirable
to have a watermark extraction process that is ‘blind’, implying that the original signal is
not required to extract the watermark. To achieve this, a fixed watermark sequence can be
embedded. However, this decreases the security of the scheme. Also, a unique watermark
sequence should be used to increase security. A solution to this problem is to use a signal
dependent watermark sequence. However, to facilitate a blind extraction process, watermark
extraction should be transparent to the watermarking scheme (implying that the sequence
extracted from the original and watermarked signals are the same). A high robustness to
attacks along with a high data rate for the embedded watermark cannot be achieved si-
multaneously [100]. There have been various attempts to increase the payload capacity for
robust watermarking [101] including multi-level watermarking in different domains that have
recently been proposed [102].
In this section we consider a new multi-level robust audio watermarking scheme based
on embedding ‘chirp’ (i.e. a stream of frequency modulated signals). The method exploits
a unique property of a chirp which is that it can be recovered in very noisy environment.
The watermarking sequence is derived from the signal spectrum by dividing it into sub-
bands using wavelet decomposition. Four levels of watermark are embedded without any
perceptual distortion. Objective measurements using the Perceptual Evaluation of Audio
Quality (PEAQ) test are reported using audio files from Speech Quality Assessment Mate-
rial (SQAM) with an Objective Difference Grade less than -1.0. The embedded watermark
is found to be robust to different simulated attacks. Due to two different processes of water-
mark sequence extraction, self-authentication and tamper-assessment can also be performed
using the proposed technique. Further, the HAS limitation of having poor sensitivity to
frequencies below 100Hz can be exploited. Along with robustness, the proposed scheme has
a capability for blind self-authentication as well. Thus, the scheme provides a multi-level
robust watermarking method with tamper detection capability.
A chirp is a signal whose frequency increases or decreases with time and may be linear,
quadratic or logarithmic as shown by the spectrograms in Figure 3.4
For example, the instantaneous frequency of a logarithmic chirp signal is given by
ωi(t) = ω0 + 10
βt (1)
where β is expressed as
β =
1
t1
log10(ω1 − ω0) (2)
Here, ω0 is the initial frequency and ω1 is the final frequency at time t1.
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Figure 3.4: Spectrograms of different types of chirp: linear (above), quadratic (centre) and
logarithmic (below)
3.8.1 Watermark Generation
To embed the watermark in a signal n(t), we use a chirp c(t) and watermark sequence m
based on the following equation
y (t) = n (t) + k · c (t) if m = 1, t ∈ [0, T ) (3)
y (t) = n (t)− k · c (t) if m = 0, t ∈ [0, T ) (4)
where y (t)is the watermarked signal and k is the scaling factor. The watermark sequence
is binary with ‘+1’ or ‘-1’ values which implies that a scaled version of a chirp is added to the
original signal in-phase or out-of-phase. This sequence can be generated by using a secret
key such that, once the key is known, the entire sequence can be generated. In this paper
we propose a technique to generate the watermark sequence using the audio signal itself.
A unique property of an audio signal is its spectral variation. This can be exploited
to derive a watermark binary sequence. The entire power spectrum is decomposed into N
sub-bands i.e.
Pi (ω) = P (ω) , ω ∈ [Ωi−1,Ωi) 1 ≤ i ≤ N (5)
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It is important that the signal n (t) is band-limited and has a bandwidth ofΩN . The set
of functions P1, P2, ..., PN represent the complete spectral characteristics of the signal n (t).
Since each of the components represents a unique part of the spectrum, a natural measure is
to consider the energy, which is given in terms of the integral of the power spectrum over the
frequency range. The energy calculated in each sub-band is represented as a percentage of
the total energy of the signal. The reason of calculating percentage energies of the sub-bands
is to avoid any influence of signal scaling on the authentication of the signal. The energy in
the ith sub-band is given by
Ei =
100
E
∫ Ωi
Ωi−1
Pi(ω)dω 1 ≤ i ≤ N (6)
where
E =
∫ ΩN
0
P (ω)dω (7)
An audio signal is split into sub-bands by applying the wavelet transformation which is
defined by [103].
WL (t) =
∫
f (τ)wL (t, τ) dτ (8)
where
WL (t, τ) =
1√|L|w
(
t− τ
L
)
Concatenating the total energy and sub-band energies gives a watermark vector. All
the elements of this vector are converted into binary form in which a ‘0’ is replaced by ‘-1’
thereby giving the watermark binary sequence m. The watermark is then embedded using
equation (3). A second level of watermark is applied by choosing a different initial and final
frequency with a different watermark sequence. The length of the chirp added can also be
different for different levels.
3.8.2 Watermark Recovery
Recovery of the watermark binary sequence requires correlation of the chirp function over the
desired interval ([nT, (n + 1)T) , n = 0, 1, 2, . . . ., ) with the watermarked signal. This
produces a correlation function that is either +1 or -1 depending upon whether the embedded
chirp is in-phase or out-of-phase. In practice +1 or -1 is never obtained and thus, thresholding
is applied such that if the value is positive then the bit is assumed to be 1 and 0 otherwise.
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3. APPLICATION OF WAVELETS TO WATERMARKING 74
Embedding Level Frequency range (Hz) SNR (dB) ODG
1 0-15 30.9050 -0.46556
2 0-30 28.1748 -0.77894
3 0-45 27.3172 -0.88256
4 0-60 26.7349 -0.95156
Table 3.1: SNR and ODG achieved for different level of embedding
The chirp used to recover the watermark must have the same parameters as those used
during the embedding watermark sequence. These parameters can be used to define part of
a private key.
3.8.3 Results
To verify the proposed scheme, audio files were selected from the Speech Quality Assessment
Material (SQAM) which is commonly used for assessing the quality of speech coders. A
logarithmic chirp signal with a frequency sweep less than 100Hz was used for embedding
the watermark. This frequency range was chosen to keep the watermarks imperceptible.
Wavelet decomposition using a ‘Daubechies 4’ mother wavelet was carried out. The resultant
sub-bands obtained for a 48kHz sampled signal are 0-3kHz, 3-6kHz, 6-9kHz, 9-12kHz, 12-
15kHz, 15-18kHz and 18-24kHz. A binary watermark sequence was derived by representing
percentage sub-band energies by 12 bits with a total energy of 32 bits giving a total of 116
bit information. The coded chirp was scaled and embedded into the signal. The first level
of watermark was embedded by using a chirp frequency sweep of 0-15Hz. A total of four
embedding levels was investigated with chirp specifications as shown in Table 3.1.
In order to analyze the worst case performance, the same sub-band based watermark
sequence was embedded at all four levels. Further, the length of the chirp and the start
point for the embedding process was kept the same at all levels giving overlapping chirp
frequency ranges over a common time frame and thereby, giving a maximum possibility of
error during the detection process. Subjective assessment of the speech quality was carried
out by calculating the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) at each embedding level. The average
SNR was evaluated for different levels providing the results shown in Table 1. This SNR
can be improved if the length of the chirp is increased. However, it is important to take
into consideration the human hearing curve to interpret the SNR achieved. Since the hu-
man ear has very poor sensitivity below 100 Hz a lower SNR is still imperceptible upon
listening. To further verify the above results, tests based on Perceptual Assessment of Audio
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Quality (PEAQ, Basic) [104] were also carried out. The PEAQ algorithm is the ITU-R rec-
ommendation (ITU-R BS.1387) for perceptual evaluation of wide-band audio codecs. This
algorithm models fundamental properties of the auditory system along with physiological
and psychoacoustic effects. It uses both original and test signals, and applies techniques to
find differences between them. An Objective Difference Grade (ODG) is evaluated using a
total of eleven Model Output Variables (MOV) of the basic version of PEAQ. The original
signal and watermarked signal for different embedding levels was used to evaluate ODG with
results as given in Table 1. ODG values mimic the listening test ratings and have values -4.0
(very annoying) to 0 (imperceptible difference).
Although all the MOVs were calculated from the PEAQ (basic version) test, only those
relevant to watermarking are reported here. The Noise-to-Mask Ratio (NMR) is an estimate
in dBs of the ratio between the actual distortion (caused due to the embedding watermark
in this case) and the maximum inaudible distortion. The total NMR is the average of the
NMRs calculated over all frames. Negative NMR values indicate inaudibility whereas values
larger than 0dB indicate audible distortions caused by the watermark. This is an important
test for checking the inaudibility of the embedded watermark at different levels. Results for
both speech signal and music signals were analysed separately and are plotted in Figure 3
along with the overall average. As stated earlier, the SNR (obtained in Table 1) shows a
high level of watermark, but due to its very low frequency, it is not audible.
The noise loudness quantifies the partial loudness of distortions that is introduced during
when the watermark is embedded in the host signal. The Root Mean Square (RMS) value
of noise loudness has a maximum limit of 14.8197. Figure 4 shows a normailsed plot of the
average RMS noise loudness achieved on the SQAM data for all of the 4 levels considered. It
is possible for the total NMR to be below 0dB (implying inaudiable), but there may be a large
number of frames with small positive values and few frames with large negative value. This
distribution can be seen by evaluating the number of disturbed frames. A relatively disturbed
frame is one in which the maximum NMR exceeds 1.5 dB and is expresses as a fraction of
the total frames. The results in Figure 4 show that with 4 level embedding, less than
3.5 percent of the frames have an NMR above 1.5dB. Thus, the multi-level watermarking
proposed is imperceptible. To evaluate the robustness and self-authentication capability,
different attacks were simulated simulated as discussed below.
3.8.4 Robustness
To evaluate the robustness of a multi-level watermark, correlation between the watermark
sequences (obtained by sub-band energies from the original signal) and the extracted wa-
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termark (obtained by correlating the chirp with the watermarked signal) was carried out.
Different attacks such as addition of additive white Gaussian noise, up-sampling, down-
sampling, re-sampling, low-pass and high-pass filtering were carried out on the multi-level
watermarked audio signal. The tests were carried out on all the SQAM files providing
‘average results’ as described below.
For and attack using additive noise, it was found that watermark embedded using a low
frequency sweep was more robust when compared to a high frequency sweep. The average
SNR at which the detection error starts for level-1 embedding was found to be -1.9060dB
while for level-4, it was 12.14dB. The overall robustness to noise of the scheme was 13.0376dB
which clearly shows that a level-4 watermark (sweep from 0-60 Hz) is more sensitive to noise.
Thus is, or course, to be expected and illustrates that multi-level watermarking can help in
embedding critical and important information using lower frequency sweeps that it more
resistant to attack.
The sampling rates were varied from 10% to 200% of the sampling frequency and the
watermark recovered at all levels without any error. Thus, the extraction scheme has no
effect of changes to the sampling rate. Amplitude scaling also observed to have no effect on
watermark recovery provided it was constant over the entire frequency band.
To simulate a filtering attack, the watermarked signal was passed through a finite impulse
response high-pass filter of order ‘50’ and cut-off frequency of ‘fc’. This cut-off frequency
was varied and extraction of watermark was carried out until an error was obtained. It
was observed that the error in recovering the watermark occurred at fc=936Hz. Since a
filter has smooth transitions from stop-band to pass-band, the embedded chirp streams are
not removed but severely attenuated. Since the chirp can be extracted from very noisy
environment, it is possible to extract the watermark at high cut-off frequency. However,
appreciable degradation of in audio quality occurs using high-pass filters with fc=936Hz.
The results obtained are shown in Figure 5. Note that higher cut-off frequencies can be
achieved if the order of the filter is reduced. The scheme is resistant to low-pass filter
attack since the embedded watermark occupies a very low frequency band. Removing the
watermark by a low-pass filter effectively removes the entire signal along with the watermark.
To have intelligible audio quality, the bandwidth of the low-pass filter should be at least 4
kHz for which the watermark is fully recoverable without any error.
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4
Digital Image Watermarking Methods
4.1 Introduction
Like many aspects of digital signal processing, watermarking schemes fall into two categories:
spatial domain and transform domain techniques. This depends on whether the watermark
is encoded by directly modifying pixels (such as simply flipping low-order bits of selected
pixels) or by altering some frequency coefficients obtained by transforming the image in the
frequency domain. Spatial domain techniques are simple to implement and often require a
lower computational cost, although they can be less robust against tampering than methods
that place the watermark in the transform domain. Watermarking schemes that operate in
a transform space are increasingly common, as these schema posses a number of desirable
features. In this Chapter, these aspects are discussed in depth and implemented. They bring
a novel approach to how we have used the embedding techniques based on an overview of
the principal techniques associated with digital image watermarking given in the following
section.
4.2 Transform Domain Methods
Like many aspects of digital signal processing watermarking schemes fall into two categories:
spatial domain and transform domain techniques. This depends on whether the watermark
is encoded by directly modifying pixels (such as simply flipping low-order bits of selected
pixels) or by altering some frequency coefficients obtained by transforming the image in the
frequency domain. Spatial domain techniques are simple to implement and often require a
lower computational cost, although they can be less robust against tampering than methods
that place the watermark in the transform domain. Watermarking schemes that operate in
77
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a transform space are increasingly common, as these schema posses a number of desirable
features. This section1 provides an overview of the principal techniques associated with
digital image watermarking.
Watermarking schemes that operate in a transform space are increasingly common, as
these schemes posses a number of desirable features including:
• By transforming spatial data into another domain, statistical independence between
pixels as well as high-energy compaction can be obtained.
• The watermark is irregularly distributed over the entire spatial image upon an inverse
transformation, which makes it more difficult for attackers to decode and read the
mark.
• One can provide markers according to the perceptual significance of different transform
domain components, which means that one can adaptively place a watermark where
it is least noticeable, such as within a textured area.
• Transform domain methods can hide messages in significant areas of the cover which
makes them more robust against several attacks and distortion. However, while they
are more robust to various kinds of signal processing, they remain imperceptible to the
human sensory system.
• Cropping may be a serious threat to any spatially based watermark but is less likely to
affect a frequency-based scheme. Since watermarks applied to the frequency domain
will be dispersed over the entirety of the spatial image upon inverse transformation,
we can retrieve part of the watermark.
• Lossy compression is an operation that usually eliminates perceptually unimportant
components of a signal. Most processing of this sort takes place in the frequency
domain. In fact, matching the transform with a compression transform may result
in better performance of the data-hiding schema (i.e. DCT for JPEG, Wavelet for
JPEG-2000).
• The characteristics of the Human Visual System (HVS) can be fully exploited in the
frequency domain.
1Based on an edited version of K. W. Mahmoud, Low Resolution Watermarking for Print Security, PhD
Thesis, Loughborough University, 2005, (Chapter 2).
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4.3 Frequency Domain Processing and HVS
It is usually the case, that the HVS is not sensitive to small changes in edges and texture but
they are very sensitive to small changes in the smooth areas of an image. In flat featureless
portions of the image, important information concerned with the ’flat parts’ concentrate on
the lowest frequency components, while, in a highly textured image, energy is concentrated
in the high frequency components. Therefore, the human eyes are more sensitive to lower
frequency noise, rather than high frequency noise. Taking into account these fundamental
points:
• The watermark should be embedded into the higher frequency components to achieve
better perceptual invisibility, however, high frequencies might be discarded after at-
tacks such as lossy compression, shrinking or scanning.
• In order to prevent the watermark from being easily attacked, it is often necessary
to embed it into the lower frequency coefficients. The attacker can not change these
coefficients, otherwise the image can be damaged. However, the human eyes are more
sensitive to lower frequency noise.
From the points discussed above, in order to invisibly embed a watermark, which can survive
most attacks, it is clear, that a reasonable trade-off is to embed the watermark into the middle
frequency range of the image [105].
4.4 Frequency Domain Processing
In watermarking in the transform domain, the original host data is transformed, and the
transformed coefficients are perturbed by a small amount in one of several possible ways in
order to represent the watermark. Coefficient selection is based on perceptual significance or
energy significance. When the watermarked image is compressed or modified by any image
processing operations, noise is added to the already perturbed coefficients. The private re-
trieval operation subtracts the received coefficients from the original ones to obtain the noise
perturbation. The watermark is then estimated from the noisy data as best as possible. The
most difficult problem associated with blind watermark detection in the frequency domain
is to identify the coefficients used for watermarking. Embedding can be done by adding a
pseudo-random noise field, quantization (threshold) or image (logo) fusion. Most algorithms
consider HVS to minimize perceptibility. The aim is to place more information bits where
they are most robust to attack and are least noticeable. Most schemes operate directly
on the components of some transform of the cover such as the Discrete Cosine Transform
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(DCT), Discrete Wavelet Transforms (DWT) and Discrete Fourier Transforms (DFT). In
this section we introduce each transformation, illustrates its main features and introduce
some techniques that use the transformation in watermarking.
4.4.1 Discrete Cosine Transform
The DCT transform has a number of advantages in respect of watermarking:
• The DCT has the primary advantage that it is a sequence of real numbers, provided
that the input sequence is real.
• The two-dimensional DCT is the basis for most popular lossy digital image compression
system used today, e.g. the JPEG system.
• The sensitivity of HVS to the DCT basis images has been extensively studied resulting
in a default JPEG quantization table.
4.5 Embedding Techniques using the DCT
Zhao, et al. [106] approach the problem by segmenting the image into 8x8 blocks. Block
DCT transformation and quantization steps are applied on each block. A bit of informa-
tion can be encoded in a block using the relation between three quantized DCT coefficients
(c1, c2, andc3) from this block. The three coefficients must correspond to the middle fre-
quencies. One block encodes a ‘1’, if c1 > c3+d and c2 > c3+d. On the other hand, a ‘0’ is
encoded, if c1+d < c3 and c2+d < c3. The parameter d accounts for the minimum distance
between two coefficients. The higher d is, the more robust the method will be against image
processing techniques. If the relations between the coefficients do not correspond to the en-
coded bit, a change must be made to the coefficients so that they can represent the encoded
bit. If the modification required to code one bit of information is too large, then the block
is not used and marked as an invalid block. Consequently, the blocks are de-quantized and
the inverse DCT is applied. In the decoding step, comparing the three coefficients of every
block in the quantized DCT domain can restore the label.
Cox, et al. [107] present an image watermarking method in which the mark (a sequence
of real numbers {wi} having a normal distribution with zero mean and a unity variance) is
embedded in the n (excluding the DC term) most perceptually significant frequency com-
ponents V = {vi} of an image’s DCT to provide greater robustness to JPEG compression.
The watermark is inserted using he procedure v´i = vi + α ∗ vi ∗ wi. This modulation law
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is designed to take into account the frequency masking characteristics of the human visual
system. This non-linear insertion procedure adapts the watermark to the energy present in
each coefficient. The advantage of this is that when vi is small, the watermark energy is
also small, thereby avoiding artifacts. When vi is large, the watermark energy is increased
for robustness. The parameter α represents a compromise between robustness and image
fidelity. The presence of the watermark is verified by extracting the main components of
the original image and those with same index from a watermarked image and inverting the
embedding formula to give a possibly modified watermark W ′. The watermark is said to be
present if the correlation between W and W ′ is greater than a given threshold.
Barni, et al. [108] propose a watermarking algorithm similar to Cox’s method. How-
ever, instead of using the n largest DCT coefficients as Cox does, the set is produced by
arranging the DCT coefficients in a zigzag order and a subset in the mid-frequency range
is selected. The lowest coefficients are then skipped to preserve perceptual invisibility. The
watermark is then embedded in this set of coefficients in the same way as Cox. In order
to enhance the invisibility of the watermark, the spatial masking characteristics of the HVS
are also exploited to adapt the watermark to the image being signed: the original image
(I) and the watermarked image (I ′) are added pixel by pixel according to a local weighting
factor b(i, j), thus producing a new watermarked image ˆIi,j = Ii,j(1 − bi,j) + bi,j ∗ I ′i,j , in
a region characterized by low-noise sensitivity, where the embedding of the watermarking
data is easier (e.g. highly textured regions where bi,j ≈ 1), i.e. in regions more sensitive to
change, in which the insertion of the watermark is more disturbing (e.g. uniform regions
where bi,j ≈ 0) the watermark is embedded only to a minor extent. In the extraction phase,
one first extracts the subset of modified coefficients from the full frame DCT of the water-
marked image. The correlation between the marked (possibly corrupted coefficients) and
the mark itself is taken as a measure of the mark presence.
O’ Ruanaidh, et al. [109] present a private watermarking technique for images using
bi-directional coding in the DCT domain. In bi-directional coding, the image is divided up
into blocks. The DCT is computed for each block. The mean of each block is incremented
to encode a ‘1’ or decremented to encode a ‘0’. This may be accomplished by using simple
thresholding techniques. A JPEG quantization table (visual masking) is used to weight
the DCT coefficients in each block. The most significant components are then selected by
comparing the square of the component magnitude to the total energy in the block. In the
decoding step, the mean of each block in the original non-watermarked image is compared
with the mean of the corresponding blocks in the tested copy to decode the stored bit.
Swanson, et al. [110] embed the watermark by computing the DCT for each block in
the cover. A perceptual mask is computed for each block. The resulting perceptual mask is
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then scaled and multiplied by the DCT of the pseudo-noise watermark. The schema uses a
different sequence for each block. The watermark is then added to the corresponding block.
The watermark can be detected by correlating the modified watermark with the original
watermark and comparing the result to a threshold.
Chae, et al. [111] use a public technique to embed a signature (watermark) into
images. The signature DCT coefficients are quantized according to a signature quantization
matrix. The resulting quantized coefficients are encoded using lattice-codes. The choice of
the signature quantization matrix affects the quantity and the quality of the embedded data.
The codes are inserted into the middle frequency DCT coefficients of the host image. This
insertion is adaptive to the local texture content of the host image blocks and is controlled
by the block texture factor. The texture factor is computed using a wavelet transform. The
selected host coefficients are then replaced by the signature codes and combined with the
original unaltered DCT coefficients to form a fused block of DCT coefficients. The fused
coefficients are then inverse-transformed to give an embedded image.
Bors, et al. [112] propose watermark algorithm based on imposing constraints in
the DCT domain. The block sites for embedding the watermark are selected based on a
Gaussian network classifier, then the DCT constraints are embedded in the selected blocks.
Two distinct algorithms are considered here. The first algorithm embeds a linear constraint
on selected DCT frequency coefficients (i.e. Y = FQ, where F is the vector of the modified
DCT coefficients, and Q is the weighting vector provided by the watermark). In the second
approach, circular regions are defined around certain DCT coefficients. For a selected block
site, they evaluate the Euclidean distance between its DCT coefficient vectors and that of the
watermark. The chosen DCT coefficients are changed to the value of the closest watermark
parameter vector. After modifying the DCT values, the image is reconstructed based on the
inverse DCT transform. In the detection stage, a check is made on the DCT constraints after
which the respective block is located. A given site is considered as being ’signed’ when the
probability of detecting the constrained DCT coefficients and the probability of detecting the
location constraint is maximized. The original image is not required for watermark detection
and simulations have showed this method to be resistant to JPEG compression and filtering.
Kankanhalli, et al. [132] propose a way of analysing the noise sensitivity of every pixel
based on the local region content (texture, edges and luminance). If the distortion caused by
the watermarking algorithm is at or below a threshold, the degradation in the original image
quality is imperceptible. The analysis is based on the DCT coefficients. The energy in the
DCT coefficients can be used as a measure of roughness, and the count of large-magnitude
fluctuations in a high-energy block can then be used to decide if the block has an edge or is
highly textured. The work also analyses the contribution of luminance to noise sensitivity.
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This luminance analysis is done at the pixel level in the spatial domain. The authors use
the previous mask to embed an invisible watermark in the spatial domain.
B. Tao, et al. [113] have an approach that is similar to that of [132]. Here, the block
as a whole is given a sensitivity label that shapes the watermark based on texture and edges
analysis. The embedding is then done in the DCT transform domain.
4.6 Discrete Wavelet Transform
The Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) is similar to a hierarchical sub-band system, where
the sub-bands are logarithmically spaced in frequency and represent octave-band decompo-
sition. The DWT can be implemented using digital filters and down-samplers [114]. The
original image is split into four quadrant bands after decomposition. The four quadrants con-
tain approximations to the sub-band (LL), horizontal detail sub-band (LH), vertical detail
sub-band (HL) and a diagonal detail sub-band (HH). This process can be repeatedly applied
on the approximation sub-band to generate the next coarser scale wavelet coefficients. The
process continues until some final scale is reached. The wavelets transform has a number of
advantages [115], [116] over other transform that can be exploited for watermarking including
the following:
• It is well known that wavelet coding has been exploited in new compression standards
such as JPEG2000 and MPEG4 due to the excellent performance in compression.
• The wavelet transform requires a lower computational cost of O(n) compared with the
Fourier or the Cosine transform which are of O(nlogn), where n is the length of the
signal.
• The wavelet transform processes data at different scales or resolutions, highlighting
both large and small features. This allows watermarking to become adaptive as it
depends on the local image characteristic at each resolution level.
• The wavelet functions provide good space-frequency localization and thus, they are
suited for analyzing images where most of the informative content is represented by
components localized in space such as edges and borders.
• With the DWT, the edges and texture are usually exploited very well in the high
frequency sub-band (HH, HL and LH). Therefore, adding a watermark via these large
coefficients is difficult for the human eye to perceive.
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• Wavelet functions have advantages over traditional Fourier methods in analyzing sig-
nals containing many discontinuities or sharp changes.
• The wavelet transform is flexible enough to adapt to a given set of images or particular
type of application. The decomposition filters (such as Haar, Daubechies-4, 6 or bi-
orthogonal filters) and the decomposition structure (wavelet packet, complex wavelet
transform) can be chosen to reflect the characteristics of the image.
• Research into human perception [117] indicates that the retina of the eye splits an
image into several frequency channels each spanning a bandwidth of approximately one
octave. The signals in these channels are processed independently. Similarly, in a multi-
resolution decomposition, the image is separated into bands of equal bandwidth on a
logarithmic scale. It can therefore expected that use of the discrete wavelet transform
will allow the independent processing of the resulting components without significant
perceptible interaction between them, and hence makes the process of imperceptible
marking more effective. For this reason the wavelet decomposition is commonly used
for the fusion of images.
4.7 Embedding Techniques in the DWT Domain
There have and continue to be many attempts to use the wavelet transform in watermarking.
These include the following.
Xia, et al. [115] propose a private watermarking system. The method utilizes large
DWT coefficients of all sub-bands excluding the approximation image to equally embed a
random Gaussian distributed watermark sequence in the whole image. The decoding process
is based on a hierarchical correlation of coefficients at different sub-bands. First, they apply
a one level DWT to the watermarked image and then on the original image. The difference
(corrupted watermark) of the DWT coefficients in the HH band of the watermarked and the
original image is then calculated. Then, the cross-correlation between the corrupted water-
mark and the part of the original watermark that was added in the HH band is determined.
If there is a peak in the cross correlation, the watermark is considered to be detected, oth-
erwise they consider the other bands at the same level (i.e. HH and LH, then HH, LH and
HL). In case the watermark still cannot be detected, they compute a new level of the DWT
and try to detect the watermark again. This process is performed until the watermark is
detected or the last level of the DWT has been reached.
Kundur, et al. [117] embed a binary watermark into the detail wavelet coefficients of
the host image with the use of a key. This binary randomly generated key is used to select
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the exact locations in the wavelet domain (ones location) in which to embed the watermark.
First, they compute the Lth level discrete wavelet decomposition of the host image to produce
a sequence of a L3 detailed images. Then, for each level, the embedding modulation at any
of the selected coefficients is undertaken as follows:
• Order the horizontal, vertical and diagonal detail coefficients at this location (high,
middle, and low).
• The range of values between high and low is divided into bins of width (high −
low)/(2Q − 1) where Q is a user-defined variable. These bins represent 1 and -1
in a periodic manner.
• To embed a watermark bit of value 1, the middle coefficients are quantized to the
nearest 1 bin. Alternatively, to embed a bit of -1, the middle coefficient is quantized
to the nearest -1 bin.
Finally, apply the inverse wavelet transform to form the watermarked image.
In Kunder, et al. [118] the host is transformed to the Lth level discrete wavelet
decomposition. Only the first level discrete wavelet decomposition of the watermark is
performed. The watermark is a random binary two-dimensional array. It is required that
the size of the watermark in relation to the host image be small. The detail images of the host
at each resolution level are segmented into a non-overlapping rectangle. Each rectangle has
the same size as any bands of the watermark. A numerical measure of perceptual importance
(salience) of each of these localized segments is computed. The watermark is embedded by
a simple scaled addition of the watermark to the particular detail component. The scaling
of the watermark is a function of the salience of the region. The greater the salience, the
stronger the presence of the watermark. Finally the corresponding Lth level inverse wavelet
transform is performed. Salience is computed based on a well-known model given by Dooly
[119], which is based on contrast sensitivity.
The original image is required in the extraction process. The extraction process is done
by applying the inverse procedure at each resolution level to obtain an estimate of the wa-
termark. The estimates for each resolution level are averaged to produce an overall estimate
of the watermark.
Ohnishi [120] propose an algorithm similar to the Kunder [117] technique. The most
significant difference between the two methods lies in the merging stage of the watermark.
Here the author marks the host by forcing the modulo 2 difference between the largest
and smallest wavelet coefficients for a particular position and resolution level to be one if
w(n) = 1 and to be zero if w(n) = −1.
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In M. Barni, et al. [121] the authors present a public watermarking system. A
binary pseudo-random sequence is weighted with a function, which takes into account the
human visual system (orientation, brightness, and texture) and is then added to the DWT
coefficients of the three largest detail sub-bands of the image (i.e. first level). For watermark
detection, the correlation between the watermark to be tested for its presence and the marked
coefficients is computed. The value of the correlation is compared to a threshold to decide
if the watermark is present or not. Experimental results prove the imperceptibility of the
watermark and the robustness against the more common attacks. A model for estimating
the sensitivity of the eye to noise - previously proposed for compression applications [122]-
is used to adapt the watermark strength to the local content of the image.
Inoue, et al. [123] propose two public digital watermarking schemes to embed a binary
code. Both methods are built on a data structure called a zerotree, which is defined in the
Embedded Zerotree Wavelet (EZW) algorithm of Shapiro [124]. Zerotree coding is based on
the hypothesis that if a wavelet coefficient at a coarse scale is insignificant with respect to
a given threshold T , then all wavelet coefficients of the same orientation in the same spatial
location at a finer scale are likely to be insignificant with respect to T . The zerotree is used
to classify wavelet coefficients as insignificant or significant as follows: given an amplitude
threshold T , if a wavelet coefficient x and all of it descendants (i.e. coefficients corresponding
to the same spatial locations but at finer scales of similar orientation) satisfy |x| < T then
they are called insignificant with respect to a given threshold T or zerotree for the threshold
T (otherwise significant coefficients). In one method, the zerotrees are constructed for any
coarsest sub-band (except LL sub-band) for a specific threshold. Each watermark binary
digit is embedded by writing the same data in the location of all elements of the current
zerotree. Data is redundantly embedded because insignificant coefficients are generally easy
to change under the influence of common signal processing. In the second method, the
watermark can be embedded by thresholding and modifying significant coefficients at the
coarser levels. However, it is well known that the modification of these components can
lead to perceptual degradation of the signal. To avoid this, they make the value of T larger
than in the previous method. As a result, the regions in which the watermark is embedded
are applied to detailed portions, i.e. edges or textures, in the coarsest scale component.
Therefore, embedding the watermark into significant coefficients is difficult for human eyes
to perceive. The watermark is detected by using the position of the zerotree’s root and the
threshold value after the wavelet decomposition of the cover image. It is shown that the
proposed method is robust against several common signal processes.
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4.8 Discrete Fourier Transform
The Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of a function provides a quantitative picture of the
frequency content in terms of magnitude and phase. This is important in a wide range of
physical problems and is fundamental to the processing and analysis of signals and images.
It is very important to know the properties of DFT so that it can be exploited efficiently.
Some of these properties are listed below:
Positive Symmetry If f(n,m);n = 1, 2, ..., N,m = 1, 2, ...,M is real (which is the case of
images), its DFT is conjugate symmetric [114]; that is F (p, q) = F ∗(N − p,M − q).
To ensure the inverse DFT is real, changes in the magnitude must preserve positive
symmetry.
Negative Symmetry This is the same as the above with regard to the phase component
(φ ), but in this case, we have a negative symmetry compounded in the result
φp,q = φp,q + δ
φN−p,M−q = φN−p,M−q − δ
Scaling Scaling in the spatial domain causes inverse scaling in the Fourier domain (i.e. as
the spatial scale expands, the frequency scale contracts and the amplitude increases
vertically in such a way as to keep the area constant), i.e.
if f(x, y)
DFT−−→ F (kx, ky) then f(axx, axy) DFT−−−→ 1
a
F (
kx
a
,
ky
a
)
Translation The translation property of Fourier transform is defined as
if f(x, y)
DFT−−→ F (kx, ky) then
f(x+ a, y + b)
DFT−−→ F (kx, ky)e−i(akx+bky)
This indicates that the phase is altered only by a translation, i.e. the amplitude is
insensitive to the spatial shift of an image. Note that both f and F are periodic func-
tions so it is implicitly assumed that the translation causes the image to be ‘wrapped
around’ (circular translation) [125]. By translation, zero padding of an image will occur
if it were placed on a scanner and scanned.
Rotation Rotating the image through an angle in the spatial domain causes the Fourier
representation to be rotated through the same angle [125], i.e.
f(x cos θ − y sin θ, x sin θ + y cos θ) DFT−−→
F (kx cos θ − ky sin θ, kx sin θ + ky cos θ)
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Log-Polar Representation Most watermarking algorithms have problems in extracting
the watermark after an affine geometric transformation on the watermarked object.
Some methods try to invert the effect of geometric distortion using the original image.
An alternative way is to build a system that can detect the watermark even after a
geometric distortion is applied, i.e. Rotation, Scaling and Translation invariance (RST
invariant). Most of these systems use the properties of log-polar representation of the
spectrum. In a log-polar mapping (which is defined as x = r cos θ, y = r sin θ), the
rotation and scaling in a Cartesian coordinate system will result in a translation in the
logarithmic coordinate system, i.e.
if f(x, y)
logh polar mapping−−−−−−−−−−−−→ f(µ, θ) then
f(ax, ay)
log polar mapping−−−−−−−−−−−→ f(µ+ loga, θ)
and
if f(x cos(θ + δ)− y sin(θ + δ), x sin(θ + δ) + y cos(θ + δ))
log polar mapping−−−−−−−−−−−→ f(µ, θ + δ)
From the translation property of the Fourier transform as well as the properties of
a log-polar mapping, we can create a RST invariant domain by applying the Fourier
transform to the log-polar version of the Fourier magnitude of an image, which is
equivalent to computing the Fourier-Mellin transform.
Phase and Magnitude Modulation The DFT is generally complex valued. This leads to
a magnitude and phase representation for the image [126]. The human visual system is
far more sensitive to phase distortion than magnitude distortion and as a consequence,
the DFT magnitude can be altered significantly without affecting the perceived qual-
ity of the image. The phase modulation can possess superior noise immunity when
compared to amplitude modulation. As a consequence of this, if a watermark is intro-
duced into the phase components with high redundancy, the attacker will cause serious
damage to the quality of the image.
4.9 Embedding Techniques in the DFT Domain
O’ Ruanaidh, et al. [126] investigate the use of DFT phase for the transformation of
information. The condition that the image is composed of real data implies that the Fourier
spectrum is symmetric, and because the human eye is more sensitive to phase distortion,
watermarking that changes the phase must preserve the negative symmetry. The most
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significant components are then selected by comparing the component magnitude squared
to the total energy in the spectrum. To detect the watermark, the marked image is simply
compared with the original image.
Solachidis, et al [127] propose a watermarking method robust to rotation and scaling.
The watermark consists of a 2-D circularly symmetric sequence taking values 1, -1. It
has zero mean value. The region in which the watermark is embedded should be a ring
covering the middle frequencies. The ring is separated in S sectors and in homocentric
circles. Each sector is assigned the same value (1, -1). The watermark is added directly to
the magnitude of the DFT domain. If the magnitude becomes negative, it is rounded to
0. The ‘conjugate symmetry’ property for the DFT must be preserved. The original is not
required for detection. The detection is done by finding the correlation between the possibly
watermarked coefficients and the original watermarks, comparing the correlation against a
threshold.
Kim, et al. [128] discuss the embedding of a binary image (seal image) into another
image. The entire watermark is modulated by a binary pseudo-noise matrix (P). The pseudo
noise serves for spreading the watermark evenly and is the secret key for retrieving the
watermark. The watermark is embedded into the Fourier domain of the cover image by
altering the magnitude components (mij = mij + α ∗ Pij ∗ wij). The amplitude factor a, is
a constant determining the signature strength. The retrieval process can be done without
knowledge of the original image. This process starts by approximating the magnitude of the
Fourier coefficients of the original image. This can be done by finding the average of the
magnitude coefficients around each point in the watermarked cover. The difference between
the predicted and the actual value in the watermarked version is divided by the pseudo-
noise that was used in the embedding process (which can be regenerated using the key).
Experimental results show that this schema gives a high robustness to the distortion such
as blurring and lossy compression.
Raymound, et al. [129] have proposed a modification to the system in [128]. They
embed a reduced version of the watermark several times using the same method. This
repetition can be used in the retrieval process to enhance the watermark.
O Ruanaidh, et al. [125] have introduced the use of the Fourier-Mellin transform
for watermarking to embed a watermark which is RST invariant from a digital image. A
Fourier transform is first applied which is then followed by a Fourier-Mellin transform. The
invariant coefficients are pre-selected for their robustness to image processing and are marked
using spread spectrum techniques. The inverse mapping is computed (an inverse log-polar
mapping followed by an inverse DFT). Note, that the inverse transformation uses the phase
computed during the forward transformations. To extract the watermark, the watermarked
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image is transformed into the RST invariant domain which then decodes the watermark.
In Herrigel, et al. [130], the embedding process starts by dividing the image into
adjacent blocks. They then map each block into perceptually ‘flat’ domains by replacing
the intensity of each pixel with their logarithm. This step ensures that the intensity of the
watermark is diminished in the darker regions of the image where it would otherwise be visible
(Weber-Fechner law for HVS response to change of luminance). The Fourier transform is then
computed for each block. Finally, the watermark is modulated with magnitude components
selected from the middle-frequency bands. To detect rotation and scaling, a template T
is embedded into selected components in log polar space. To determine the rotation and
scaling that the image suffered, they calculate the normalized cross correlation between the
log-polar components and the template pattern T to find the point of best correlation. If
the image has neither been rotated nor scaled, then this point is at the origin.
Lin, et al. [131] propose a watermarking algorithm that is robust to RST distortions.
The watermark is embedded using the following steps: Find the discrete log-polar mapping
for the Fourier magnitude components of the input image (M rows, N Columns). Sum the
logs of all values in each column (angle dimension) and add the result of summing column j to
the result of summing column j+N/2 storing the result in a vector (v). Mix the watermark
with v using a weighted average of w and v to produce vector s. Modify all the values in
column j of the log-polar Fourier transform so their logs sum to sj instead of vj. Invert the
log-polar re-sampling of the Fourier magnitude, thus obtaining a modified Cartesian Fourier
magnitude. The complex terms of the original Fourier transform are scaled to have the
new magnitudes found in the modified Fourier transform. The inverse DFT is applied to
obtain the watermarked image. The detection process is as follows: Apply the same signal-
extraction process to the watermarked image to produce the extracted vector v. Compute
the correlation coefficient between v and input watermark vector w. If the correlation is
grater than a threshold T , then the watermark is present, otherwise it is absent.
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5
Document Authentication using
DataGlyph’s
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a new approach to digital watermarking is presented for a range of appli-
cations. The process is defined by using analytical techniques and concepts borrowed from
Cryptography. It is based on computing a ‘scramble image’ by diffusing a watermark image
with a noise field. The cover image is then introduced using a simple additive process. The
watermark is subsequently recovered by removing the covertext and then correlating the
output with the original (key dependent) noise source. For covert encryption, this approach
provides the user with a method of hiding ciphertexts (the scrambled image) in a host image
before transmission of the data. In this sense, it provides a steganographic approach to
cryptology in which the ciphertext is not apparent during an intercept. Decryption is based
on knowledge of the key and access to the host image. In terms of watermarking a digital
image, the method provides a way of embedding information in an image that can be used
to authenticate it, in that it has come from an identifiable source, a method that is relatively
insensitive to lossy compression, making it well suited to digital image transmission.
The ICA method (discussed in Section 5.11) is used to apply the process of protecting
authenticity of black and white documents. This is intended to demonstrate that this tech-
nology can be effectively used in the detection of fraudulent documents. We show that this
method can recover (although not perfectly) the original image, after being masked by wa-
termarking with a 2D DataGlyph. We consider extending a DataGlyph to one that is based
on the computer generation of a grey level and/or colour texture directly - a ‘TextureG-
lyph’. This is based on using diffusion only watermarking for document authentication and
91
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the combined process of diffusion and confusion for e-to-e based watermarking. We consider
an embedding process to counterfoil the detection process using Independent Component
Analysis (ICA). Through the application of ICA, we present a method that demonstrates
how ICA can be used to detect forged documents. We then show that rescaling of the doc-
ument does not affect the method, except in dimensional extremes. Extensive research has
been contributed in which ICA is used in images and videos. Audio processing (as discussed
in Section 5.9) uses an on-the-spot mixing model in which audio/sound signals are convolved
within their individual broadcasting auditory surroundings. Vector Space Methods (VSM)
and Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) are used handle text (Section 5.10). Finally we show
that if the original watermark has been changed (tampered with) there is a low probabil-
ity of recovering the image. Due to the immensity of the literature in this area we give a
conglomeration of applications.
5.2 Document Authetication
The use of image based information exchange has grown rapdily over the years in terms of
both e-to-e image storage and transmission and in terms of maintaining paper documents in
electronic form. Further, with the dramatic improvements in the quality of COTS printing
and scanning devices, the ability to counterfeit documents has become a widespread problem
Consequently, there has been an increasing demand to develop digital watermarking tech-
niques which can be applied to both electronic and printed images (and documents) that can
be authenticated, prevent unauthorized copying of their content and withstand a substantial
amount of abuse and degradation before and during scanning.
In this chapter, a new approach to digital watermarking is presented for applications.
The process is defined by using analytical techniques and concepts borrowed from Cryptog-
raphy. It is based on computing a ‘scramble image’ by diffusing a watermark image with
a noise field. The cover image (covertext) is then introduced into using a simple additive
process (Confusion). The watermark is subsequently recovered by removing the covertext
and then correlating the output with the original (key dependent) noise source. For covert
encryption, this approach provides the user with a method of hiding ciphertexts (the scram-
bled image) in a host image before transmission of the data. In this sense, it provides a
steganographic approach to cryptology in which the ciphertext is not apparent duing an in-
tercept. Decryption is based on knowledge of the key (which can include noise field generated
using CrypsticTM, for example) and access to the host image. In terms of watermarking a
digital image, the method provides a way of embedding information in an image that can be
used to authenticate that it has come from a identifiable source, a method that is relatively
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insensitive to lossy compression, making it well suited to digital image transmission.
With regard to document authentication, the use of diffusion and confusion using a cover
is not robust. The reason for this is that the registration of pixels associated with a covertext
can not be assured when the composite image is printed and scanned. We therefore consider
a diffusion only approach to document authentication which is robust to a wide variety of
attacks including geometric attacks, drawing, crumpling, and print/scan attacks. This is
because the process of diffusion (i.e. the convolution of information) is compatible with the
physical principles of an imaging system and the theory of image formation and thus, with
image capture devices (digital cameras and scanners, for example) that, by default, conform
to the ‘physics’ of optical image formation. The diffusion of plaintext (in this case, an
image) with a noise field (the cipher) has a synergy with the encryption of plaintext using
a cipher and an XOR operation (when both the plaintext and cipher are represented by
binary streams). However, decryption of a convolved image (deconvolution) is not as simple
as XORing the ciphertext with the appropriate cipher. Here, we consider an approach which
is based on pre-conditioning the original cipher in such a way that decryption (de-diffusion)
can be undertaken by correlating the ciphertext with the cipher. If a high entropy cipher is
used that is uniformly distributed, then the PSDF of the output will be determined by the
PSDF of the plaintext (image). Now, if the image is based on naturally occurring objects
which are roughly of a self-affine type, then the PSDF may tend to scale as 1/ | k |β. In other
words, the diffusion of self-affine images with white noise will generate output images that
are, in effect, random fractal images with fractal-type textures. In this sense, the use of white
noise diffusion for document authentication is based on using texture maps which are either
fully or partially fractal. Either way, the outputs considered for document authentication
are based on printing textures of a type that are determined by the spectral characteristics
of the plaintext which can be applied using low resolution COTS printers and scanners.
A basic DataGlyphs is a pattern of forward and backward slashes representing ones and
zeroes. This pattern forms an evenly textured field. In this chapter we consider extending
a DataGlyph to one that is based on the computer generation of a grey level and/or colour
texture directly - ‘TextureGlyph’. This is based on using diffusion only watermarking for
document authentication and the combined process of diffusion and confusion for e-to-e
based watermarking which is discussed in the following section.
5.3 Diffusion and Confusion based Watermarking
In this section we consider approch to watermarking plaitext using both diffusion and con-
fusion. The basic approach is as follows: Given a plaintext image and a covertext image, the
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stegotext image is given by
stegotext = ciphertext+ covertext
where
ciphertext = cipher ⊗⊗plaintext
where ⊗⊗ denotes the two-dimensional convolution operation. The problem is to find a
cipher which provides a ciphertext that, given the equation above can be well hidden in the
covertext.
5.3.1 Fresnel Diffusion Watermarking
There is clearly a compatibility between the use of Fresnel diffusion for watermarking digital
images and chirp coding for watermarking digital signals as discussed in the previous chapter.
We consider a watermarking model given by
I3(x, y) = rp(x, y)⊗⊗I1(x, y) + I2(x, y)
with PSF
p(x, y) =
1
2
(1 + cos[α(x2 + y2)]
and where
‖p(x, y)⊗⊗I1(x, y)‖∞ = 1 and ‖I2(x, y)‖∞ = 1.
Here, r is controls that extent to which the host image I2 dominates the diffused watermark
image I1. In effect, r is like a signal-to-noise ratio, or, in this application a ‘diffusion-to-
confusion’ ratio The output of this process I3 is the watermarked host image. Recovery of
the watermark image is then based on the following process:
I1(x, y) =
1
r
p(x, y)(I3(x, y)− I2(x, y)
The method is implemented numerically using a Fast Fourier Transform and application of
the two-dimensional convolution and correlation theorem
p⊗⊗f ⇐⇒ PF
and
pf ⇐⇒ P ∗F
respectively.
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Figure 5.1: From top to bottom and from left to right (all images are 512×512): Watermark
I1, host image I2, PSF p for α = 0.001, diffused image p⊗⊗I1, host image after watermarking
I3 for r = 0.1, recovered watermark.
Figure 5.1 shows an example result of implementing this watermaking method where a
digital image of Albert Einstein (the covertext) is watermarked with a binary image of his
most famous of equation (the plaintext). Note that the dynamic range of the diffused field
and the reconstruction is relatively low and the images given in Figure 5.1 are displayed by
re-quantisation to an 8-bit grey scale of the data min[I(x, y)] ≤ I(x, y) ≤ max[I(x, y)]. On
the other hand, the low dynamic range of the diffused field allows the diffused field to be
added to the host image without any significant distortions becoming discernable other than
increasing the brightness of the image1.
Fresnel diffusion is only of value when the plaintext is of binary form (i.e. a binary image)
and when the covertext is well textured throughout in order to ‘hide’ the diffused plaintext.
In this application, the host image together with (α, r) form the key where the algorithm
is taken to be in the public domain. Given these conditions, the method is useful for
application to watermarking digital images provided that the distortion accompanying the
restoration of the watermark is acceptable. However, the method is not particularly well
suited to document (hard-copy) watermarking accept under special circumstances. One such
example is given in Figure 5.2 which illustrates a method designed whereby, using standard
1In each case the data is re-normalised to floating point values between 0 and 1 before application of
grey-scale quantization.
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security printing technology, a covert digital thread can be introduced (typically into a print
file) that reflects a conventional overt thread. In this example, a one-dimensional Fresnel
transform (a symmetric chirp function) is used to encode a single or multiple bar code and the
result embedded into an existing print file. Recovery of a digital thread is obtained through
correlation of the same symmetric chirp function with a scanned image. This approach is
analogous to the application of a matched filter and, in particular, the deconvolution on
linear FM (Frequency Modulated) chirps. Applications include currency, bank bonds and
other security documents. In this case the model is based on the following:
I3(x, y) = rp(x, y)⊗⊗I1(x, y) + I2(x, y)
where I1 is a binary image consisting of a bar code (single or multiple bars),
p(x, y) =
1
2
[1 + cos(αx2)]
and I2 is the host image. Recovery of the bar code (i.e. estimation Iˆ1 of I1 is then given by
Iˆ1(x, y) ∼ p(x, y)I3(x, y) + 
where
 = p(x, y)I2(x, y)
such that, provided I2 does not correlate with p (e.g. I2 is a textured image), then
‖(x, y)‖ << ‖p(x, y)I3(x, y)‖
This condition allows an exact reconstruction of I1 to be obtained through application of a
threshold to binarize Iˆ1.
5.3.2 Noise Diffusion Watermarking
The principal weakness associated with Fresnel diffusion is that the cipher is based on a
deterministic function. To overcome this, we consider a noise diffusion approach. Diffusion
by noise is compounded in the model
u(r) = n(r)⊗r u0(r).
Suppose we use this approach to diffuse an image u0 using a key based noise field n. There
are now two approaches to solving the problem: Given u and n, obtain u0. We can invert
or deconvolve by using the convolution theorem giving
u0(r) = F−1
[
U(k)N∗(k)
| N(k) |2
]
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Figure 5.2: 600dpi scan of a 20 Pounds Sterling Bank (of England) note (above) whose
graphic file includes the addition of symmetric chirp (centre) and recovery of a digital thread.
where F−1 is the inverse Fourier transform operator, N is the Fourier transform of n and
U is the Fourier transform of u. However, this approach requires regularisation in order to
eliminate any singularities when | N |2= 0 through application of a constrained deconvolution
filter such as the Wiener filter. Alternatively, if n is the result of some random number
generating algorithm, and since the functional form of n is arbitrary, we can construct the
stochastic field
m(r) = F−1
[
N∗(k)
| N(k) |2
]
where | N(k) |2> 0, the diffused field now being given by
u(r) = m(r)⊗r u0(r).
The inverse problem is then be solved by correlating u with n, since
n(r)r u(r)⇐⇒ N∗(k)U(k)
and
N∗(k)U(k) = N∗(k)M(k)U0(k) = N∗(k)
N∗(k)
| N(k) |2U0(k) = U0(k)
so that
u0(r) = n(r)r u(r)
The condition that | N(k) |2> 0 is simply achieved by implementing the following process:
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∀k
if | N(k) |2= 0
then | N(k) |2= 1
This result can be used to ‘embed’ one data field in another. Consider the case when
we have two independent images I1(x, y) ≥ 0∀x, y and I2(x, y) ≥ 0∀x, y and we consider
the case of embedding I1 with I2. We construct a noise field m(x, y) ≥ 0∀x, y a priori and
consider the equation
u(x, y) = rm(x, y)⊗⊗I1(x, y) + I2(x, y)
where
‖m(x, y)⊗⊗I1(x, y)‖∞ = 1 and ‖I2(x, y)‖∞ = 1.
By normalising the terms in this way, the coefficient 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, can be used to adjust the
relative magnitudes of the terms such that the diffused image I1 is a perturbation of the ‘host
image’ I2. This provides us with a way of watermarking one image with another, R being
referred to as the watermarking ratio2 This approach is of course identical to the Fresnel
diffusion method considered in the last section but where the Fresnel PSF is replaced with
the pre-conditioned noise field m . However, for applications in image watermarking, the
diffusion of an image with noise provides a superior result because: (i) a noise field provides
more uniform diffusion; (ii) noise fields can be generated using random number generators
that depend on a single initial value or seed (i.e. a private key). The noise field (which should
be uniformly distributed) can be created using any number of random number generators.
In each case, the algorithm used provides an output that is key dependent and thus, given a
known algorithm, reconstruction of the watermark is achieved with knowledge of the private
key together with the host image. Generation of the noise field can also be obtained using
chaos based ciphers. However, in this case, the floating point output from the cipher(s)
must be used to produce a digital integer stream rather than a bit stream through stretching
and rounding, e.g. if the uniformly distributed floting point stream is given by ci where
ci ∈ [in(fi),max(fi)] where fi ∈ [0, 1] is the output from a chaotic cipher then, the noise field
is given by
xi =
[ci −min(fi)]
max[ci −min(fi)]
so that ‖x‖∞ = 1. The two-dimensional array n(x, y) is generated from xi on a row-by-
row (or column-by-column basis), i.e. filling each row of size N with random floating point
2Equivalent, in this application, to the standard term ‘Signal-to-Noise’ or SNR ratio as used in signal and
image analysis.
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Figure 5.3: From top to bottom and from left to right (all images are 512×512): Watermark
I1, host image I2, PSF m, diffused image m ⊗ ⊗I1, host image after watermarking I3 for
r = 0.01, recovered watermark.
numbers from the array xi, i = 1, 2, ...N
2. Here, the seed is any integer such as 1873... (when
applying a conventional PRNG with integer arithmetic) or a decimal number (between 0
and 1) such as 0.1873 (when applying a chaos based PRNG with floating point arithmetic)
which can be based on the application of a PIN (Personal Identity Number) or a password
(e.g. ‘Enigma’, which in terms of an ASCII string - using binary to decimal conversion -
is ‘216257556149’ or ’‘0.216257556149’). Alternatively, noise fields can be created indirectly
through application of a variety of cryptographic systems. This is of practical value, because
in this application, it is necessary to exchange the host image between sender and receiver
and thus, the exchange of a noise field becomes compatible with a necessary protocol, both
the noise field and the host image being transmitted as ciphertext using a given encryption
standard.
An example of this approach is shown in Figure 5.3 which should be compared with
Figure 5.1. Here, the image I2 (the ‘host image’ - covertext) is watermarked by another
image I1 (the ‘watermark image’ - plaintext) with to produce output image I3 with r = 0.01.
The relatively small perturbation of the term m⊗⊗I1 to the host image I2 for r = 0.01 does
not affect the output image in any way that is visually significant.
A further advantage of noise diffusion is that is not limited to watermarking covertexts
with binary image plaintexts. However, the effect of adding the diffused greyscale watermark
image to the host image yields a different, slightly brighter image because of the perturbation
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of I2 by Rm ⊗ ⊗I1. This effect can be minimized by introducing a smaller watermarking
ratio such that the perturbation is still recoverable by subtracting the host image from the
watermarked image, an example being given in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Example of watermarking an image with another image using noise based dif-
fusion. The ‘host image’ I2 (top-left ) is watermarked with the ‘watermark image’ I1 (top-
centre) using the diffuser (top-right) given by a uniform noise field n whose pixel-by-pixel
values depend upon the seed used (the private key). The result of computing m ⊗ ⊗I1
(bottom-left) is added to the host image for r = 0.1 to generate the watermarked image
u (bottom-centre). Recovery of the watermark image I1 (bottom-right) is accomplished by
subtracting the host image from the watermarked image and correlating the result with the
noise field n.
For the purpose of further quantifying the basic algorithms involved in this method of
watermarking the reader is referred to the pseudo-coded function that follows:
void function WM(cipher,plaintext,covertext,wartermark,size,pth)
\\
\\ Fuction: Watermarks an image using noise diffusion
\\
\\ Input arrays: cipher - noise field image
\\ plaintext - the watermark image
\\ covertext - host image
\\ N.B. All input arrays are taken to be of type float with
\\ values ranging from 0 to 1 inclusively.
\\
\\ Parameters: size - image size (assumed to be size x size)
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\\ pth - diffused plaintext to host image ratio
\\
\\ Ouput: watermrk - watermarked image
\\
\\ Internal functions: FFT - Foward Fast Fourier Transform
\\ IFFT - Inverse Fast Fourier Transform
\\ MAX - Computes the maximum value
\\ REAL - Extracts the real component
\\ ABS - Computes the absolute value
\\
cipher=FFT(cipher);\\Compute spectrum of cipher
plaintex=FFT(plaintext); \\Compute spectrum of plaintext
powerspectrum=ABS(cipher)*ABS(cipher);\\Compute Power Spectrum
\\ Pre-condition power spectrum of cipher
FOR i=1 to size AND j=1 to size DO:
temp=pp[i,j];
IF temp==0
powerspec[i,j]=1;
ELSE
powerspec[i,j]=powerspec[i,j];
END IF
END DO
\\ Diffuse plaintext image with pre-conditioned cipher
FOR i=1 to size AND j=1 to size DO:
diffusion[i,j]=cipher[i,j]*plaintext[i,j]/powerspec[i,j];
END DO
diffusion=REAL(IFFT(diffusion));\\ Compute real part of IFFT
diffusion=diffusion/MAX(diffusion);\\ Normalise diffused field
\\ Compute the watermark
FOR i=1 to size AND j=1 to size DO:
watermark[i,j]=r*diffusion[i,j]+covertext[i,j];
END DO
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watermark=watermark/MAX(watermark);\\ Normalise for output
void function RECWM(cipher,watermark,covertext,plaintext,size)
\\ Function: Recovers watermark from watermarked image
\\
\\ Input arrays: cipher - noise field image
\\ watermark - watermarked image
\\ covertext - host image
\\ N.B. All input arrays are taken to be of type float with
\\ values ranging from 0 to 1 inclusively.
\\
\\ Parameters: n - image size (assumed to be size x size)
\\
\\ Output: plaintext - recovered watermark image
\\
\\ Internal functions: FFT - Forward Fast Fourier Transform
\\ IFFT - Inverse Fast Fourier Transform
\\ MAX - Computes the maximum value
\\ REAL - Exatracts the real component
\\ CONJ - Conjugates a complex array
\\
\\Subtract covertext from watermarked image
FOR i=1 to size AND j=1 to size DO:
diffusion=watermark-covertext;
END DO
cipher=FFT(cipher); \\Compute spectrum of cipher
diffusion=FFT(diffusion); \\Compute spectrum of diffused field
\\ Correlate diffused field with cipher
FOR i=1 to n AND j=1 to n DO:
plaintext[i,j]=CONJ(cipher[i,j])*diffusion[i,j];
END DO
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plaintext=REAL(IFFT(plaintext)); \\Compute real part of IFFT
plaintext=plaintext/MAX(plaintext);\\ Normalise output
5.3.3 Steganography and Cryptography
One of the principal components associated with the development of methods and algorithms
to ‘break’ ciphertext is the analysis of the output generated by an attempted decrypt and
its evaluation in terms of an expected type. The output type is normally assumed to be
plaintext, i.e. the output is assumed to be in the form of characters, words and phrases
associated with a natural language such as English or German, for example. If a plaintext
document is converted into an image file then the method described in the previous section
on ‘Noise Diffusion Watermarking’ can be used to diffuse the plaintext image I1 using any
other covertext image I2 to produce stegotext I3. If both I3 and I2 are then encrypted, any
attack on these data will not be able to make use of an ‘analysis cycle’ which is based on the
assumption that the decrypted output is plaintext. This approach provides the user with
a relatively simple method of ‘confusing’ the cryptanalyst and invalidates attack strategies
that have been designed and developed on the assumption that the encrypted data have
been derived from plaintext alone.
In steganography, one message is hidden inside another, without disclosing the existence
of the hidden message or making it apparent to an observer that this message contains a
hidden message [134]. Moreover, the information hidden by a watermarking system is always
associated with the object to be protected or its owner while steganographic systems just
hide information. On the other hand, cryptography can be defined as the study of secret
writing (i.e. concealing the contents of a secret message by transforming the original message
into a form that cannot be easily interpreted by an observer). The method considered here
(diffusion and confusion) can be easily used in both applications. The hidden message can
be transformed into a diffused form (i.e encrypted) and inserted into the background. The
hidden information might have no relation with the text (foreground). At the same time,
backgrounds are usually used with documents and so diffused data will not necessarily trigger
the attention of an observer. Moreover, the hidden message is also encrypted which increases
the security level of such documents.
5.4 Hardcopy Steganography
The use of the model
stegotext = ciphertext+ covertext
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can be applied for watermarking digital images associated with electronic-to-electronic type
communications in which there is no loss of information. This method can be used to
watermark digital image for the purpose of authentication but can also be viewed as a
method of covertly transmitting ciphertext when the plaintext is converted to the form of a
digital image. Steganography and watermarking techniques are also of value for hardcopy
‘data’ which has a range of applications for authenticating printed material and copyright
validation, for example. However, to be of practical value to the security printing industry
the methods must be robust to the significant distortions generated by the printing and/or
scanning process. A simple approach is to add information to a printed page that is difficult
to see. For example, some modern colour laser printers, including those manufactured by HP
and Xerox, print tiny yellow dots which are added to each page. The dots are barely visible
and contain encoded printer serial numbers, date and time stamps. This facility provides a
useful forensics tool for tracking the origins of a printed document which has only relatively
recently been disclosed.
5.4.1 Diffusion Only Watermarking
If a stegotext image is printed and scanned back into electronic form, then the print/scan
process will yield an array of pixels that will be significantly different from the original
electronic image even though it might ‘look’ the same. These differences can include the size
of the image, its orientation, brightness, contrast and so on. Of all the processes involved
in the recovery of the watermark, the subtraction of the host image from the watermarked
image is critical. If this process is not accurate on a pixel-by-pixel basis and deregistered
for any of many reasons, then recovery of the watermark by correlation will not be effective.
However, if we make use of the diffusion process alone, then the watermark can be recovered
via a print/scan because of the compatibility of the processes involved. However, in this
case, the ‘watermark’ is not covert but overt.
Depending on the printing process applied, a number of distortions will occur which
diffuse the information being printed. Thus, in general, we can consider the printing process
to introduce an effect that can be represented by the convolution equation
uprint = pprint ⊗⊗u.
where u is the original electronic form of a diffused image (i.e. u = n⊗⊗u0) and pprint is the
point spread function of the printer. An incoherent image of the data, obtained using a flat
bed scanner, for example (or any other incoherent optical imaging system), will also have a
characteristic point spread function pscan say. Thus, we can consider a scanned image to be
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given by
uscan = pscan ⊗⊗uprint
where uscan is taken to be the digital image obtain from the scan. Now, because convolution
is commutative, we can write
uscan = pscan ⊗⊗pprint ⊗⊗p⊗⊗u0 = p⊗⊗pscan/print ⊗⊗u0
where
pscan/print = pscan ⊗⊗pprint
which is the print/scan point spread function associated with the processing cycle of printing
the image and then scanning it back into electronic form. By applying the method discussed
earlier, we can obtain a reconstruction of the watermark whose fidelity is determined by
the scan/print point spread function. However, in practice, the scanned image needs to be
re-sized to that of the original. This is due to the scaling relationship (for a function f with
Fourier transform F )
f(αx, βy)⇐⇒ 1
αβ
F
(
kx
α
,
ky
β
)
.
The size of any image captured by a scanner or other device will depend on the resolution
used. The size of the image obtained will inevitably be different from the original because
of the resolution and window size used to print the diffused image u and the resolution
used to scan the image. Since scaling in the spatial domain causes inverse scaling in the
Fourier domain, the scaling effect must be ‘inverted’ before the watermark can be recovered
by correlation since correlation is not a scale invariant process. Re-sizing the image (using
an appropriate interpolation scheme such as the bi-cubic method, for example) requires a
set of two numbers n and m (i.e. the n × m array used to generate the noise field and
execute the diffusion process) that, along with the seed required to regenerate the noise
field, provides the ‘private keys’ needed to recover the data from the diffused image. An
example of this approach is given in Figure 5.5 which shows the result of reconstructing
four different images (a photograph, finger-print, signature and text) used in the design
of an impersonalized debit/credit card. The use of ‘diffusion only’ watermarking for print
security can be undertaken in colour by applying exactly the same diffusion/reconstruction
methods to the red, green and blue components independently. This provides two additional
advantages: (i) the effect of using colour tends to yield better quality reconstructions because
of the colour combination process; (ii) for each colour component, it is possible to apply a
noise field with a different seed. In this case, three keys are required to recover the watermark
although it should be noted that, due to the errors associated in the extraction of each colour
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Figure 5.5: Example of the application of ‘diffusion only’ watermarking. In this example, four
images of a face, finger-print, signature and text have been diffused using the same cipher
and printed on the front (top-left) and back (bottom-left) of an impersonalized identity card
using a 600 dpi printer. The reconstructions (top-right and bottom-right, respectively) are
obtained using a conventional flat-bed scanner based on a 300 dpi grey-level scan.
component from a colour scan, this approach does not yield reconstructions with the same
degree of robustness as in the case when the same key/algorithm is used for each colour
component.
Because this method is based on convolution alone and since
uscan = pscan/print ⊗⊗u0
as discussed earlier, the recovery of the u0 will not be negated by the distortion of the
point spread function associated with the print/scan process, just limited or otherwise by
its characteristics. Thus, if an image is obtained of the printed data field p ⊗ ⊗u0 which is
out of focus due to the characteristics of pscan/print, then the reconstruction of u0 will be out
of focus to the same degree. Decryption of images with this characteristic is only possible
using an encryption scheme that is based a diffusion only approach. However, if a covertext
image f is introduced so that
uscan = pscan/print ⊗⊗u0 + pscan/print ⊗⊗f
then because
uscan − f 6= pscan/print ⊗⊗u0
recovery of the plaintext is not possible which is why we resort to a diffusion only method
approach.
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Figure 5.6: Original image (top-left), diffused image (top-right), reconstruction using a
flatbed scanner (bottom-left) and reconstruction using a mobile phone (bottom-right). These
images have been scanned in grey scale from the original colour versions printed on to a per-
sonalised identity card at 600dpi stamp-size (i.e. 2cm×1.5cm).
Figure 5.6 illustrates the recovery of a diffused image printed onto a personal identity
card obtained using a flat bed scanner and then captured using mobile phone camera. In
the latter case, the reconstruction is not in focus because of the wide-field nature of the
lens used. However, the fact that recovery of the watermark is possible with a mobile phone
means that the scrambled data can be transmitted securely and the card holders image (as in
this example) recovered remotely and transmitted back to the same phone for authentication.
This provides the necessary physical security needed to implement such a scheme in practice
and means that specialist image capture devices are not required on site.
The diffusion process can be carried out using a variety of different noise fields other
than the uniform noise field considered here. Changing the noise field can be of value in
two respects: first, it allows a system to be designed that, in addition to specific keys, is
based on specific algorithms which must be known a priori. These algorithms can be based on
different pseudo uniform random number generators and/or different pseudo chaotic number
generators that are post-processed to provide a uniform distribution of numbers. Second,
the diffusion field depends on both the characteristics of the watermark image and the noise
field. By utilizing different noise fields (e.g. Gaussian noise, Poisson noise), the texture of the
output field can be changed. The use of different noise fields is of value when different textures
are required that are aesthetically pleasing and can be used to create a background that is
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Figure 5.7: Example of the diffusion of composite images with the inclusion of a reference
frame for enhancing and automating the processes of cropping and orientation. In each case
the data fields have been printed and scanned at 300 dpi.
printed over the entire document - texture maps. In this sense, variable noise based diffusion
fields can be used to replace complex print security features with the added advantage that,
by de-diffusing them, information can be recovered. Further, these fields are very robust to
data degradation created by soiling, for example. In the case of binary watermark images,
data redundancy allows reconstructions to be generated from a binary output, i.e. after
binarizing the diffusion field (with a threshold of 50% for example). This allows the output
to be transmitted in a form that can tolerate low resolution and low contrast copying, e.g.
a fax.
The tolerance of this method to printing and scanning is excellent provided the output is
cropped accurately (to within a few pixels) and oriented correctly. The processes of cropping
and orientation can be enhanced and automated by providing a reference frame in which
the diffused image is inserted. This is illustrated in Figure 5.7 which, in addition shows the
effect of diffusing a combination of images. This has the effect of producing a diffused field
that is very similar but nevertheless conveys entirely different information.
5.4.2 Covertext Addition and Removal
Because diffusion only watermarking is based on convolution/correlation operations it is
relatively insensitive to contrast stretching and compression. This provides the opportunity
to introduce covertext in the form of the addition of foreground information (e.g. text) to a
printed document that has been watermarked a priori with a grey scale texture map whose
brightness and contrast has been adjusted to be unobtrusive with regard to the covertext
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Figure 5.8: Example of a covert watermarking scheme. I1 (top-left) is ‘processed’ with I2
(top-middle) to produce the noise field (top-right). I2 is printed at 600 dpi, scanned at 300
dpi and then re-sampled back to its original size (bottom-left). Correlating this image with
the noise field generates the reconstruction (bottom-centre). The reconstruction depends on
just the host image and noise field. If the noise field and/or the host image are different or
corrupted, then a reconstruction is not achieved, as in the example given (bottom-right).
(i.e. the watermark is made bright compared to black text). Alternative, once the texture
field has been designed, it may be introduced into a text editor that provide the inclusion of
watermarks. For example, Microsoft Word has the facility to include a printed watermark
(Format→Background→Printed Watermark) that provides the option to select a Picture
Watermark (Existing Watermark) with options on scale and ‘Washout’.
In order to extract the watermark, it is then necessary to remove the text after a scan
has been undertaken under the assumption that the covertext is not available. This can be
accomplished using a median filter which is effective in removing isolated noise spikes, i.e.
in this application, foreground text. However, in this case, the median filter is not applied
to the image in its entirety. Instead, it is applied only to the neighbourhood of pixels (i.e.
a user defined moving window) that exist below a user defined threshold that is specified in
order to differentiate between the watermark and those pixels associated with the covertext.
After removal of the covertext, the image watermark is reconstructed by correlation with
the cipher.
5.5 Covert Watermarking using Diffusion
Watermarking is usually considered to be a method in which the watermark is embedded
into a host image in an unobtrusive way. Another approach is to consider the host image to
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be a data field that, when processed with another data field, generates new information.
Consider two images I1 and I2. Suppose we construct the following function
n = F2
(
I1
| I1 |2 I2
)
where I˜1 = F2[I1] and I˜2 = F2[I2]. If we now correlate n with I1, then from the correlation
theorem
I1 n⇐⇒ I˜∗1
I˜1
| I˜1 |2
I˜2 ⇐⇒ I2.
In other words, we can recover I2 from I1 with a knowledge of n. Because this process
is based on convolution and correlation alone, it is compatible and robust to printing and
scanning, i.e. incoherent optical imaging. An example of this is given in Figure 5.8. In this
scheme, the noise field n is the private key required to reconstruct the watermark and the
host image can be considered to be a public key.
5.6 Applications of Texture Coding
Some applications of diffusion only coding are already evident from the examples already
given to introduce the technique in previous sections. Strictly speaking, the method is not
a watermarking technique unless a covertext can be used to hide the ciphertext. However,
as discussed previously, application of a covertext is not applicable for the authentication
of printed documents due to the degradation of the covertext when printing and scanning
a document. Hence, for application to low resolution print security, the method should be
refered to as texture coding.
In this section, we consider a range of application to which the method can be applied 3
5.6.1 Authentication
Authentication of a document image should ensure that the document has not been al-
tered from the time it is created and signed by the author to the time it is received at
the destination. Authentication of paper documents is an important concern as the ability
of counterfeiters has increased substantially in recent years. This is contributed to by the
dramatic improvement in the capability of high resolution scanners and printers. More-
over, digital documents can be accessed and modified by intruders relatively easily. This is
especially true in the case of documents that are exchanged over the Internet.
3Based on K. W. Mahmoud, Low Resolution Watermarking for Print Security, PhD Thesis, Loughborough
University, 2005, (Chapter 7).
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Using the model and methods discussed here, a selective authentication approach can be
applied in which only significant changes cause authentication to fail. This can be verified
by embedding information in a document that be later be verified as to whether it has been
tampered with or otherwise.
5.6.2 Photo Verification
Figure 5.6 shows an example of a photo verification system that can be incorporated into
an ID card where a photograph of the card holder is texture coded and printed beside the
original image. Substantial editing, such as changing the original photo, will be illegitimate
because it will completely change the interpretation of the card. Thus, a photo verification
system can be designed to do the following:
1. Capture the diffused watermark using any tool (scanner, camera, etc).
2. Read the key. The key might be:
(a) Encoded using bar code, or
(b) Stored in a local Database, or
(c) Stored in a distance Database that can be accessed via the Internet.
3. Extract the watermark.
4. Verify the authenticity by comparing the original photo with the extracted one. This
can be done either by:
(a) A subjective test, using the judgment of human beings. For more details on the
scales that have been suggested for use in evaluation of watermarking quality refer
to [135].
(b) Quality metrics, such as the Mean Square Error or Chi-square test.
(c) Any other matching algorithm including the application of an Artificial Neural
Network as required.
Such a system can be modified to include more information in the diffused watermark as
required, such as the name of the ID card holder. Moreover, texture coding can be used
to generate a de-personalised ID card either on an individual image base (Figure 5.5) or in
terms of a composite image (Figure 5.7).
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Figure 5.9: Coded Statistical Information
5.6.3 Statistical Verification
When a document is prepared using MSWord, for example, or any other major word process-
ing package, statistical information from the document can be gathered; information about
the author, date and time, number of characters and spaces and so on. A verification system
can use this information to check the authenticity of the document. Any attempt at modi-
fication of the file will be reflected in its statistics. The system can either incorporate these
data in plain text or as a diffused code into a patch on the document which is encoded into
an indecipherable image as shown in figure 5.9. The image needs to be attractively packaged
in an appropriate place on the document - the bottom right hand corner or example.
It is assumed that the recipient of the document (scanned or electronic) will have the
appropriate software available. The encoded image is read into the decoding software and
text-recognition used to reveal the text which is then compared with the plain-text statistics
of the document. The data in the image can alternatively be checked manually against the
statistics of the file instead of using text recognition. Each author can have a particular key
for encoding of image. Upon receipt, the recipient applies that particularly key to decode
the image. Alternatively, a separate one-time PIN can be transmitted to the recipient in
order to decode the image.
5.6.4 Original Copy Verification
When a document is scanned, subject to the scanner type and settings (including the resolu-
tion, for example), the output digital image file will have a specific statistical characteristic
compounded in the histogram. If the document is copied and scanned again then this char-
acteristic histogram will change because of the copy process. In general, a copied document
will tend to have a smoother histogram since it is, in effect, the original document image con-
volved with a PSF that is characteristic of the copier (a function of the composite scan/print
process). By printing a texture code of the histogram of the original document, typically on
the back of the document, the document can be scanned and the histogram compared with
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the watermark, at least within an acceptable tolerance. This application has value in the
authentication of high value documents such a Bank Bonds, an example of which is given in
Figure 5.10. Figure 5.11 shows the texture map and the reconstruction of the plaintext, i.e.
a histogram of the luminance of the original colour image together with some basic statis-
tical information. By specifying the type of scanner and operational constraints, statistical
information of this type (i.e. the mean, standard deviation and median, for example) can
be used to qualify whether or not the Bank Bond or other high value documents has been
copied. This statistical verification may include measures relating to the RGB components
for the case of high value colour document (which is usually the case but can not be repro-
duced here). Although each scan (using the same scanner with identical settings) will not
output an identical digital image (due slight differences in the crop, for example, as well as
the natural ‘jitter’ of the scanner) the statistical information should not change significantly
unless a copy has been made, acceptable tolerances having been established a priori.
5.6.5 Component Verification
The system described in the previous section can be extended to include a ‘specific parts’
from of the text that must be correct, e.g. a sum of money, name of beneficiary etc. An
example is shown in figure 5.12.
After decoding, the message would be as given in the figure shown in 5.13 Clearly, the
diffused code could be placed into the background of each data field (i.e. instead of placing
it in the next empty line).
5.6.6 Transaction Tracking
Also called fingerprinting, transaction tracking involves the embedding of a different water-
mark into each distributed copy. This is especially useful for identifying people who obtain
a document legally but illegally redistribute it.
5.6.7 Leaked Document Monitoring
One common method to monitor and discover any ‘leak’ associated with a very important
document is to use visible marks. For example, highly sensitive documents are sometimes
printed on backgrounds containing large gray digits using a different number for each copy.
Records are then kept about who has which copy. Of course, imperceptible watermarks (or at
least diffused watermark) are preferable to visible marks. They are easy to remove/replace
from a document when it is copied. Using this model for document watermarking, the
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Figure 5.10: Example of a high value Bank Bond (grey scale of colour image).
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Figure 5.11: Texture map (left) and reconstruction of statistical information relating to scan
of original document using Adobe Photoshop V5.
Figure 5.12: Coded Specific Part from a Document
Figure 5.13: Revealed Document after Coding Specific Parts.
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tracking number is diffused and inserted into the background. The diffused watermark is
inseparable from the document. The adversary (a person who attempts to remove, disable,
or forge a watermark for the purpose of circumventing its original purpose) does not know
the embedded number and can not recognize the difference between copies (it is difficult for
human eyes to find a difference between two copies with different watermarks).
5.6.8 Owner Identification (Copyright)
Copyright can be undertaken by embedding the identity of a document’s copyright holder as
a watermark in order to prevent other parties from claiming the copyright of the document.
The embedded data can be a biometric characteristic (such as signature). The receiver of
the document reconstructs the signature used to watermark the document, which is then
used to verify the authors claimed identity.
5.6.9 Signature Verification
Handwritten signatures are commonly used to certify the contents of a document or to au-
thenticate legal transactions. A handwritten signature is a well-known biometric attribute.
Other biometric attributes, which are commonly used for authentication include iris, hand
geometry, face, and fingerprints (See [136] and [137]). While attributes like the iris and fin-
gerprints do not change over time, they require special and relatively expensive hardware to
capture the biometric data. An important advantage of the signature over other biometric
attributes is that it has been traditionally used in authenticating documents and hence is
socially accepted. Signature verification is usually done by visual inspection. In automatic
signature verification, a computer takes over the task of comparing two signatures to deter-
mine if the similarity between the signatures exceeds some pre-specified threshold. There
a many similarity measures that can be used for this purpose. Figure 5.14(left) shows an
example for this approach. The signature of the customer is diffused and inserted into the
background of the cheque. Each customer has their own key that is known only to them and
their bank. They use the key to generate the background and then print the cheque. The
bank then uses the key to extract the customer signature from the cheque. If the extracted
and the existing signatures on the cheque are matched to each other, then the cheque is
accepted.
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATION USING DATAGLYPH’S 117
Figure 5.14: Watermarked cheque (above) and recovered signature from watermark (be-
low); from K. W. Mahmoud, Low Resolution Watermarking for Print Security, PhD Thesis,
Loughborough University, 2005.
5.7 Case Study: Passport Authentucation
Like any other security document, ID card and so on, a passport consists of a number of
security features depending on the sophistication on the design associated with the author-
ity responsible for an issue. These range from the use of printing complex background,
microprinting, conventional paper watermarking, UV watermarking, foil holograms, ghost
images and so on. Each of these security features my be more or less dificult to counterfeit
depending on the sophistication of the feature and the counterfeiter. In this case study, we
consider the use of texture coding within the context of authenticating a passport including
the protocol associated with a typical ‘cycle’. The method is simple and cost effective to
implement in terms of the hardware required, i.e. Standard PC, flatbed scanner and printer,
all of which are COTS. All that is required is a remote web site hub to which digital scans of
the texture code can be emailed and where a decrypt can take place, forwarding the result
back to the point of enquiry.
The principal idea is to take a low resolution scan (say 600dpi) of the page (or pages)
of a passport that contains the primary information, e.g. Passport number, Name, Date of
birth, Signature and Photograph of the passport holder - the plaintext. This plaintext is
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then forwarded to a designated Hub where it is diffused with a unique noise field that is
maintained at the Hub alone to produce the ciphertext. The result is then emailed back
to the user, printed and the result (permanently or as required) inserted into the passport,
a process that is similar to issuing a Visa, for example. At any point of contact, if the
passport requires authentication, the ciphertext is scanned and the digital image emailed to
the appropriate Hub where upon it is decrypted and the result (the watermark) sent back
to the point of origin. Automation of this cycle would require a new infrastructure to be
established which is both time consuming and expensive. Instead, the cycle described above
would be best suited for use with regard to spot checks at an airport terminal, for example,
especially if the holder of the passport or the passport itself is suspect. The scanning process
(using a standard flat bed scanner, for example) can then be undertaken while the holder of
the passport is waiting for it to be authenticated (or otherwise) based on a visual comparison
between the decrypt and the plaintext.
An example of the system designed to implement this method working with full colour
images in which each RGB component is diffused with the same cipher is given in Figure 5.15.
This figure shows the GUI and the result of decrypting the texture code associated with au-
thors passport after being scanned at 300dpi and the output emailed as a JPEG attachment.
5.8 Application of ICA
We consider an embedding process to counterfoil the detection process using Independent
Component Analysis (ICA) and present a method that demonstrates how ICA can be used
to detect forged documents. The expansion of network systems and the lack of difficulty in
reproducing digital media which does not lack quality have necessitated novel techniques to
restrain the forbidden reproduction, forgery and dissemination of digital data [191], [192],
[193] and [194]. Watermarking and cryptography are devices that assist the enforcing of
copyright protection and authentication of digital audio, images and video. For the purposes
of this investigation we focused on images only.
Robust digital watermarks used for copyright protection can be explained as undetectable
information concealed in a digital media. This information should be detectable as long as
the quality of the content is considered as being acceptable. Despite many algorithms,
methods, techniques and fully functional systems being used to hide information, the main
dilemma is that the bulk of these methods use a symmetric key [195].
Both symmetric watermarks and symmetric cryptography is similar: whereby the exact
key is used to encode the information and to authenticate the watermark. The key becomes
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Figure 5.15: Example of passport authentication system (GUI) and a decrypt of the texture
code (top-left image) generated by diffusing the cipher (top-right image) with the passport
holders details revealed in the decrypt as shown (bottom image). Note that this figure is
grey scale images of a colour GUI and colour images.
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the ‘weakest link’. In order to decipher or decode the hidden data it is necessary to know the
secret key [195]. Once the secret key is known, the watermark can be not only decoded, but
also easily estimated and removed from the content. In such a state of affairs, a decoder used
for copy protection has to be either put into operation as a tamper-proof device, or located
in a trusted third party [196]. These solutions are expensive and not necessarily plausible.
We used ICA to separate our 2D DataGlyph from the watermark itself. Of interest is
the fact that the 2D DataGlyph plays the role of a watermark and is created to mislead the
attacker who would try to crack the watermark typically as a watermark is normally broken.
This is done in the view that an attacker, not realizing that a different element had been
introduced, would be foiled.
We embedded a 2D Dataglyph as a watermark signature into a watermark. In case of
symmetric watermarks, the management of the keys is another challenge. This problem is
rectified by ensuring that a watermarker implements the key and only they alone know the
key. The 2D DataGlyph will have its own key, whist the image maker will have the original
image. Each will be separate and not shared amongst the others. The chances of all three
keys being found are then minimal. Within these parameters we used ICA to see if it is
possible to break the watermark.
The ICA technique extracts linearly independent distinctive parts from a data-set. Unlike
decorrelating data methods, ICA searches for directions in data-space which are independent
across all statistical orders [197]. ICA is capable of finding the underlying factors or sources
when classic methods fail completely [198]. The approach reported here has the advantage
of including a learning probabilistic model (as opposed to projections in data-space), while
remaining computationally efficient in high dimensions.
Independent Component Analysis is a computational technique for unraveling a mul-
tivariate signal into additive subcomponents under the assumption of mutual statistical
independence of non-Gaussian source signals. It is a special case of blind source separation
[200], [201] and [202]. ICA is a method of utilizing the process of computer power and statis-
tical techniques for illuminating secret influences which are embedded within sets of random
variables, measurements, or signals [197], [203]. ICA has the ability to examine data from
various kinds of application fields, as well as digital images, document databases, economic
indicators and psychometric measurements [198]. In numerous applications, the dimensions
are rendered as a set of parallel signals or time series; the expression blind source separation
is employed to differentiate this problem. Common examples are mixtures of simultaneous
speech signals that have been picked up by several microphones, brain waves recorded by
multiple sensors, interfering radio signals arriving at a mobile phone, or parallel time series
obtained from some industrial process [199]. Here, we used the ICA to see if it is be able to
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separate a 2D Dataglyph from a Watermark using the Delome model [204].
The data variables are linear mixtures of some unfamiliar latent variables, and the mix-
ing system is also unfamiliar [204]. The hidden variables are non-Gaussian and mutually
independent. They are called the independent components of the observed data [204]. The
sources are mixed and then separated into two sources. Delorme [204] uses the time series
of two independent sources A and B. Both sources are linearly mixed, i.e. added (or sub-
tracted) to produce a linear combination of the form aA + bB where a and b are assigned
coefficients. The ICA algorithm recovers the original sources A and B. Of import is the fact
that the algorithm cannot recover the exact amplitude of the sources. Note that ICA can
only extract sources that are combined linearly [199].
The focus of ICA is that it bestows unsupported grouping of multimedia data that has
shown to be well-aligned with manual grouping [145], [144], [143], [142], [141], [140], [139]
and [138] in different media.
5.9 Videos and Images
Extensive research has been contributed in which ICA is used in images and videos. Due to
the immensity of the literature in this area we give a conglomeration of applications.
5.9.1 Feature Extraction, Noise Reduction and Natural Scenes
A. Bell and T. Sejnowski [145] and J. H. van Hateren and D. L. Ruderman [142] contemplate
basic properties of natural scenes and demonstrate the application of ICA using Gabor-like
[174] localized and oriented spatial filters, which resembles receptive fields in the visual
cortex. Thus edges are the independent components of natural scenes. P. O. Hoyer and
A. Hyvarinen [151] enlarge on these thoughts by extracting features from stereo and color
images utilizing Gabor-like spatial filters. A. Hyvarinen [155] uses maximum autocorrelation
features which are identical to the Molgedey-Schuster ICA algorithm [175] for remote sensing
images and biological shape scrutiny. X. Zhou, B. Moghaddam, and T. S. Huang [154] use
ICA to factorize histograms. In order to detect the object within a cluttered space filled
scene with other objects, they use joint feature vectors with detection performance being the
result of ICA. K. Takaya and K. Y. Choi [156] show dual ICA applications for distinguishing
facial components in images contained in a video sequence. There objective is to chart and
identify facial features, such as the eyes and nose, onto a 3D wireframe model which are used
in face animation. A. Hyvarinen, [155] uses a sparse code shrinkage algorithm and combines
ideas of ICA with wavelet shrinkage to show different data techniques for noise modulation
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in images. This feature improves on the various approaches such as the Wiener filter, for
example.
5.9.2 Detection of Watermarks
Watermark recognition and removal is essential for verification of multimedia data partic-
ularly when disseminated over the Internet. S. Noel and H. Szu [157] including F. Sattar
D. Yu and K. K. Ma [158] have used ICA for uncovering and recognizing watermarks which
appear robust to major image processing attacks.
5.9.3 Content Based Image Retrieval
J. Eakins and M. Graham [176] state that image recovery, which is content driven, is a
difficult feature of multimedia investigation. Their reasoning is based on the limited com-
prehension which exists regarding the narrow understanding of the interactions of image
features and abstract content descriptions, i.e. it is difficult to explain content in terms of
intensity, edges and texture. The examples they use is Google, FAST Multimedia Search
engines, IBM’s QBIC system [177], the VIR Image Engine from Virage, Inc. [178] and Visual
Retrieval Ware product by Excalibur Technologies [179]. The foundation of repossessing or
salvaging images and text on these examples are based on image analysis. These techniques,
as well as the research prototypes discussed [180], [176], utilize immature image features for
recovery. Of interest is the fact that associated keywords and adjacent text is used to search
for an image. To conduct in depth data mining, more context text based tactics needs to
be implemented by using latent semantic indexing [160], [161] using statistical tools such as
the vector space approach and ICA extensions [138], [162].
5.9.4 Brain Data using Multimodal Interaction
T. P. Jung, S. Makeig, M. J. McKeown, A. Bell, T.-W. Lee, and T. Sejnowski [143] state that
a method to eradicate artifacts and separate graphics (EEG) and magnetoencephalographic
(MEG) is to use ICA. A comparable tactic used by V. D. Calhoun, T. Adali, L. K. Hansen,
J. Larsen, and J. J. Pekar[163] is proving invaluable for functional magnetic resonance brain
imaging (FMRI) data.
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5.10 Audio
Audio processing uses an on the spot mixing model which is disappointing because au-
dio/sound signals are convolved within their individual broadcasting auditory surroundings.
K. Torkkola [164] investigates various areas of blind separation of convolved signals. Torkkola
focuses on audio signals and related methods. A broad-spectrum benefit is that extra fea-
tures are needed. For example, S. Deerwester et al’s [181] speech signals can have a better
effect, or inserting L. C. Parra and C. V. Alvino’s [165] statistical independence with geo-
metric source location (beam forming). A major test is to coordinate the amount of audio
source separation tasks with the microphones which are usually less than the audio source.
A problem is that sound sources for listening purposes are difficult to extract and identify.
5.10.1 Auditory Evaluation
Natural sound signals are scrutinized by A. J. Bell and T. J. Sejnowski[144] and S. A.
Abdallah and M. D. Plumbley [141]. The areas they investigate relate to non-Gaussian
signals which emanate from radio stations which broadcast speech and classical music. There
output produces wavelets with standard time rate of recurrence which is comparable to a
human auditory structure. Multiple-cause neural networks are used by J. Klingseisen et al
[187].
5.10.2 Source Separation
ICA can be used to separate musical instruments using Saund’s method [183]. Automated
music dictation is investigated by M. D. Plumbley, S. A. Abdallah, J. P. Bello, M. E. Davies,
G. Monti, and M. B. Sandler [188] with the purpose of identifying instruments and notes
and recording the information in writing. The assimilation matrix holds each shape of every
musical note and the data of sparse coding together with Saund’s multiple cause method is
used [183]. S. Dubnov and A. Ben-Shalom [189] also look at the corresponding sound effects
needed to edit music notation and use MPEG-7 applications to hunt for similar patterns [146].
The Markov method in spectra arrays in sound media retrieval are investigated together
with ICA. M. Casey and A. Westner [166] use an Independent Subspace Analysis (ISA)
to take apart sounds from mixed channels. The ISA is an extention of ICA and works
by extrapolating a single channel onto a high-dimensional manifold. Dynamic component
channels all volatile source signals and they are able to separate speech and audio patterns.
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5.11 Text
Vector Space Methods (VSM) and Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) handle text. The various
ICA methods used in this arena search for various subjects [147], [167], [168]. Molegedey-
Schuster investigate [175] techniques and divides and sorts dynamic text data [139]. The
CNN.com Internet chat room text is one such area using this method. A. Kaban and M.
Girolami[184] use the Markov method which is almost the same. The complexity pursuit is
considered in [185] which is another method of similar value.
5.11.1 Document Recovery and Hybrid-Language
To search for hybrid-language (Gaelic/English) documents in a semantic space J. Klingseisen
and M. D. Plumbley[187] use an extension of the kernel ICA [186] of F. Bach and M. I. Jordan.
The recovery rate is highly improved.
5.11.2 Audio-Visual Separation
Dividing a scene is dealt with by Wang, et al[170]. They use MPEG-7[146] to deal with
audio-visual separation scene division. Other algorithms for separation and video archiving
are explored. T. Darrell, J. Fisher, P. Viola, and B. Freeman [171] and [172] and J. W.
Fisher, T. Darrell, W.T. Freeman, and P. Viola use a similar pattern of data in the audio-
visual material to find a common denominator. They compare the lip movements of the
speaker and other auditory signals [173]. A joint statistical method is used. P. Smaragdis
and M. Casey [148] stream audio/visual data and compare the output.
5.11.3 Assimilated Text/Image Removal
The Vector Space Model [159], [160] and [161] regarding the removal and understanding data
from images and the text is another manner for gathering information and extruding it. The
essential part of the canonical relationship research using ICA is investigated by T. Kolenda
et al [138] and A. Vinokourov et al [162].
5.12 ICA Method
The ICA requires at least n versions of the mixture of n signals in order to be able to
reasonably and reliably separate n signals. The method is applied to the process of protect-
ing authenticity of black and white documents. This is intended to demonstrate that this
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technology can be effectively used in the detection of fraudulent documents. We show that
this method can recover (although not perfectly) the original image, after being masked by
watermarking with a 2D DataGlyph. We then show that rescaling of the document does
not affect the method, except in dimensional extremes. Finally we show that if the original
watermark has been changed (tampered with) there is a low probability of recovering the
image.
ICA is applied to recover an original image from a mixture of images. A fast ICA
algorithm is used to process an image that requires an n×mmatrix of pixels. Black and white
images are processed as an image of n×m pixels. Colored images are n×m× p processed,
where p describes the components of colour. Colored images must first be converted into
black and white images before the processing can be applied.
The technique is investigated using the following steps:
Step 1: We embed the DataGlyph (on the image that has been watermarked) into a BMP
image file.
Step 2: The image is then processed. On completion of this process we obtain an image
composed of the following features: an original image, the watermark and the 2D DataGlyph.
Step 3. We then apply ICA to recover the original image from the mixed image in step two.
Figure 5.16 shows a typical example of applying these processing steps.
Typical parameters that can be changed are the number of rows or the number of columns
of the matrix processed by the ICA, the seed or ‘key’ used in the generation of the DataGlyph
and the key used to in the watermark process. Any change of parameters affects the ICA
recovery process.
When trying to measure the recovery rate of using ICA, it is possible to provide a
measure. There are two methods to measure the rate of recovery. The first is asymptotic
and the second is based on a probablity measure. If we consider that the outcome of using
ICA recovers a clear image once a 2D DataGlyph and a Watermark are added then from
probability theory we can consider that the probability of reconstructing the original image
using ICA is give by the nuber of ‘clean images’ generated using ICA divided by all possible
transformations that are not representative of the original image. The term ‘clean images’
specifies an image that is distinguishable and is visually recognisable as being the original
image after applying ICA. The topic of fuzzy logic can be applied in deciding whether the
ICA object is recognizable as the original.
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Figure 5.16: Original image (top-left), DataGlyph (bottom-left), texture map composed of
the original image (after resizing) and the DataGlyph (top-right), reconstruction (bottom-
right)
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5.13 Discussion
The ICA model has been used extensively to extract information from various multimedia
digital fields of investigation. Using asymmetrical assimilation of both cryptography and
watermarking applications including embedding a 2D DataGlyph within the algorithm makes
the extraction of data more difficult. We have offered a different method to both robust
and fragile watermarking, using ICA and the ability to discover hidden material within
the hidden material. The novel line of attack, founded on how data is extruded using the
latest data of extraction, namely ICA, shows a high rate of data removal. Our combination
of watermark and 2D DataGlyph was not able to be successfully broken and the rate of
robustness is positive. We have examined its performance on a set of representative images,
random messages and various attacks, and experiments show promising performance on
all the attacks examined. The main advantage of our approach is that, being based on
embedding information using statistically independent sources, the watermarking held up
against the latest method of data removal used. Based on local information and a linear
transform, our method is computationally efficient, and offers additional security in the use
of mixing and demixing matrices that are not easy to obtain. Further research may improve
the performance by refining existing statistical models or identifying a new approach for
selecting the IC’s to be watermarked or the distortion measures used (for instance a measure
based on the human visual system).
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Further Development
6.1 Introduction
In this thesis, we have developed a robust watermarking method for paper security. Unlike
traditional watermarking techniques, in this approach we can extract the hidden watermark
after a print/scan attack which is achieved by using the convolution and correlation processes
for coding and decoding respectively. This approach is chosen because of its compatibility
with the principles of physical optics involved in scanning of a document. The system is
secure in that it can not be attacked easily. First, the feature is not ‘suspicious’ as many
documents have a background texture. Second, the attacker does not know the algorithm
used to generate the diffused watermark. Even if the attacker does know the algorithm,
he/she must still know a significant amount of information before the system can be broken,
such as: the correct key, the diffusion operator type, the original image size.
6.2 Conclusions
Valuable paper documents are subject to misuse by criminals. This is largely due to the
dramatic improvement in personal computer hardware and peripheral equipment. Embed-
ding watermarks into a printed document is one way to secure them. The ability to extract
the watermark from a printed copy is generally useful to help establish ownership, authen-
ticity, and to establish the origin of an unauthorized disclosure. However, finding a robust
watermarking technique is a continuing challenge. This is due to extensive amount of noise
that is added when a document is printed and scanned. Moreover, printed documents do
not maintain their quality over time.
The basic approach developed for this thesis is compounded in the following. The wa-
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termark w is diffused (convolved) with a noise field n and placed into the background of a
covertext, typically a text document. The watermark is extracted by removing the covertext
f using a modified median filter. We then correlate the diffused watermark with the original
noise field. This process (i.e. coding and decoding) is compounded in the following formula:
w′ = F

Covertext removal︷ ︸︸ ︷
 Diffusion︷ ︸︸ ︷AweiθwAneiθn +f

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Confusion
−f
Ane−iθn
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Correlation

= F−1 {Aweiθw |An|2}
where w′ is the extracted watermark, Aw and An are the amplitude spectra of the watermark
and cipher respectively, θw and θn are the respective phase spectra. The extracted watermark
is a noisy version of the embedded watermark. This noise is due to the power spectrum
| An |2. In order to enhance the extracted watermark, we have to eliminate the power
spectrum term or at least minimize its effect. One way to do this is to divide the output
over the power spectrum during the diffusion step or correlation step. To avoid singularities,
we replace each and all zero in | An |2 by 1. Alternatively, we can choose n such that it has
a homogeneously distributed power spectrum across all frequencies, (such as white noise) or
pre-process n by replacing it’s amplitude spectrum with a constant value. However, these
conditions are restrictive and the regularisation method discussed above to avoid singularities
is both simple and effective.
The method is robust to a wide variety of attacks including geometric attacks, drawing,
crumpling and print/scan attacks. The method is relatively insensitive to lossy compression,
filtering, amplitude adjustments, additive noise and thresholding. The principal weakness of
the system is its sensitivity to rotation and cropping. This can be minimized by orienting the
document correctly and accurately before scanning and using automatic cropping software
which is available with selected scanners (e.g. Cannon scanners). Alternatively, introduction
of a frame provides a reference feature from which an accurate crop can be obtained.
The visibility of the diffused watermark and the compatibility of this system with the
physical principles of an imaging system, increase the robustness of the system and provided
a successful approach to the extraction of the watermark after scanning at low resolution.
Moreover, using correlation in the extraction phase increases the robustness of the system
to some important attacks such as translation and cropping (most likely to occur during a
scan).
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The system is secure in that it can not be attacked easily. First, the feature is not
‘suspicious’ as many documents have a background texture. Second, the attacker does not
know the algorithm used to generate the diffused watermark. Even if the attacker does know
the algorithm, he/she must still know a significant amount of information before the system
can be broken, such as: the correct key, the diffusion operator type, the original image size
and so on
6.3 Covert Encryption using Digital Image Steganog-
raphy
In terms of further developments, the principles discussed in this thesis can be used to de-
sign an entirely covert encryption system. By inputting any encrypted file as binary data,
we can generate a binary image (consisting entirely of pixels with values of 0 or 1). For
example, consider the plaintext Cryptology which is encrypted to provide the ciphertext string
ydr39bkLP9 and is equivalent to the 7-bit ASCII bit stream
11110011100100111001001100110111001
11000101101011100110010100000111001
This bit stream is converted into the 9×9 square image1 with zero padding being used
to complete the array as given below:
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The binary image is then diffused with a random image field and the output embedded in
a covertext through addition using a suitable diffusion-to-confusion ratio (suitable in the
sense that the binary image is recovered with no bit errors for the case when the difference
1The image does not necessarily need to be square and is used here for illustrative purposes only
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Figure 6.1: From top to bottom and from left to right (all images are 512×512): Binary
image of ciphertext, covertext (digital image), cipher, diffused image, stegotext after addition
of the diffused data (for a confusion-to-diffusion ratio of r = 0.01), reconstruction.
between the covertext and stegotext is insignificant). The size of the image that is required
to implement this method is related to the binary length of the ciphertext. Assuming that
the ciphertext and plaintext are of the same size (i.e. no padding is applied to the plaintext
before encryption), and, given that the average number of letters per word (in the English
language) is 6 (including the space), then a n2 binary image will provide for approximately
n2/(7× 6) words.
An example of using this approach is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The ‘watermark’ (top-
left) is a 512×512 binary image obtained from the ciphertext of a 6000 word document after
encryption with 7-bit ASCII binary conversion. The reconstruction is a bit-for-bit replica of
the input and can thus, be decrypted without error. The binary image is first converted back
into a bit stream (upto the point beyond which padding is applied) and each consecutive
7-bit block, converted back into the ciphertext which is then decrypted.
In order to enhance the cryptographic strength associated with approach, the cipher
shown in Figure 6.1 can be obtained from a genuine random number generator such as
HotBits (http://www.fourmilab.ch/hotbits/) and then encrypted (to secure the data file)
using a specified cryptosystem. Cleary, in addition to the receiver of the stegotext requiring
the facility to decrypt the reconstruction, in order to obtain this reconstruction, the receiver
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must have the cipher and the covertext. The covertext should be one of a database of images
maintained by both parties together with the cipher that is ideally stored in encrypted form.
Because the stegotext and covertext images look identical, the receiver can search through
the image data base to select the appropriate covertext. The whole point of this process is
that it provides a way of camouflaging the encrypted data during transmission, the difference
between sending the ciphertext and the stegotext being illustrated in Figure 6.1 as digital
images. However, in this process, a macro-key is required to be exchanged which is composed
of the following:
• the cipher
• the covertext database
• the decryption system
A covertext database is required for two reasons: (i) each time a transmission is undertaken,
it is safer to transmit a different stegotext in order not to alert a potential attacker to
multiple transmissions of the same data; (ii) a database of images should be stored rather
than a single image in order that no apparent significance is given to a single image should
the platform (i.e. PC or USB stick, for example) be compromised.
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